dax
A coding agent for the terminal. It reads, searches, edits and writes
files in your project and runs commands, asking you before it does
anything it should not do alone, and records every session so you can
list, resume, verify and export it. It runs against a local Ollama with
no setup, OpenAI, Anthropic or Gemini with a key, or Claude and Gemini on
Google Vertex AI with your gcloud login.
It is a thin product over a set of small Go libraries
(openresponses, agentturn, agentkit, agentpolicy,
agentsession and friends); docs/design.md says who
owns what.
dax is a minimal core meant to be extended. The session (the model,
the store, the policy, the workspace, AGENTS.md, MCP servers,
compaction) knows no tool. Everything the model can do comes from an
extension, and dax's own are extensions like any other: dax-coding
(the file tools and bash), dax-agents (the sub-agents), dax-skills
and dax-memory. A Go program runs dax with extensions of its own on
the same terms, or leaves one of dax's out; see
Building on dax.
Where the tools act is a value too. dax is meant to feel the same
whether its tools act on this machine or elsewhere: every tool, and
every check the policy makes of a call, goes through one workspace
interface, and this machine's directory is one implementation of it;
see Where the tools act.
Install
go install github.com/ChristopherDavenport/dax/cmd/dax@latest
# or, in a checkout
make install
Go 1.26 or later. With no flags dax talks to Ollama on
localhost:11434 and runs qwen3.5:9b.
dax # REPL in the current directory; Ctrl-C aborts a run in flight
dax -p "what is in go.mod" # one prompt, then exit
dax -provider anthropic # a hosted model
Providers and keys
-provider |
default model |
key (environment or api_key_command) |
-base-url |
ollama (default) |
qwen3.5:9b |
none |
default http://localhost:11434/v1; another Ollama host |
openai |
gpt-5 |
OPENAI_API_KEY |
not supported |
openrouter |
deepseek/deepseek-v4-pro-0813; sub-agents deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash |
OPENROUTER_API_KEY |
not supported |
openresponses |
none; -model is required |
the variable -api-key-env names, or none |
required |
anthropic |
claude-sonnet-5-5 |
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY |
not supported |
gemini |
gemini-2.5-pro |
GEMINI_API_KEY |
not supported |
vertex |
claude-sonnet-5-5 |
none; Google Application Default Credentials |
not supported |
A provider is a vendor: openai is OpenAI, and openrouter is
OpenRouter, whose models are named vendor/model. Any other server that
speaks the Open Responses (OpenAI Responses) API, such as vLLM, LM Studio
or a proxy, is openresponses, with its -base-url, a -model, and
-api-key-env naming the variable its key is in, if it takes one:
LITELLM_KEY=... dax -provider openresponses -base-url https://llm.internal/v1 -model qwen3-coder -api-key-env LITELLM_KEY
-model names another model. -subagent-model names the one the
sub-agents run; without it a sub-agent runs the provider's default for
sub-agents, where it has one, else the main model.
A missing key is an error before any request
is made: dax: openai: no API key: set OPENAI_API_KEY in the environment. dax reads keys from the environment and nowhere else (not
from a config file, not from a flag, so they stay out of ps and out of
a repository), and never prints one. The variable a key was read from is
removed from the environment of bash commands and MCP servers, whatever
it is called, unless pass_env names it.
For a key that expires, such as a short-lived access token, set
api_key_command in your config (or -api-key-command) to a program
that prints the key, in place of the variable:
{
"provider": "openresponses",
"base_url": "https://llm.internal/v1",
"model": "qwen3-coder",
"api_key_command": ["gcloud", "auth", "print-access-token"]
}
dax runs it without a shell when it starts, again once the key is five
minutes old, and again when the server answers 401 or 403, then sends
the refused request once more with the new key, so a long session
outlives any one key. Its output must be a single token of printable
ASCII, at most 16 KiB. It may take up to five minutes, long enough to
wait on a sign-in in a browser. Concurrent requests share one run. The
key is held in memory only: it is never written down or printed, and
never put in any environment, so bash commands and MCP servers cannot
see it. It is for the providers that take a key (not ollama or
vertex), and is one source or the other with api_key_env.
-api-key-command "" turns off a command your config sets.
When the command fails, or the server refuses even a fresh key, the
turn ends with an error that starts authentication failed and carries
the last line the command wrote to standard error. A failure is not
retried and the command is not run again for a few seconds, so a
helper that cannot sign in is not run over and over; send the prompt
again once you have signed in. The REPL and -p show the command's
standard error as it runs; the terminal client keeps it for the error,
so it does not draw over the screen. To have the error say how to sign
in, set api_key_login to a URL or a command:
"api_key_command": ["my-token-helper", "print"],
"api_key_login": "my-token-helper login"
gives authentication failed; sign in with my-token-helper login, then try again (...). dax only shows it; it does not open or run it.
A server may group a client's calls by session, or key its prompt cache
on the session, and record which client called. session_header names
the header each model call carries its session's ID in, and
client_header the header that carries dax/ and dax's version:
"session_header": "X-Session-Id",
"client_header": "X-Client"
The ID is that of the session the call is recorded in: a sub-agent's
calls carry the sub-agent's own session, and after /clear the new
session's. A request made outside a run, such as asking the vendor what
a model supports, carries none. Each must be a header name of letters,
digits and hyphens, not one the client sets itself (Authorization,
X-Api-Key, Content-Type and the like), and the two must differ.
They are not for vertex.
Ollama, OpenAI, OpenRouter and openresponses use the openresponses
client; Anthropic and Gemini use its provider adapters.
vertex is Google Vertex AI, which serves Claude and Gemini behind one
project and login. Each request goes to the Anthropic adapter for a
claude- model and to the Gemini adapter for a gemini- model, so the
main agent and the sub-agents can run different families and /model
can move between them; any other model name is refused. It takes no
key: it authenticates with Application Default Credentials
(gcloud auth application-default login, or
GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS). It reads Google Cloud's usual settings
from the environment: the project from GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT, falling
back to the credentials' own project, and the location from
GOOGLE_CLOUD_LOCATION (or GOOGLE_CLOUD_REGION), such as global or
us-east5.
gcloud auth application-default login
export GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT=my-project GOOGLE_CLOUD_LOCATION=global
dax -provider vertex -model claude-opus-5-5 -subagent-model gemini-3.5-flash
Vertex publishes no model capabilities, so what dax knows is read off
the model ID's generation, from what Vertex accepted from each model:
| models |
efforts |
so |
Claude before 4.6 (claude-haiku-4-5, claude-opus-4-5) |
none |
reasoning is off; the adapter sends an effort as adaptive thinking, which they do not take |
| Claude 4.6 |
none to high |
xhigh asks for high |
| Claude 4.7 to 5 |
not described |
sent as configured |
| Claude 5.5 and later |
minimal to xhigh |
-think=false asks for minimal: they refuse the way the adapter turns thinking off |
| Gemini |
low to high |
none and minimal ask for low, xhigh for high |
What the model takes
At start dax asks the vendor what the model supports and shows it under
the banner, model: reasoning low–max, always on · default high · 1M context · 128k out (openrouter). Anthropic and Gemini are asked through
their model endpoints, OpenRouter through its public catalogue (fetched
once, without the key) and Ollama through /api/show; OpenAI and an
openresponses server publish nothing, and nothing is shown.
