auth

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 Go to latest Published: Aug 15, 2026 License: MIT Imports: 32 Imported by: 0

README

awesome-go-auth

awesome-go-auth is a Go authentication library with stateful sessions and access/refresh tokens.

Installation

go get github.com/nik2208/awesome-go-auth

Quick start

package main

import (
	"context"
	"log"

	auth "github.com/nik2208/awesome-go-auth"
)

func main() {
	cfg := auth.DefaultConfig("replace-with-at-least-32-random-chars")
	service, err := auth.NewService(cfg, auth.NewMemoryUserStore(), auth.NewMemorySessionStore())
	if err != nil {
		log.Fatal(err)
	}

	_, tokens, err := service.Register(context.Background(), auth.RegisterInput{
		Email:    "alice@example.com",
		Password: "supersecurepassword",
		TenantID: "tenant-1",
	})
	if err != nil {
		log.Fatal(err)
	}

	log.Println("access token issued", tokens.AccessToken != "")
}

Features

  • Secure configuration with validation.
  • Register/login with password hashing (bcrypt).
  • Signed access token + refresh token (HMAC-SHA256) with expiry.
  • Stateful sessions with refresh token rotation and revocation (logout).
  • Configurable session check policy (allcalls / refresh / none).
  • Authenticated user retrieval (Me).
  • Account management (UpdateProfile, DeleteAccount) in addition to password/email lifecycle.
  • CSRF double-submit middleware (cookie + header) for browser flows.
  • Password reset (ForgotPassword, ResetPassword, ChangePassword).
  • Passwordless magic link (SendMagicLink, VerifyMagicLink).
  • SMS OTP login (SendSMSCode, VerifySMSCode).
  • Mail and SMS delivery for both of the above via Config.SendMagicLink / Config.SendSMSCode, with built-in senders over an HTTP mailer or SMS gateway (Delivery).
  • TOTP 2FA (SetupTOTP, VerifyTOTPSetup, VerifyTOTP, DisableTOTP).
  • Email verification (SendVerificationEmailToken, VerifyEmail) and email change (RequestEmailChange, ConfirmEmailChange).
  • Session admin helpers (ListSessions, RevokeSessionByID, CleanupExpiredSessions).
  • User metadata store and service helpers.
  • Multi-tenant in-memory RBAC (MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) with roles and permissions.
  • In-memory tenant store (MemoryTenantStore) with user↔tenant membership.
  • Custom token claims via Config.BuildTokenClaims, also reflected in the enriched profile.
  • API key service and HTTP middleware (APIKeyService, APIKeyMiddleware).
  • In-process event bus (EventBus) for event-driven integrations.
  • Extended storage interfaces and thread-safe in-memory implementations for all the above flows.

Idiomatic entrypoint and HTTP adapters

  • auth.New(...) entrypoint with functional options (WithSecret, WithTokenTTLs, WithUserStore, WithSessionStore, etc.).
  • Framework-agnostic adapters available:
    • adapter/nethttp (Middleware, Mount, MountWithConfig)
    • adapter/chi (Middleware, Mount, MountWithConfig)
    • adapter/gin (Middleware, Mount, MountWithConfig)
    • adapter/echo (Middleware, Mount, MountWithConfig)
  • All four adapters serve the same wire contract, configured by a single auth.HTTPConfig (mount prefix, cookie policy, CSRF) and written through the shared helpers in wire.go.

HTTP wire conventions

The HTTP surface follows the awesome-node-auth contract the family clients (Angular, Flutter, the served auth.js) are pinned to:

  • GET <prefix>/me returns the user object unwrapped.
  • Cookie mode (default) answers {"success": true} and sets the cookies; X-Auth-Strategy: bearer (exact, case-sensitive) answers with top-level accessToken/refreshToken and sets no cookies.
  • Cookie names resolve to __Host- / __Secure- / bare from the cookie policy, and every read tries __Host- → __Secure- → bare.
  • Errors are {"error": "<message>", "code": "<CODE>"}; a revoked session is 401 {"code": "SESSION_REVOKED"}, the signal both browser clients use to stop refreshing and log out.
  • CSRF is double-submit on X-CSRF-Token, enforced for cookie-authenticated unsafe methods only. There is no /csrf endpoint: the cookie is distributed by the router-level middleware.

