termtext

Documentation

Overview

Package termtext neutralizes terminal control sequences in untrusted, session-derived strings before they are written to a TTY.

aispend renders fields lifted verbatim from session logs — branch names, repo names, file paths, model ids, session titles, and the raw human prompt. A log is attacker-influenceable (a crafted .jsonl, a synced/shared ~/.claude or ~/.codex directory, or simply a branch created with control bytes:

git checkout -b $'main\e]0;PWNED\a\e[2J'

because encoding/json decodes � into a literal ESC byte). Rendered raw, such a value can clear the screen, hide text, forge output, rewrite the window title, or — on emulators that honor response/clipboard sequences — inject a paste. This is terminal escape-sequence injection (CWE-150).

The defense is to sanitize at the render boundary while leaving the stored value intact, so grouping/identity (which keys reports and matches turns to files) is unaffected. This supersedes the ad-hoc, scan-only scrubber in internal/scan (sampleOf), which never covered the report/TUI surfaces.

Index

• func SanitizeLabel(s string) string
• func SanitizeMultiline(s string) string

Functions

func SanitizeLabel

func SanitizeLabel(s string) string

SanitizeLabel returns s with every C0 control (including ESC, BEL, CR, LF, TAB), DEL, and C1 control replaced by U+FFFD. The result is a single inert line, so it is safe to drop into a fixed-width column. Use for single-line labels: branch, repo, model, file path, session title, and report group keys.

func SanitizeMultiline

func SanitizeMultiline(s string) string

SanitizeMultiline is like SanitizeLabel but preserves newline and tab, so genuinely multi-line untrusted text — the human prompt shown in the TUI's evidence viewport — keeps its line structure while ESC, CR, and every other control byte is still neutralized.