The reasoning effort dax asks for is then fitted to the answer: an
effort the model does not take becomes the nearest one it does, and dax
says so once, [qwen3-coder:30b: reasoning effort low is not accepted; asking for none (ollama)]. So -think on a model that cannot reason
turns reasoning off instead of failing, and -think=false on one that
always reasons asks for its least effort. The fitting is done where each
configuration is made (the main agent's, the sub-agents', a fold's
summary, /think and /model), never to a request on its way out, so
the session records the effort that was sent. When the vendor cannot be
asked, or does not know the model, the effort is asked for as
configured. -think (default on)
asks for the -effort (minimal, low by default, medium, high or
xhigh) with summaries and shows the reasoning; -think=false turns
reasoning off. The effort is fitted like any other, so medium on a model
that takes only low and high asks for low.
Sub-agents
The main agent can start sub-agents, each a run of its own on the
sub-agent model, recorded as a child session:
-
explore investigates without changing anything (read, glob, grep, ls
and bash) and returns a written answer.
-
task carries out a coding task with the file tools and bash, then
reports what it changed, what it ran and what is left. Its instructions
are dax's, your instructions_file and the AGENTS.md chain, without
skills or memory. The main agent chooses, per call:
context: fresh (the default) sees only the brief, so the brief
must be complete; fork also sees the conversation so far, for a
task that depends on what was said or decided in it.
model: subagent (the default) runs the sub-agent model; main
runs the main model, for a task that needs it.
Each call reads /think and /model as they stand: main is the
model /model last chose, and with no subagent_model configured the
sub-agents run it too.
A fork's conversation is recorded in the child session as its own
opening items, so the child verifies like any session. On OpenRouter
the defaults were the cheapest in a trial: a fresh Flash sub-agent
cost about a twentieth of a Pro one at the same pass rate, and a Pro
fork about twice a fresh Pro task.
Several calls in one turn run at once, so the main agent can hand out
independent pieces of work in parallel. Writes and edits take a
workspace lock, so two sub-agents editing one file cannot lose an edit,
though they can still make changes that do not fit together; the
sub-agent is told to change only the files its task is about.
Both are offered by default; -agents=false or "agents": false
turns them off. They are the dax-agents extension, which ships an
allow rule for starting one, since what a sub-agent then does is decided
call by call by the same policy.
Config
Settings come from three layers, each overriding the one before:
~/.config/dax/config.json ($XDG_CONFIG_HOME/dax/config.json; -config path names another)
.dax/config.json in the working directory, read through the workspace, which can only tighten the policy
- flags
{
"provider": "anthropic",
"model": "claude-sonnet-5-5",
"base_url": "",
"think": true,
"effort": "high",
"instructions_file": "~/.config/dax/instructions.md",
"skills_dirs": ["~/skills"],
"memory_dir": "~/.dax/memory",
"pricing_file": "~/.config/dax/prices.json",
"mcp_servers": {
"fs": { "command": "mcp-server-filesystem /home/me/notes" }
},
"policy": {
"builtin": true,
"fallback": "ask",
"allow": ["bash(make:*)", "write(docs/**)"],
"ask": ["bash(go test -race:*)"],
"deny": ["bash(git push --force:*)"]
}
}
model, subagent_model, base_url, api_key_env, api_key_command, api_key_login, session_header and client_header belong to the provider in force
where they are set. A later layer that switches the provider leaves them
behind, so with "model": "qwen3-coder:30b" in your config,
dax -provider openrouter runs OpenRouter's default model rather than
asking OpenRouter for an Ollama one; -model beside -provider names
another.
Every field is optional. The files are strict: an unknown field, a bad
provider, a malformed URL or a rule that does not parse is an error that
names the file and the field.
| field |
meaning |
provider, model, subagent_model, base_url, think, effort |
as above; base_url is for ollama and openresponses |
agents |
offer the explore and task sub-agents; default true |
api_key_env |
the variable holding the openresponses provider's key (the name, never the key) |
api_key_command |
a program and its arguments, ["program", "arg", ...], that prints the provider's key; run again as the key ages or is refused (see above) |
api_key_login |
how to sign in again, a URL or a command, shown when api_key_command fails or its key is refused; one line, at most 500 bytes |
session_header |
the header each model call carries its session's ID in, for a server that groups calls by session (see above) |
client_header |
the header each model call carries dax/<version> in, for a server that records which client called |
instructions_file |
your own instructions, added to the system prompt after dax's; a relative path is relative to the file that names it |
skills_dirs |
more skill directories, after .dax/skills and ~/.dax/skills; one that does not exist is an error |
agents_md_global |
your own instruction files for every session, whatever the repository holds, such as an AGENTS.md in a directory above your checkouts: read on this machine after ~/.dax/AGENTS.md and before the repository's AGENTS.md chain, in order; a missing one is skipped; a relative path is relative to the file that names it |
memory_dir |
where the model's memory lives; "" turns memory off. Default ~/.dax/memory |
pricing_file |
a JSON file of model prices ("model": {"input","cached","output"} in USD per million tokens), used by the terminal client's status line and session pane to show cost; without it the client shows token usage but no cost |
mcp_servers |
stdio MCP servers by name; the name prefixes their tools, mcp__<name>__<tool>; command is split as executor's string is |
max_read_bytes |
the most bytes of a file read scans per call and edit will rewrite; default 2 MiB (use grep to find a line later in a bigger file) |
pass_env |
credential-looking variables bash commands and MCP servers may inherit, by name (default none) |
executor |
{"command": "docker exec -i box dax execute -root /work"}: run the tools, and the MCP servers, in dax execute started by that command (see below). command is a command line, split as a shell splits words ('…', "…", \) with nothing expanded (no $VAR, ~ or globs), or an array, ["docker", "exec", "-i", "box", "dax", "execute", "-root", "/my work"], used exactly; no shell runs either |
executor.pass_env |
variables, credentials included, that only the command starting the executor is given, by name: SSH_AUTH_SOCK for ssh's agent, the token a kubectl credential plugin reads. bash and MCP servers never get them, here or in the sandbox; the model's key may not be one. It may be set without command, for a -executor given each time |
policy |
see below |
A project's .dax/config.json comes from a repository, not from you, so
it can only tighten. It may add ask and deny rules to policy
(no allow, and no ! carve-out of any rule), set "builtin": false to
drop the shipped allow rules (their asks and denies stay), and set
"fallback" to ask or deny when
that is stricter than yours. It cannot bring back what you dropped or
loosen what you set, and its rules rank below yours so they cannot cancel
one of yours. It may not set provider, model, subagent_model, base_url, api_key_env, api_key_command, api_key_login, session_header, client_header, think, effort, agents,
instructions_file, skills_dirs, agents_md_global, memory_dir, pricing_file, mcp_servers or executor: dax
refuses the file with an error naming the field and saying to put it in
your own config. (Where the model runs, what it is told and remembers, and
what programs start are decisions that send your code, your files and your
keys somewhere; a repository does not get to make them.)