Deliberate deviations from the reference

The standing rule is to reproduce awesome-node-auth including its quirks, because the family clients are pinned to it. The entries below are the places this port knowingly does not, each with the reason the rule was set aside.

This section is generated from CompatibilityNotes(), which returns the same register as data — it is not a second copy kept in step by hand. compatibility_test.go re-renders it and compares it against this file, so a deviation cannot be edited on one side only, and cannot be added to the register without appearing here. The test also pins the set of ids and the wire facts each entry has to keep stating, so an entry cannot be quietly hollowed out by someone who does regenerate.

Citations are file:line into awesome-node-auth@cc01e997 (npm 1.9.0), the revision the whole contract was extracted from.

forgot-password: unconditional 200 on delivery failure

forgot-password-succeeds-on-delivery-failure

  • Surface: POST <prefix>/forgot-password.
  • This port: Always 200 {"success": true} — when the mail was sent, when the configured sender returns an error, and when no sender is configured at all. The reset token stays stored in every case. A store failure still answers 500, which is the reference's behaviour and is kept.
  • The reference: The send sits inside the route's try, so a throwing mailer reaches handleError and answers 500 (auth.router.ts:787-798).
  • Why: That 500 fires only for an address that exists, so a broken mail gateway turns the one route whose purpose is to reveal nothing about who is registered into an account-enumeration oracle. The contract records the status as [UNTESTED], and no client can depend on one that appears only when the operator's mailer is down.
  • Observing the failure: Only the HTTP surface swallows it. Auth.ForgotPassword absorbs ErrDeliveryFailed (and nothing else) and logs auth: password reset delivery failed; the route still answered success: …, without naming the address. Service.ForgotPassword still returns the error, so a direct library caller learns about it.
The 2FA step-up token is typed, not an access token

temp-token-is-typed-not-an-access-token

  • Surface: POST <prefix>/login (the tempToken in a 2FA challenge) and the step-up routes that accept it.
  • This port: The step-up token carries its own type. It is accepted by the second-factor routes and by nothing else, and an ordinary access token is not accepted in its place.
  • The reference: Mints the tempToken as an ordinary 5-minute access token with no claim distinguishing it, so it authenticates any protected route for five minutes before the second factor has been presented, and a full access token also passes as a tempToken (auth.router.ts:572-575, token.service.ts:20-24).
  • Why: Reproducing it would mean shipping a five-minute bypass of the second factor the challenge exists to demand. The type claim is not on the wire — the token is opaque to every client — and the reference's own sharing is [UNTESTED] there, so no shipped client depends on it. The cost is that the tempToken in a 2FA_SETUP_REQUIRED answer cannot reach the enrolment routes, which sit behind the access-token gate.

link-request-exempts-bearer-from-csrf

  • Surface: POST <prefix>/link-request.
  • This port: A request carrying a real Authorization: Bearer credential is exempt from the double-submit check, as it is on every other route. Without one the check is enforced whether or not the request is cookie-authenticated.
  • The reference: Gates its hand-written double-submit check on config.csrf.enabled alone, with no usingBearer term — unlike its own auth middleware (auth.middleware.ts:35) — so it answers 403 CSRF_INVALID to a bearer-authenticated caller that carries no cookie pair (auth.router.ts:1489-1495).
  • Why: Authorization is not CORS-safelisted, so no cross-site page can set it and the exemption costs no CSRF protection: every request it admits is one an attacker could not have forged. The family contract records the reference's behaviour as a MISMATCH that breaks native bearer clients with no cookie jar, and marks it [UNTESTED]. A client that sends the pair is accepted by both.
A password policy on reset-password and change-password