| flag |
|
-provider, -model, -subagent-model, -base-url, -api-key-env, -think, -effort |
override the config |
-api-key-command 'program arg ...' |
overrides api_key_command, split as a shell splits words with nothing expanded; "" turns it off, and api_key_login with it |
-api-key-login hint |
overrides api_key_login |
-session-header name, -client-header name |
override session_header and client_header; "" turns one off |
-config path |
the user config file |
-memory dir |
memory directory; off or empty disables it |
-executor 'command ...' |
overrides executor: the command line that starts dax execute where the tools act, split as a shell splits words (-root "/my work") with nothing expanded; "" clears it |
-executor-pass-env NAME,NAME |
overrides executor.pass_env; "" clears it |
-pricing-file path |
JSON file of model prices for the terminal client's session cost |
-no-policy |
run every tool call without asking; ignores the config's policy |
-front tui|repl |
the front end; default tui when standard input and output are both terminals and a session is recorded, repl otherwise (so -sessions "" gives the REPL); -front tui without a terminal or a session store is refused; -p always prints |
-v |
the terminal client prints its start lines before it takes the screen and what dax noted during the run after it exits; without it, only the executor's line and warnings before, and warnings that came while it had the screen and the resume command after |
-agents-md-global 'a.md:b.md' |
overrides agents_md_global, split on : as PATH is, so a path may hold a space; "" clears it |
-agents-md, -skills, -trust-skills |
the AGENTS.md files (~/.dax/AGENTS.md, agents_md_global and the repository's chain), skills, and a skill's allowed-tools running unasked until the next message, for skills in ~/.dax/skills and skills_dirs only, never the repository's |
-compact N, -compact-server |
fold the transcript above N estimated tokens, locally or through the server; without -compact, N is three quarters of the model's context window when the vendor reports the window, and compaction is off when it does not; -compact 0 turns it off |
-mcp "cmd" |
one more stdio MCP server, as mcp__cli__<tool>; split as -executor is |
-agents |
offer the explore and task sub-agents (default on; -agents=false turns them off) |
-sessions dir, -sync append|response|never |
the session store (-sessions "" disables recording) and when appends are durable |
| tool |
what it does |
read |
numbered lines of a file, with offset and limit |
write |
create or replace a file, making parent directories |
edit |
replace one exact occurrence of a string |
glob |
paths matching a doublestar pattern (**/*.go, cmd/*/main.go, *.{md,txt}), sorted |
grep |
a regular expression over files: path, include (a glob), ignore_case, max_results; prints path:line:text |
ls |
one directory, sorted, directories with /, files with their size |
bash |
a command in the working directory with a timeout; runs one at a time, its output reported as progress while it runs |
The file tools are confined to the working directory. A path that is
absolute outside it, climbs out with .., or goes out through a
symbolic link is refused. bash is not confined (a shell reaches what you
reach); the policy is what stands in front of it. glob and grep skip
.git, node_modules, vendor, .venv, __pycache__ and similar trees
by name; there is no .gitignore support. Search a skipped directory by
naming it as path.
Environment of commands and servers
Commands the bash tool runs and the MCP servers dax starts do not get
your credentials. A variable is removed from their environment if its
name ends in _KEY, _KEY_ID, _PAT, _PWD, _JWT, _CREDENTIALS,
_AUTH, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _PASSWORD or _API_KEY, contains
PASSWORD or SECRET, is one of PASSWORD, TOKEN, API_KEY,
SECRET_KEY, DATABASE_URL, SSH_AUTH_SOCK, PGPASSWORD, MYSQL_PWD or
a provider or CI token by name (OPENAI_API_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN, ...), or
holds a URL with user:password@ in it. So a test, a build script or a
server cannot read them, and cannot use your ssh agent.
Variables that hold the path of a credential file pass through, since
a program that needs its file needs them: GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS,
KUBECONFIG, DOCKER_CONFIG, NETRC, AWS_SHARED_CREDENTIALS_FILE,
AWS_CONFIG_FILE, CLOUDSDK_CONFIG, PGPASSFILE. The files are as
readable to a command as they are to you. dax has no setting to withhold
them; unset one before starting dax to keep it from commands.
A command that needs a scrubbed variable (gh, a private module proxy)
gets it by name from your config: "pass_env": ["GITHUB_TOKEN"]. Only
your own config can say that.
dax execute serves dax's tools over MCP on its standard input and
output, from inside the place they should act: a container, a VM,
another host. It runs no model, no policy and no session. A session
elsewhere decides each call under its own policy and sends it there to
run: start that session with -executor (or "executor" in your
config) set to the command that starts dax execute.
dax -executor 'docker exec -i box dax execute -root /work -kind container -ref box'
docker exec -i box dax execute -root /work -kind container -ref box
ssh build-host dax execute -root /home/me/src/app
kubectl exec -i pod/agent -- dax execute -root /work -kind container -ref pod/agent
docs/sandbox.md has recipes for daily use: an image
with dax in it, each launcher, the config, what to check and what does
not work yet.
The pipe is the credential: whoever started the process is its one
client. There is no listener, no port and no token. Since no policy
runs in it, anyone who can start it can run whatever its tools run,
which is no more than anyone who can already docker exec or ssh
there.
| Flag |
Default |
|
-root |
the current directory |
where the tools act |
-max-read-bytes |
2 MiB |
as max_read_bytes |
-pass-env |
none |
comma-separated variables to pass to commands though they look like credentials, as pass_env |
-kind |
remote |
the workspace's kind as the session records it: local, container or remote |
-ref |
this host's name |
the workspace's ref as the session records it: an image, a host, a pod |
It reads no config file: the sandbox holds the files it would read,
and the policy is the session's. Commands get its environment with
credentials removed, as under a session; the model's key is never sent
to it.
It serves the tools of every extension that has them: dax-coding's,
and a program built on dax.Main serves its own as <name> execute,
less those it leaves out with WithoutExtension. Sub-agents, skills
and memory are the session's and stay where it runs. The tools served
are the tools themselves, so what a call would touch is read there, in
the sandbox's files, and the stamp that holds an allowed call to what
was decided is made and checked there, under that process's own key: a
stamp made anywhere else is refused, and a file tool's path that
became a link since the decision is caught where the file is. What MCP has no field for
crosses beside the tools: agenttool's _meta (facts and replay claims,
sequential, resource), its execution/facts method, and the
experimental capability io.github.christopherdavenport.dax/executor
with the descriptor, the extensions, each tool in order with its
extension, read-only, facts and strict, and where its files are read. A
running command's output arrives as progress, and a tool's question
reaches the session.
It also serves the workspace's files, read-only, so the session reads
the project where the project is: MCP resources under the template
dax-workspace:///{op}{?path}, where op is stat, lstat,
readdir, readlink or read and path a name relative to the root
(. for the root itself), percent-encoded. Every name goes through the
workspace's own confinement: one that is absolute, climbs out with ..
or leads out through a link is refused, and nothing is written. A read
gives at most 1 MiB of a regular file (the bound on a project's config
and a skill's file) and refuses a larger one, a directory or a FIFO; a
listing gives at most 10,000 entries. The reply is one JSON document,
with a refusal's kind (notexist, outside, invalid, permission
or other) in it, so the session sees the same errors a read of its
own directory would give.
It can start a process for the session, a process that lives longer
than one call with pipes to it, as the session's own machine starts an
MCP server: dax-specific JSON-RPC methods, dax/process.start,
.write, .read, .closeStdin, .signal, .wait and .close,
named in the capability's start field. They are not tools, so another
harness connected to dax execute is offered no tool that runs a
command, and nothing in the sandbox (its files, a project's config, a
tool) makes it start one: it starts only what its one client asks for
and keeps no list of its own. A process starts at the root (or a
directory under it) with the environment commands get; each session has
its own processes, at most 32 open at once, and an id another session
started is refused; a write is at most 1 MiB and a read's reply at most
64 KiB; standard error it holds unread is bounded, and past the bound
dropped. When the session's connection closes, or a signal stops dax execute, every process it started for the session ends with it. A
session started with -executor runs its MCP servers this way.
With -executor, the session starts the command with this machine's
environment less its credentials, but those pass_env and
executor.pass_env name, and never the model's key's variable, so the
key stays here. What the command and dax execute write to standard
error is cleaned; while the terminal client has the screen it is held
with dax's other warnings and printed when the client exits. It refuses a
program that is not a dax executor (no facts method, no capability, a
capability of another version, or tools the capability does not name),
and checks the tools against what it would have built: every extension
with tools must be one the executor runs. Each call is decided here, on
what the executor says it would touch; when the executor cannot say (its
claim fails, a reading takes longer than 30 seconds, the executor is
gone) the call is blocked, never allowed. The banner and the record name
the executor's workspace, and the model is told its root.
The MCP servers run in the sandbox too: every one in your config's
mcp_servers, -mcp and /mcp add starts in dax execute, at its
root and with the environment its commands get, never on this machine.
Which servers start is yours alone to say: the executor keeps no list
and reads no config, and a project's .dax/config.json may not name
one. Their tools are mcp__<name>__<tool> as anywhere, decided here by
name under your rules (they ask by default; an MCP server's tools make
no claim of what they would touch), and recorded here. Their standard
error comes back cleaned, and /mcp remove, the session's end or the
executor's end stops them. An executor too old to start a process (dax
v0.0.8 or earlier) fails a session that has an MCP server, and /mcp add, with "update dax execute where it runs"; the server is not started
here in its place.
The project's files are the executor's, read through it and not from
this directory: the root's AGENTS.md, .dax/skills and
.dax/config.json. They are screened as a local project's are: an
AGENTS.md that is a link out of the workspace, and a skills directory
with a link out of it, are left out with an omitted: line. Nothing
above the executor's root is read, from either machine, even when it
says it is a local directory. The project's config is read once the
executor is connected (your config and the flags say which executor; a
project's file cannot) and, as anywhere, can only tighten the policy;
one that cannot be read (a link out, over 1 MiB, the executor gone or
answering none of it within 30 seconds) stops the start, since leaving
it out would drop rules that only tighten. An executor whose files
cannot be read at all when the session starts stops it too; a single
AGENTS.md or skills directory that cannot be read is left out and
reported, as on this machine. Your own ~/.dax/AGENTS.md,
agents_md_global and skills are read here as usual. An executor from
dax v0.0.6, which does not serve its files, is refused: update dax
where it runs.
What -executor does not do yet:
- Only a command: an
http:, https: or unix: address is refused.
Standard output carries MCP and nothing else. While it serves,
os.Stdout is standard error, so a stray print from a tool cannot
corrupt the stream; commands get no standard input and their output is
captured. Logs and errors go to standard error.
Policy
Each tool call is decided by rules: deny, then ask, then
allow, then the fallback (ask). A rule is a tool name, or a name
with a specifier: read, bash(go test:*), write(docs/**). Bash,
Read and Edit are accepted as the reference's names. For bash the
specifier is matched against the command; go test:* means go test and
anything after it at a word boundary, so it matches go test ./... and
not go testing.
dax ships this default, as the rules of its extensions (a verdict names
the one whose rule decided it: extension:dax-coding, say):
- runs without asking:
read, glob, grep, ls and the read-only
bash commands listed below (dax-coding's), explore and task
(dax-agents'), skill (dax-skills') and memory_search (dax-memory's);
- asks:
write, edit, every other command, memory writes, and every
MCP tool. go test, go build, go vet and go list ask: they run the
repository's code (a TestMain, cgo, a vet tool), so a hostile
repository would run code as you on the model's say-so.
What runs without asking is a safe subset, not a blacklist. A bash
call is auto-allowed only when it parses in a strict subset of the syntax
and every part of it is a command dax knows to be read-only, with
arguments that are.
The syntax: words of letters, digits and _ . / : @ % + , = - (and ~
or ^ inside a word, as in HEAD~1), single-quoted strings, and
double-quoted strings with no $, backtick or backslash; the operators
&& and |; at the end of a command 2>&1, 2>/dev/null or
>/dev/null as a separate word; and * or ? in the arguments of ls.
Anything else, ;, &, ||, <, any other >, #, $, backtick,
backslash, parentheses, braces, [, a newline, = in the command word, a
non-ASCII byte, asks. It is never denied for that.
The commands (&& joins any of them; after a | only head, tail,
wc, sort, uniq, cut and grep, with flags from a short list and no
file arguments):
git status, diff, log, show, branch (listing forms only, a name
only with --list), rev-parse, ls-files, remote (-v only), blame,
stash list, tag (listing forms only), describe, shortlog and
config --get of one key that holds no secret (user.name, user.email,
core.autocrlf, branch.*.remote, remote.*.url, ...; not --list,
--get-regexp, --global, --system, http.* or credential.*), with read-only
flags from an allowlist, including combined short flags (-sb) and
space-separated values (-n 5, --author x, -S foo). Not
--output, -o, --ext-diff, --textconv, -c, -C, --git-dir,
--no-index, or %G in a format.
ls (listing flags; a glob is expanded and checked), pwd, go version,
go env NAME.
cat, head, tail, wc and grep (not recursive) on named files.
Each file must be a regular file inside the working directory no larger
than max_read_bytes (default 2 MiB), checked when the call is decided,
and what bash returns is capped at 50 KiB however big it is; grep -r
asks, use the grep tool.
cd <directory inside the workspace> && ...: the directory is checked,
and what follows is checked relative to it.
The arguments: every path stays inside the working directory with links
resolved and no .. component at all, and no git revision or pathspec
contains a : (HEAD:file and :/file name what is in the repository,
which may be above the working directory).
git: before a git command runs unasked, dax asks git for the config it
would use (git config --list --show-scope). If the repository's own
config, or anything it includes, names a program (filter.*.clean,
smudge or process, diff.*.textconv or command, core.askPass,
editor, gitProxy, attributesFile, remote.*.uploadpack or
receivepack, credential.helper, merge.*.driver, pager.*,
protocol.*.allow = always, ...), moves the work tree (core.worktree),
is bare, sets an extension, or runs a submodule update command, or if a
submodule's own config names a program, the call asks and the question
names the key. It also asks when .git is a file or a link, or when git's
own answer for the repository (rev-parse) is not the workspace's
ancestor chain: a hand-built .git can point git at another repository or
at your home directory. Your own global and system config are trusted. The
auto-allowed run switches off the rest: no fsmonitor, pager, ssh command or
hooks, the gpg programs are /bin/false, --no-ext-diff --no-textconv
are added to diff, log and show, and go runs with
GOTOOLCHAIN=local. What an auto-allowed command prints has the
user:token@ of any URL replaced by ***@. A command you approve runs as
you would run it, hooks and GIT_CONFIG_* included.