password-policy-on-reset-and-change

  • Surface: POST <prefix>/reset-password and POST <prefix>/change-password.
  • This port: Rejects a new password shorter than Config.MinPasswordLen with 400 {"error": "Password is too weak", "code": "WEAK_PASSWORD"}, checked before the current-password comparison on /change-password.
  • The reference: Applies no strength check on either route — the password goes straight to passwordService.hash. Its own OpenAPI document declares minLength: 8 on both bodies and nothing enforces it (auth.router.ts:801-825, auth.router.ts:904-932).
  • Why: The reference will hash and store a two-character password on a route reached with a mailed token, which silently undoes whatever policy the host applied at registration. WEAK_PASSWORD has no reference counterpart, so a client that does not know the code still sees a 400 it must show the user either way. The check order differs too: the reference would report a wrong current password first.
2fa/setup omits the QR code

totp-setup-omits-qrcode

  • Surface: POST <prefix>/2fa/setup.
  • This port: Answers {"secret", "otpauthUrl"} and nothing else.
  • The reference: Also returns qrCode, the same provisioning URI rendered as a PNG data URL (auth.router.ts:832-835).
  • Why: The root package is stdlib plus golang.org/x/crypto and a QR encoder is neither. A client renders otpauthUrl itself, which is what the Rust port of this family does too. A client that displays the reference's PNG directly has to encode the URI instead.
One-time tokens are base64url, not hex

one-time-tokens-are-base64url

  • Surface: The reset-password, email-verification and email-change tokens carried in mailed links.
  • This port: Renders 32 random bytes as 43 base64url characters.
  • The reference: Renders the same 32 random bytes as 64 hexadecimal characters (token.service.ts:270-272).
  • Why: randomToken is shared with the API-key and IdP code paths, which have no reason to be hex. Both forms are URL-safe and opaque, and no shipped client parses or measures a token — but a host that pinned a column width or a validation regex to 64 hex characters has to widen it.
An advertised 2FA method must be one the store supports

advertised-2fa-methods-require-store-support

  • Surface: POST <prefix>/login, the available2faMethods list in a 2FA challenge.
  • This port: Advertises a second factor only when the configured user store implements the capability that factor needs, as well as the configuration and user state the reference checks.
  • The reference: Checks configuration and user state alone, so it can advertise a method whose route then answers 501 because the store does not implement it (auth.router.ts:557-559).
  • Why: A client picks its next request from this list, so advertising a factor that cannot complete strands the login with no way forward. The extra term can only ever remove an option that would have failed; a deployment whose store implements the capability sees the reference's list.

csrf-cookie-not-reissued-with-tokens

  • Surface: Set-Cookie on every route that issues tokens, including POST <prefix>/login and POST <prefix>/refresh.
  • This port: The CSRF cookie is written by the router-level auto-init only, when the request carries no readable one. Issuing tokens does not reissue it, so one response never carries two Set-Cookie headers for that name.
  • The reference: setTokenCookies sets a fresh csrf-token cookie on every cookie-mode issuance — it is reached from sendTokens (auth.router.ts:403) and from the OAuth redirect path — in addition to the router-level auto-init, so a first login emits two Set-Cookie headers for the same name with different values in one response (token.service.ts:204-209, auth.router.ts:529-538).
  • Why: Which of two same-name Set-Cookie headers survives is left to the cookie jar, so the reference's pair makes the token a client will send back ambiguous on exactly the response that establishes it. Emitting one keeps the double-submit pair consistent. The cookie stays JS-readable and valid either way, so a client that reads it per request — as all three family clients do — cannot tell the difference.