What was decided is what runs: the policy stamps an auto-allowed call with
the plan it approved and the files it was decided on, and the bash tool runs
a stamped call only if the line still analyses to that plan on those files.
If a file, where a path leads (notes.txt is now a link to .env) or the
repository's config changed in between, the call fails with "the command
changed since it was allowed; ask again", and the original line is never
run instead. A line outside the subset that writes through a redirect
(echo x > notes) is never auto-allowed, but once you approve it (or a
rule allows it) it is stamped with the files its redirects write, and it
runs as typed only while they are still those files: a target that
became a link to .env after your yes is refused the same way. Only dax
can stamp a call; one the model stamps is refused. ls with a glob runs with the
expansion after a --, so a file called -n is a name.
Secret-looking files ask (any case, and under any name: a link to one is
decided under its target as well): reading .env*, *.pem, *.key, id_*,
*.p12, *.pfx, .npmrc, .netrc, .pgpass, .git-credentials,
credentials*, *secret*, .aws/**, .ssh/**, .kube/config or
.docker/config.json (at the root or in any directory) asks, whether by
read, grep, glob or ls or by cat, head, tail, wc, grep
and git show, log, diff or blame of the path: the stage is decided
as a read of it. Name the path to open one, in your own config:
"allow": ["read(.env)"] (or Read(config/*.pem)) allows it for every
tool, cat .env included, and only that. A bare "allow": ["read"] does
not open them: an ask beats an allow. This is a guard on naming a file, not
a boundary: a search of the whole tree (grep -r, the grep tool with no
path) can still read one, and so can anything you approve.
A line with git in it asks if the repository names a program, whatever
else is on it: when a line is not auto-allowed (a stage your own rule
allowed, say echo, beside git status) it runs as typed, without the
auto-allow environment, so the repository's core.fsmonitor, hooksPath,
sshCommand, pager and gpg program count as well, and the question names
the key.
A command outside the subset is still cut into its parts, so a deny or ask
rule for rm reaches git status; rm x, a redirect to a file is decided
as a write of the file it opens, and the question names the part it is
asking about. The target is read as a file tool's path is: normalised from
the directory the line is in (after a plain cd DIR, and from the root as
well), and through its links, so "deny": ["write(.env)"] refuses
echo x > notes when notes is a link to .env, and
cd sub && echo x > ../.env. A target whose links the workspace cannot
read, or that leads out of it, adds a subject no rule names; one bash
expands ($HOME/x, ~/x, a glob) is decided as its text.
The cut is for the question and for deny and ask rules. Nothing is allowed
because of it: a command outside the subset is allowed only by a bare
bash allow rule or "fallback": "allow". Inside the subset a command
the list above does not govern (make, rm) is for your rules, one stage
at a time.
Trusting go test for your own repositories. Put the rule in your
user config, ~/.config/dax/config.json, never a repository's (a
project file's allow rules are ignored):
{ "policy": { "allow": ["bash(go test:*)", "bash(go vet:*)", "bash(go build:*)"] } }
It applies to every repository you open, so only add what you would run
by hand in any of them. Each call is still one simple command: go test ./... && rm -rf x asks, as does go test ./... > out, and an arbitrary
-exec, -toolexec or -vettool is yours to decide: tighten with
"ask": ["bash(go test -exec:*)", "bash(go build -toolexec:*)", "bash(go vet -vettool:*)"]
(the -o and -coverprofile flags write files and are worth asking about
too).
Your rules in policy add to the default. Because deny beats ask beats
allow, allow what the default asks about ("allow": ["write(docs/**)"])
and ask or deny what it allows. An ask the extensions ship, such as the
one for a secret-looking path, holds against a plain allow of yours: lift
it with a carve-out ("ask": ["deploy(!staging)"]) or, for the file
tools, an allow that names the path ("allow": ["read(.env)"]).
"builtin": false drops the shipped allow rules, so only your rules
allow anything; the shipped asks and denies stay. "fallback": "allow"
or "deny" changes what a call no rule names does.
Path rules (read(.env), write(docs/**), Read(secrets/**)) are written relative to the working directory and match the path after cleaning, so ./.env, a/../.env and the absolute path all meet the rule for .env, and docs/../.git/x is .git/x. Links are not followed for matching; the tools' own confinement still refuses one that leaves. glob, grep and ls are matched on the directory they search (default .), not on their pattern, and a rule for a directory should name dir and dir/**. A path rule is not a read ACL for a search that includes the directory from above.
An asked call prints ? allow bash {"command":"..."} (reason) [y/N].
Your answer is recorded in the session as a person's.
Security model
dax gives a model the ability to read your files, change them and run
commands, so what it does and does not stand between the model and your
machine matters.
What dax does
- Asks by default. Every call that is not on a short allow list asks
you first: writes, edits, every command that is not one simple read-only
command, memory writes and every MCP tool. Your answer is recorded.
- Auto-allows a small, checked set. The read-only tools (
read,
glob, grep, ls, confined to the working directory) and bash lines
that parse in a safe subset of the syntax (simple commands joined by
&& and |, with a few trailing redirects) and whose every part is a
read-only git, ls, cat/head/tail/wc/grep on named files, pwd,
go version/go env NAME or cd into the workspace, with arguments
that pass a per-command check and paths that stay inside the working
directory (no .., links resolved). It is an allow-list of what is safe,
not a list of what is dangerous: anything dax does not recognise asks.
git is asked what its config would run first. go test, go build and
go vet run the repository's code and are not on it.
- Confines the file tools. Paths outside the working directory,
.., and symbolic links that lead out are refused, by the operating
system's rooted open rather than by string checks.
- Treats the repository as untrusted. Its
.dax/config.json can only
tighten the policy; it cannot choose the provider, model or endpoint,
add instructions, skills, memory or MCP servers, or allow anything.
Its "builtin": false drops only allow rules, never an ask or a deny.
Its AGENTS.md, .dax/skills and .dax/config.json are read through
the workspace, so one that is a symbolic link out of it is refused as
a tool's read would be: an AGENTS.md or .dax/skills is left out
and reported, and a .dax/config.json is an error. A .dax/skills
holding a link that leads outside it, even into the workspace, is left
out too, since the skill tool reads without asking. A read of a file
of the repository's skills, the instructions included, is held to
read's asks and denies on the file's name in the workspace and where
its links lead, so a .dax/skills that is itself a link elsewhere in
the workspace (-> .., -> ../config) does not read a .env without
read(.env)'s question, and your deny read(config/**) refuses it.
An allow of read(...) never allows such a read; the skill tool's own
rule does. The skills you installed are read unasked. Path rules match
the path after normalisation, so docs/../.git/x is not under docs/**.
- Keeps credentials away from what it starts. Bash commands and MCP
servers get your environment without
*_API_KEY, *_TOKEN,
*_SECRET and the like unless your config names a variable. Keys are
read from the environment or from your own api_key_command, and
never printed.
- Bounds resource use.
read scans at most 2 MiB a call, grep
skips big and non-regular files, search patterns cannot run away, and
git runs with the repository's fsmonitor, pager and diff programs
switched off.
- Keeps its records private. The session store and memory are
created
0700; terminal control sequences in tool output and model text
are stripped.
What dax does not do
- There is no sandbox. A command you approve runs with all your
privileges, and a command that is auto-allowed is only as safe as the
checks above.
bash reaches files outside the working directory
(approved commands are not confined, and the read-only allow list
checks paths but cannot see what a program does with them). If you
need a boundary, run dax in a container or VM.
- A prompt injection can still ask. A file, a web page, an MCP
tool's output or an
AGENTS.md can tell the model what to do. dax
makes the dangerous steps ask; it cannot make you read the question.
Read what you approve, especially a compound command, a write to
.git/hooks, .dax/, AGENTS.md or .github/, and anything that
sends data out.
- Your own
allow rules are yours. "allow": ["write"] lets a
model write .git/hooks/pre-commit; bash(go test:*) runs a hostile
repository's tests with your privileges. Prefer narrow rules, and put
deny or ask rules for the sensitive paths beside them.
- Committed secrets are not caught. The secret-path asks fire when a
file is named.
git log -p, git show and git diff without a path,
grep over the tree and git show HEAD~5 print what a repository
holds, and a .env or key that was ever committed is in it. Keep
secrets out of history (and rotate one that got in); dax cannot tell
which lines of a diff are keys.
-trust-skills trusts the skills in directories you named
(~/.dax/skills and your config's skills_dirs) and never the
repository's: a skill in .dax/skills is text from the repository, and
its allowed-tools are withheld, so it cannot run anything unasked.
- The provider sees what the model reads. Files and command output go
to the model's provider (OpenAI, OpenRouter and whichever upstream it
routes to, Anthropic, Google, your Ollama host, or the
openresponses
server you named). Choose the provider with that in mind; a path rule is not a read
ACL for a search that includes the directory from above.
- The sub-agents are governed like the parent: every call
explore
or task makes is decided by the same rules (your denies, the
secret-path asks, path rules, the auto-allow list), and one that asks is
put to you, from inside the sub-agent's run. A task can write, so with
"fallback": "allow" it writes unasked, as the main agent would.
- Not covered: programs the user's own git config names (it is
trusted), a race between dax checking a path and the command using it,
credential-file path variables such as
KUBECONFIG (they pass through to
commands), and denial of service by a model that loops (use Ctrl-C).
The terminal client
On a terminal, dax opens the terminal client
(agentconsole) over
the same session: the conversation rendered from the session's record, with
the run's live deltas on top. When it exits it leaves one line on the
terminal, the command that resumes the session:
To resume this session: dax -resume 01a112e5-b4df-7081-bd11-baac746b29cc
Any warning, such as a store whose permissions were fixed, is printed
before the client takes the screen, and dax waits for Enter, since the
client uses the alternate screen. A warning that comes while the client
has the screen, such as what the executor's launcher writes to standard
error, is held and printed when it exits, above the resume command.
With -executor, the executor's line (its name and version, kind and
ref, and root) is printed before the client either way, and stays on
the terminal when it exits. With -v dax also prints its start lines
(provider and model, the session, the policy in force, the tools, any
omitted: line) and waits for Enter on an omission too, and when the
client exits it prints what it noted during the run (skill grants,
compactions, denied calls) above the resume command.
Each of dax's tool calls is drawn as what it does, on one line, with a
short body under it:
| tool |
the line |
collapsed |
Ctrl-O |
edit |
the path, the lines it adds and removes (+3 −1) |
the change as a diff, up to 8 lines |
the whole diff |
write |
the path and the content's lines |
|
the content |
bash |
$ and the command's first line, its timeout if set |
how many lines it printed; a failure's exit status and last 3 lines |
the whole output and the exit status |
read |
the path and the lines asked for (a.go:120-199) |
how many lines it read |
the output |
grep, glob, ls |
the pattern or directory, where and how |
the matches and files, the files or the entries counted |
the output |
explore, task |
the brief's first line, fork and main model when set |
the report's first 2 lines |
the report |
A call that failed shows its error in place of the body. A call waiting on
a permission shows what it would do: an edit its diff, a command of several
lines the rest of it. Any other tool (skill, memory, an MCP server's) is
drawn as the client draws any call, its name and arguments.
| key |
|
| Enter |
send a prompt, or steer the run in flight |
| Ctrl-C |
copy the selection when one is drawn; otherwise abort the run, quit when idle (a second one quits at once) |
y / n |
approve / refuse the permission asked; n then takes an optional reason and Enter |
y / a / n |
on a question: allow, allow with a note, refuse with an optional reason; the note or the reason is typed, then Enter |
| PgUp, PgDn, Ctrl-Up/Down, Ctrl-Home/End, mouse wheel |
scroll the conversation |
| Ctrl-R / Ctrl-O |
show reasoning / tool arguments and output in full: the selected row's, or with no row selected every row's |
| Ctrl-T |
the tree of the session's branches; Enter views one, c continues from it |
| Ctrl-P, Ctrl-N, Ctrl-B, Tab |
move over the rows, continue from a row, open its detail (policy decision, who decided, verification) |
| click |
select the row under the pointer; a click on the selected row expands or collapses it |
| drag |
select text anywhere on the screen; it stays drawn until the next key or press |
| Ctrl-/ or F1 |
list every key; Esc, q or Ctrl-/ goes back |
A call the policy asks about is a permission: the panel shows the call and
the reason, which is the policy's with what it is asking about added: the
rule that fired, the secret-looking path, the git config key that names a
program, the part of a command line. A call the policy only held beside
the one it asks about is not shown: your answer to the batch decides it.
A call that was started before it was held says it may have run. A
session that stopped with a call held for approval opens with it on the
panel, and a prompt waits until it is answered. Everything that can ask is answered on
screen; nothing reads standard input once the client has the terminal. Two
things cannot be a permission, which a run that ended answers, since the
call that needs the answer is still running; the client asks them as
questions while the run goes, ahead of any permission:
- A call a sub-agent (
explore or task) makes that the policy asks
about: y allows it, a allows it with a note, n refuses it with an
optional reason, and Esc goes back. The sub-agent sees the note with
the call's result, and the reason in place of it.
- A question a tool asks mid-call (MCP elicitation) that is yes or no.
One that is a form or a page to visit has no screen in the client, and
is cancelled.
A call stamped as auto-allowed that changed before it ran fails with "the
command changed since it was allowed ... ask again", which shows in the
transcript.
Commands
A line that starts with a slash is a command to dax, in the terminal
client and the REPL alike; the model never sees it. Start a line with
// to send the model a line that begins with a slash (//etc/hosts
sends /etc/hosts). In the terminal client a command's output shows over
the input until the next line, and an error gives the line back to edit.
/model name, /think on|off: the model and reasoning from the next
request.
/mcp add <name> <command> (tools are mcp__<name>__<tool>; a name has
letters, digits, - and _, and no __), /mcp remove <label>.
/tools, /session, /help.
/follow text queues a follow-up that runs once the model would have
stopped; /abort aborts the run; /quit leaves.
Any other line typed while a run is in flight steers it and lands before
the next model call. /model, /think and /mcp wait for the run to
end; the rest work during one. An unknown command is an error, not a
prompt. /compact does not exist (use -compact N).