cookie-max-age-follows-configured-ttl

  • Surface: Set-Cookie on every cookie-mode route that issues tokens, including POST <prefix>/login, POST <prefix>/register and POST <prefix>/refresh.
  • This port: Derives each token cookie's Max-Age from the lifetime of the token it carries — the access cookie from Config.AccessTokenTTL, the refresh cookie from Config.RefreshTokenTTL — unless the deployment sets CookieOptions.AccessTokenMaxAge or RefreshTokenMaxAge explicitly. On DefaultConfig that is Max-Age=900 on the access cookie and Max-Age=2592000 (30 days) on the refresh cookie.
  • The reference: Hardcodes both lifetimes in setTokenCookies, ignoring configuration: maxAge: 15 * 60 * 1000 on the access cookie and maxAge: 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000 on the refresh cookie, so it always emits Max-Age=604800 there whatever refreshTokenExpiresIn says (token.service.ts:28, token.service.ts:195, token.service.ts:199-202).
  • Why: Deriving the cookie lifetime from the configured TTL is the point: a cookie must not outlive, or expire before, the token it carries. The reference's hardcoded value silently contradicts its own refreshTokenExpiresIn — that option signs the refresh token (defaulting to 7d), so raising it to 30 days leaves the token valid for 30 days while the browser drops the cookie carrying it after 7, ending the session early with a credential nobody can present. The divergence is a header value, not a validity change: each port honours its own tokens' server-side expiry either way. The access cookie matches the reference on DefaultConfig (both 15 minutes, Max-Age=900) and diverges on any custom AccessTokenTTL; the refresh cookie diverges at the default too, because Config.RefreshTokenTTL is 30 days here where the reference's refresh token defaults to 7d.
  • Matching the reference exactly: A host that needs the reference's literal headers sets CookieOptions.RefreshTokenMaxAge to 7 days (and AccessTokenMaxAge to 15 minutes); an explicit value is never overwritten by the derivation.

Parity Snapshot vs awesome-node-auth

Capability Status in awesome-go-auth Notes
Auth strategies (email/password, magic link, SMS OTP, TOTP 2FA, OAuth linking) ✅ Implemented OAuth + account linking in oauth.go.
Token management (cookie/bearer, access/refresh rotation, secure cookies) ✅ Implemented Adapter HTTP supportano cookie e bearer; rotation attiva.
Identity Provider (IdP) mode (RS256 + JWKS + resource server validation) ✅ Implemented OIDC IdP con discovery, authorize, token, userinfo e JWKS.
Stateful sessions ✅ Implemented Revoca/rotation + Config.SessionCheckOn (allcalls/refresh/none).
Dynamic email templates + UI i18n fallback ✅ Implemented Template mail + fallback i18n built-in.
CSRF protection ✅ Implemented CSRFMiddleware cookie+header double-submit.
Account management ✅ Implemented Register, UpdateProfile, DeleteAccount, password/email lifecycle.
Account linking ✅ Implemented Pending link + linked account store.
RBAC ✅ Implemented RolesPermissionsStore tenant-aware.
Multi-tenancy ✅ Implemented TenantStore e membership utente↔tenant.
Admin panel ✅ Implemented ServeAdminUI() embedded.
Built-in UI + auth runtime (auth.js) ✅ Implemented ServeAuthUI() + ServeAuthJS().
Client libraries compatibility (Angular + Flutter) ✅ Implemented Cookie+CSRF browser e bearer per native client.
Event-driven tooling (event bus, SSE, inbound/outbound webhooks, telemetry, notify channels) ✅ Implemented Event bus, SSE, webhooks, telemetry, notify.
API keys (M2M) ✅ Implemented APIKeyService + middleware API key.
OpenAPI / Swagger docs ✅ Implemented GenerateOpenAPISpec.
MCP server (awesome-node-auth-mcp-server) ➖ Out of scope Fuori scope di parity per questa libreria.

Documentation

Index

Constants

View Source 
const (
	SessionCheckOnAllCalls = "allcalls"
	SessionCheckOnRefresh  = "refresh"
	SessionCheckOnNone     = "none"
)
View Source 
const (
	EmailVerificationModeNone   = "none"
	EmailVerificationModeLazy   = "lazy"
	EmailVerificationModeStrict = "strict"
)

Email verification modes accepted by Config.EmailVerificationMode. 

none   : Register marks the address verified, so verification never comes up
         on the self-registration path. An address left unverified by some
         other route (admin provisioning, a data import, a custom UserStore
         whose column defaults to false) is still refused at login. This is
         the default and is exactly how the service behaved before the mode
         existed.
lazy   : Register leaves the address unverified and login is allowed anyway.
         This is the only mode in which an unverified address may log in.
strict : Register leaves the address unverified and login is refused until
         the address is confirmed.
View Source 
const (
	PasswordResetPath      = "/reset-password"
	EmailVerificationPath  = "/verify-email"
	EmailChangeConfirmPath = "/change-email/confirm"
)

The routes the three tokens are spent on, relative to the mount prefix.