Serving a session: dax serve and dax attach
dax serve runs a session with no front of its own and serves it, so a
terminal elsewhere can drive it with dax attach. It takes the same
flags as dax (the provider, the model, -resume, -executor and the
rest) and -listen, the address (default 127.0.0.1:0, a free port):
dax serve -resume 01a112e5-b4df-7081-bd11-baac746b29cc
# serving at http://127.0.0.1:41753
# token: /home/you/.dax/serve/01a112e5-....token
# attach: dax attach -token-file /home/you/.dax/serve/01a112e5-....token http://127.0.0.1:41753
dax attach -token-file ~/.dax/serve/01a112e5-....token http://127.0.0.1:41753
-
Loopback, unless it has a certificate. Without TLS, dax serve
refuses an address that is not 127.0.0.1, ::1 or localhost: the
session runs tools and answers what its policy asks, so it is not
offered to the network in the clear. The simplest way in from another
machine is still a tunnel: ssh -L 7878:127.0.0.1:7878 host, then
attach to http://127.0.0.1:7878.
-
HTTPS with a certificate. Given a certificate and its key (PEM),
dax serve serves HTTPS and may listen on any address:
dax serve -listen 0.0.0.0:7878 -tls-cert host.pem -tls-key host-key.pem
dax attach -token-file host.token https://host.example:7878
dax attach verifies the certificate against the system's roots, or
against the CA you give it with -tls-ca ca.pem for a certificate of
your own; nothing skips the check. It refuses an http:// URL to a
host that is not loopback, since the token would cross the network in
the clear. The certificate must name the host you attach to.
-
One token. Every request needs it. It is $DAX_SERVE_TOKEN if
set; otherwise dax serve makes one and writes it to a file under
~/.dax/serve that only you can read, removed when it stops. The
token is never printed; attach reads it from -token-file or
$DAX_SERVE_TOKEN.
-
One conversation. Every view attached to a session drives the same
conversation: what one asks, the others show, and a permission or a
question is answered from whichever view answers first. Questions and
held calls wait for whoever attaches. For independent work, fork the
session instead.
-
Leaving is not stopping. /quit in an attached view leaves the
session's run going; ctrl+c in a view aborts it. dax serve stops on
ctrl+c or SIGTERM, aborting a run still going, and prints the command
that resumes the session.
-
Commands. The slash commands run against the served session:
/model, /think, /mcp and /session act there, through the
server's commands.
-
The tree. Continuing from an entry (Ctrl-B on a row, c in the
tree) moves the served session's head, as it does locally: the next
prompt, from any view, continues from there. A move the session
refuses, while a run goes or from a call whose output is not on the
path, is shown in the view that asked.
In the REPL
dax -front repl (the default when not on a terminal) is a line REPL
with the same commands; a permission or a question is answered with y
or n on the next line, and what follows the first word is what you say
with the answer, which the model is told: y keep it short allows with a
note, n not that file refuses with a reason. Any other line refuses,
the whole line its reason. -p reads its answers the same way.
Sessions
Every run is recorded in one content-addressed store,
~/.dax/sessions, for every project. Admin commands:
dax -list # sessions recorded for this directory
dax -resume <id> # continue one, answering any call an abort cut off
dax -verify <id> # rebuild every request and check its hash
dax -project <id> -out dir # write one as a JSONL file (RFC 0001)
dax -import old.jsonl # bring a JSONL session into the store
dax -gc pack # pack loose objects; -gc sweep also drops what no session needs
dax -repair <id> # rewrite a damaged log from what still reads
-list, -verify and -project open the store read-only, so they work
beside a running dax. -sessions "" disables recording.
Other state lives in ~/.dax: AGENTS.md (read before the project's),
skills/, memory/. A project's .dax/skills and its AGENTS.md files
are read too, through the workspace. The AGENTS.md chain follows the
convention (https://agents.md): from the repository's root, the nearest
directory at or above the start that holds a .git, down to where dax
starts, the nearest file last; a directory above the repository is not
read. With no repository only the start directory's file is read. A
file you want in every session whatever the repository, such as one in a
directory above your checkouts, goes in your config's
agents_md_global.
Building on dax
dax is a Go module as well as a command. cmd/dax is one line,
dax.Main with no options; a program of your own is the same line with
an extension:
func main() {
os.Exit(dax.Main(context.Background(), os.Args[1:],
dax.WithName("acme", ""),
dax.WithExtension(extension.Extension{
Name: "acme-deploy",
Tools: deployTools, // func(extension.ToolEnv) []agenttool.Tool
Matchers: extension.FixedMatchers(map[string]agentpolicy.ToolMatcher{"deploy": {Match: agentpolicy.GlobMatcher("env")}}),
Policy: policy.Rules{Allow: []string{"deploy(staging)"}},
Instructions: "Never deploy to prod unless the user asks.",
Renderers: func(string) toolview.Renderers { return toolview.Renderers{"deploy": deployRenderer{}} },
})))
}
dax's own extensions are built the same way, from the same fields:
| Extension |
Package |
What it offers |
dax-coding |
ext/coding |
read, write, edit, glob, grep, ls and bash; the allow list, the secret-path asks, the matchers and the aliases (Bash, Read, Edit, Write) for them; the stamp that holds an auto-allowed bash call to the plan and the facts the policy approved |
dax-agents |
ext/agents |
the explore and task sub-agents, given every extension's tools (the read-only ones for explore) |
dax-skills |
ext/skills |
the skill tool and catalogue; grants under -trust-skills |
dax-memory |
ext/memory |
the memory tools and block |
dax-coding is always on; the others follow agents, skills and
memory in the settings. WithoutExtension leaves one of the four out
whatever the settings say (any other name is an error), and
WithExtension adds the program's after them.
extension.Extension field |
What it adds |
Name |
the extension's name; its rules are recorded as extension:<Name> |
Tools |
tools (agenttool.Tool), in order, for the main agent and for task |
ReadOnly |
the names of its tools that only look, which explore gets too; one annotated destructive is refused |
Owns |
names of tools it adds through Kit (skill, memory_save), so its rules may name them |
Matchers |
how a rule's specifier reads a call of one of its tools: deploy(staging) above. Built over the session's ToolEnv, so one that looks at files looks at the session's workspace; extension.FixedMatchers wraps ones that read only the arguments |
Aliases |
names a rule may use for several of its tools: Read for read, grep, glob and ls |
Policy |
the allow, ask and deny rules it ships for its tools |
Lifts |
its tools whose asks a user's allow rule with a specifier lifts: read(.env) |
HeldTo |
its tools whose calls are held to another extension's tools' ask and deny rules (never their allows), by what the tool's facts claim names: dax-skills holds skill to read |
BeforeToolCall |
a hook, built over the session's ToolEnv, that decides or rewrites a call, folded with the policy, for the main agent and the sub-agents; extension.FixedHook wraps one that needs nothing of the session |
Instructions |
text in the main agent's system prompt, in extension order, before your instructions_file |
Kit |
agentkit options for anything else (skills, memory, child agents, guards), given every extension's tools |
Renderers |
how the terminal client draws its tools' calls (toolview.Renderer) |
A session builds its extensions in two phases: every extension's tools,
then each one's Kit options, so a sub-agent built in the second phase
gets a tool an extension listed after it adds. Names are checked across
the whole session, without regard to case: two extensions may not offer
a tool, an alias or an owned name that differ only in case, mcp__
belongs to MCP servers, and an alias may differ from its own tool only
in case (Bash and bash). The session's own kit options (the name,
the model, the instructions, the policy, the session) go after the
extensions', so where an option replaces another the session's is the
one in force; a Kit that sets a policy on a session with the policy
off is an error. The session closes the tools it built. One tool value
is shared by every agent that has it, the main agent, explore and
task, and may be called by them at once, so a tool that keeps state
guards it.