View Source 
const (
	TwoFactorMethodTOTP      = "totp"
	TwoFactorMethodSMS       = "sms"
	TwoFactorMethodMagicLink = "magic-link"
)

Second-factor method names, exactly as the reference spells them in available2faMethods (auth.router.ts:557-559). A client picks its next request from this list, so these strings are wire: "magic-link" is hyphenated and nothing is capitalised.

View Source 
const (
	CodeOAuthStateInvalid      = "OAUTH_STATE_INVALID"
	CodeOAuthTokenExchangeFail = "OAUTH_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_FAILED"
	CodeOAuthProfileFailed     = "OAUTH_PROFILE_FAILED"
	CodeEmailRequired          = "EMAIL_REQUIRED"
	CodeTokenRequired          = "TOKEN_REQUIRED"
	CodeInvalidLinkToken       = "INVALID_LINK_TOKEN"
	CodeLinkTokenExpired       = "LINK_TOKEN_EXPIRED"
	CodeUnauthorized           = "UNAUTHORIZED"
)

Error codes for this route group. The first five are the reference's own literals; OAUTH_STATE_INVALID has no counterpart because the reference never rejects a state.

View Source 
const (
	CodeTempTokenRequired = "TEMP_TOKEN_REQUIRED"
	CodeInvalidTempToken  = "INVALID_TEMP_TOKEN"
	// CodeInvalidAccessToken is what /2fa/verify answers for a bad step-up
	// token where its siblings answer INVALID_TEMP_TOKEN. See
	// HTTPErrInvalidStepUpToken.
	CodeInvalidAccessToken = "INVALID_ACCESS_TOKEN"
	CodeInvalidMagicLink   = "INVALID_MAGIC_LINK"
	CodeTokenMismatch      = "TOKEN_MISMATCH"
	CodePhoneNotSet        = "PHONE_NOT_SET"
	// CodeEmailNotConfigured and CodeSMSNotConfigured report a deployment that
	// cannot deliver what the send route just minted. See delivery.go.
	CodeEmailNotConfigured = "EMAIL_NOT_CONFIGURED"
	CodeSMSNotConfigured   = "SMS_NOT_CONFIGURED"
)

Error codes for this section of the contract.

View Source 
const (
	// AuthStrategyHeader opts a caller into bearer delivery. The reference reads
	// this header in exactly one place and compares the value exactly, so the
	// match here is case-sensitive on purpose.
	AuthStrategyHeader = "X-Auth-Strategy"
	// AuthStrategyBearer is the only recognised AuthStrategyHeader value.
	AuthStrategyBearer = "bearer"
	// CSRFHeaderName carries the double-submit token.
	CSRFHeaderName = "X-CSRF-Token"
)
View Source 
const (
	AccessTokenCookieName  = "accessToken"
	RefreshTokenCookieName = "refreshToken"
	CSRFTokenCookieName    = "csrf-token"
)

Cookie base names. The prefix a cookie actually carries is resolved by CookieOptions.CookieName.

View Source 
const (
	CodeInvalidCredentials  = "INVALID_CREDENTIALS"
	CodeEmailNotVerified    = "EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED"
	CodeSessionRevoked      = "SESSION_REVOKED"
	CodeInvalidToken        = "INVALID_TOKEN"
	CodeInvalidRefreshToken = "INVALID_REFRESH_TOKEN"
	CodeCSRFInvalid         = "CSRF_INVALID"
	CodeTwoFactorRequired   = "2FA_REQUIRED"
	CodeUserNotFound        = "USER_NOT_FOUND"
	CodeNotImplemented      = "NOT_IMPLEMENTED"
)

Error codes emitted by the HTTP layer. The first block is the reference catalog; a client keying on any of these keeps working across the family.

View Source 
const (
	CodeUserExists   = "USER_EXISTS"
	CodeWeakPassword = "WEAK_PASSWORD"
	CodeInvalidBody  = "INVALID_BODY"
)

Codes with no counterpart in the reference catalog. The reference delegates registration to a host-supplied callback and therefore has no code of its own for a duplicate address or a rejected password; these fill that hole. No shipped client branches on them.

View Source 
const CodePasswordRequired = "PASSWORD_REQUIRED"

CodePasswordRequired is the one coded error in this group. Every other failure here is code-less in the reference, and a client is documented not to pattern-match on an absent code.

View Source 
const CodeTwoFactorSetupRequired = "2FA_SETUP_REQUIRED"

CodeTwoFactorSetupRequired tells a client that a second factor is demanded of this account and it has none to present, so enrolment has to come first. It is declared here rather than in wire.go's catalog because the body it appears in is not the error envelope — see WriteTwoFactorChallenge — and because passwordless.go sets the precedent of a feature file owning its own codes.

View Source 
const DefaultAPIPrefix = "/auth"

DefaultAPIPrefix is where the auth routes mount unless told otherwise.

View Source 
const MagicLinkVerifyPath = "/magic-link/verify"

MagicLinkVerifyPath is the route a magic link points at, relative to the mount prefix.

View Source 
const ReferenceRevision = "awesome-node-auth@cc01e997 (npm 1.9.0)"

ReferenceRevision names the revision every Deviation.Citations entry resolves against. The citations are file:line, so they mean nothing without it.

View Source 
const StepUpMode = "2fa"

StepUpMode is the only value of the `mode` field the routes special-case.

Variables

View Source 
var (
	ErrInvalidCredentials  = errors.New("auth: invalid credentials")
	ErrUserExists          = errors.New("auth: user already exists")
	ErrInvalidToken        = errors.New("auth: invalid token")
	ErrSessionNotFound     = errors.New("auth: session not found")
	ErrSessionRevoked      = errors.New("auth: session revoked")
	ErrWeakPassword        = errors.New("auth: password is too weak")
	ErrFeatureNotSupported = errors.New("auth: feature not supported by configured stores")
	ErrEmailNotVerified    = errors.New("auth: email not verified")
	ErrInvalidCode         = errors.New("auth: invalid code")
	ErrTwoFactorRequired   = errors.New("auth: two-factor authentication required")
	ErrAlreadyExists       = errors.New("auth: resource already exists")
	ErrTenantNotFound      = errors.New("auth: tenant not found")
	ErrRoleNotFound        = errors.New("auth: role not found")

	// ErrEmailNotConfigured and ErrSMSNotConfigured mean the deployment has no
	// way to deliver the credential a send route just asked for. They are
	// deliberately not ErrFeatureNotSupported: that one says the configured
	// store cannot hold the column, and it is already on the wire as
	// NOT_IMPLEMENTED on these same routes. See delivery.go.
	ErrEmailNotConfigured = errors.New("auth: email delivery is not configured")
	ErrSMSNotConfigured   = errors.New("auth: sms delivery is not configured")
)
View Source 
var (
	// HTTPErrOAuthState is the fix for #10. It is a 401 with a code because a
	// browser mid-flow has to be able to tell a tampered state from a provider
	// failure, and because the reference's own choice on this route is a JSON
	// error rather than a redirect (wire-contract.md §4, gap 5).
	HTTPErrOAuthState = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusUnauthorized, Message: "Invalid or expired OAuth state", Code: CodeOAuthStateInvalid}