An extension's tools are under the same policy as dax's. A call no rule
allows asks first. Each extension's rules are a source of their own,
extension:<Name>, which every verdict one of them decides names in the
session's record, and the start line counts them. A rule may name only
the extension's own tools and aliases, not a pattern and not a
carve-out, so one extension cannot loosen another's tools or cancel its
rules. Nor can it borrow them: a call of another extension's tool that
its tool's facts claim (agenttool.Factual) or its matcher's own
subjects name is decided as a tool no rule names, so it asks, unless
HeldTo holds the claiming tool to that tool, whose asks and denies
then apply to the call and whose allows never do. Deny beats ask beats allow whatever the source: an extension's
ask or deny holds against a plain allow in your config, and a carve-out
in your config ("ask": ["deploy(!staging)"]) or, for a tool in
Lifts, an allow with a specifier lifts it. A project's config can add
asks and denies, and "builtin": false drops the extensions' allow
rules but keeps their asks and denies.
An extension's tools get an extension.ToolEnv: the session's
Workspace, Files over it, and MaxReadBytes. A tool that takes a
path from the model reads and writes through Files (ReadFile,
WriteFile, Update, Stat, ReadDir, Rel), which turns the path
the model wrote, absolute in the workspace's root or relative to it,
into the workspace's name and refuses one that leaves, as dax's file
tools do. Update is a read-modify-write under the lock dax's write
and edit take, so a tool's change and an edit beside it cannot lose
each other's; a FIFO or a device is refused rather than waited on. A
tool that runs a process uses Workspace.Exec, whose processes start
with Workspace.Env(), the environment with credentials removed (a
copy each call); the workspace types are the agentworkspace module's
(github.com/ChristopherDavenport/agentworkspace, which dax imports
as workspace). Written that way, a tool runs unchanged wherever the
session's workspace is. A tool is built over ToolEnv rather than
agentkit's kit because what it needs is dax's, the workspace and its
confinement, which the kit does not hold.
A renderer reads only the record. It declines (returns ok false) a call
whose arguments or schema it was not written for, such as one an older
version recorded, and the client draws that call as raw text. Two
extensions that draw one tool are an error.
WithName puts the program's name in the banner, the resume command,
the client header, the session header and the prompt; the config files
and the store are still dax's (~/.config/dax, .dax, ~/.dax). The
program keeps the flags, the config files, the providers, the session
store, MCP, and the three fronts.
For a front of your own, build the session with agent.New and
Options.Extensions, and drive it as agentturn's control contract
(*agent.Session is an agentturn.Control): prompt, queue a steer or a
follow-up, answer the permissions a run stops on (Session.Permissions,
Resume), reply to the questions asked while a call runs (the
agentturn.Question events, Reply, after Session.Answering), and
subscribe to the agent's events. Session is also agent.Controls
(model, reasoning, MCP servers, Info); Session.Record is the store
to follow for a view, and Session.Recorder what agentconsole's
client.RecordOf takes.
agent.Drive is a controller that answers by rule, for running without
a person. The terminal client is agentconsole; hand it
extension.Renderers(dir, exts). The public packages are dax,
agent, extension, policy, tool, toolrender and the four
under ext/, over the agentworkspace module's Workspace; the configuration, providers, model metadata, prompt frame and
renderer for the REPL stay internal. Everything is pre-1.0: the exported
API may change in a minor version, and the changelog says when.
A session acts in one workspace.Workspace, from the agentworkspace
module (github.com/ChristopherDavenport/agentworkspace): a root, a
file system that never blocks on a FIFO or a device, writes and
removes, an environment, one-shot execution with its output streamed as
it arrives, and a descriptor the session records; a workspace that can
also run a long-lived process with pipes is a workspace.Starter.
workspace.Local is this machine's directory, opened as an os.Root
so no name leaves it, with each command in its own process group. A
container or a remote runtime is another implementation of the same
interface, and the rest of dax cannot tell them apart:
- dax-coding's tools act through it:
read, write, edit, glob,
grep and ls through tool.Files, and bash through
Workspace.Exec, with the same output wherever it runs.
- The policy's checks of a call read the same workspace: a path rule
follows links through it, and the bash analyzer stats files, follows
links, finds
.git and reads git's configuration there (git is run
through Exec, with paths passed as arguments). A workspace whose
file system cannot tell a link from its target leaves those checks
unable to follow links, and they ask.
- The project's instructions are read through it: the
AGENTS.md
chain (agentsmd's Options.FS), .dax/skills (an agentskill.Source
over its file system) and .dax/config.json, each screened there, so
a container gives its own and nothing comes from the directory dax
started in. Only when the workspace is that directory on this machine
and dax started below its repository's root are the AGENTS.md files
between the two read from this machine, screened the same way.
- MCP stdio servers run in it when it is a
Starter (Local is, and
so is an executor's), at its root and with its environment, and end
with the session; in a workspace that cannot start a process they run
on this machine, with its environment scrubbed.
- The session records the workspace: the header's and the env entry's
cwd are its root, and the env entry names its kind (local,
container, remote) and ref. The model is told the root as the
working directory.
agent.Options.Workspace takes one; without it the session opens a
workspace.Local over Dir and closes it. agent.Options.Executor
takes an executor in its place (agent.DialExecutor, which starts dax execute as -executor does), whose tools act where it runs; the
caller closes it. agent.Options.Store takes
the session store the same way: an agentsession.Store the caller
opened and closes, or, without it, the content-addressed store at
Root. A remote store client (agentsession's RFC 0003) is meant to fit
there.
What is not there yet:
- dax uses only
workspace.Local; a container or remote workspace is
a program's to provide until agentworkspace ships one. dax execute
serves the tools from inside a sandbox and -executor
(agent.Options.Executor, agent.DialExecutor) runs a session's
tools and MCP servers there and reads the project's files through
it.
- RFC 0003's client is not a drop-in
Store: opening takes a lease,
an append returns a different result, and a lost lease needs
handling. Options.Store takes today's interface; the lease handling
waits for agentsession's remote client. Session.Path is empty for a
store that is not local.
- A front over a wire (the terminal client driving a session elsewhere,
ACP) is not built. The contract it carries is agentturn's, which the
session implements, served by
agentturn/front/control; what waits
is the record over the wire (agentsession's RFC 0003 read and follow)
for the view.
Develop
make check # gofmt, go mod tidy -diff, go vet, staticcheck, govulncheck, go test -race
make build # ./dax
In this workspace the module is built outside the go.work:
GOWORK=off GOFLAGS=-mod=readonly make check. See AGENTS.md
for the layout and release process, and CHANGELOG.md.
License
MIT. See LICENSE.