	// Coded, unlike its passwordless sibling. The reference throws AuthError with
	// EMAIL_REQUIRED here (auth.router.ts:1498) but answers uncoded on
	// /magic-link/send (auth.router.ts:1111), so the two are not interchangeable.
	// See HTTPErrPasswordlessEmailRequired.
	HTTPErrLinkEmailRequired  = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "email is required", Code: CodeEmailRequired}
	HTTPErrTokenRequired      = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "token is required", Code: CodeTokenRequired}
	HTTPErrInvalidLinkToken   = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "Invalid account-link token", Code: CodeInvalidLinkToken}
	HTTPErrLinkTokenExpired   = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "Account-link token has expired", Code: CodeLinkTokenExpired}
	HTTPErrTargetUserNotFound = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusNotFound, Message: "Target user not found", Code: CodeUserNotFound}

	// HTTPErrLinkUnauthorized is the reference's second identity-resolution
	// failure. Its first one ("Authentication required", emitted when no pending
	// link store is configured at all) is unreachable here: this port resolves
	// both the stash and the link-token storage through the same
	// PendingLinkStore, so an absent store answers NOT_IMPLEMENTED before
	// identity resolution is ever attempted.
	HTTPErrLinkUnauthorized = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusUnauthorized, Message: "Authentication required or no pending link found", Code: CodeUnauthorized}
)

The error catalog for this group. Messages are the reference's strings where the reference has one.

View Source 
var (
	HTTPErrTempTokenRequired = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "tempToken is required for 2FA mode", Code: CodeTempTokenRequired}
	HTTPErrInvalidTempToken  = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusUnauthorized, Message: "Invalid or expired temp token", Code: CodeInvalidTempToken}

	// HTTPErrInvalidStepUpToken is /2fa/verify's answer to the failure the
	// magic-link and SMS routes answer with HTTPErrInvalidTempToken. The
	// reference verifies the tempToken there through verifyAccessToken and lets
	// its AuthError through unchanged (auth.router.ts:862 vs :1096, :1144,
	// :1201, :1264), so the same failure has two codes depending on the 2FA
	// method. It is reproduced rather than harmonised: a client that special-
	// cases TOTP today would break if this route started agreeing with its
	// siblings.
	HTTPErrInvalidStepUpToken = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusUnauthorized, Message: "Invalid or expired access token", Code: CodeInvalidAccessToken}

	// Uncoded on purpose. The reference emits this same message WITHOUT a code on
	// /magic-link/send (auth.router.ts:1111) but WITH code EMAIL_REQUIRED on
	// /link-request (auth.router.ts:1498), so this and HTTPErrLinkEmailRequired are
	// not interchangeable. Do not merge them into one entry.
	HTTPErrPasswordlessEmailRequired = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "email is required"}
	HTTPErrUserIDOrEmailRequired     = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "userId or email is required"}
	HTTPErrUserIDRequired            = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "userId is required"}
	HTTPErrPhoneNotSet               = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "User does not have a phone number configured", Code: CodePhoneNotSet}

	HTTPErrInvalidSMSCode = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusUnauthorized, Message: "Invalid or expired SMS code"}

	// HTTPErrEmailNotConfigured is /magic-link/send's answer when nothing can
	// mail the link (magic-link.strategy.ts:12-14).
	HTTPErrEmailNotConfigured = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusInternalServerError, Message: "Email not configured", Code: CodeEmailNotConfigured}

	// HTTPErrSMSNotConfigured is /sms/send's answer when nothing can text the
	// code. The reference states this one twice with two different messages: the
	// router checks config.sms first and says "SMS is not configured"
	// (auth.router.ts:1179), and the strategy behind it says "SMS not
	// configured" (sms.strategy.ts:12) — no "is". Only the router's string is
	// ever on the wire, because its check runs before the strategy is reached,
	// so that is the one reproduced. The strategy's wording is not a second
	// catalog entry here; it has no route that can emit it.
	HTTPErrSMSNotConfigured = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusInternalServerError, Message: "SMS is not configured", Code: CodeSMSNotConfigured}

	// HTTPErrInvalidMagicLink covers both of the reference's magic-link
	// failures. The reference splits them — INVALID_MAGIC_LINK for a token it
	// cannot find, MAGIC_LINK_EXPIRED for one past its TTL
	// (magic-link.strategy.ts:41-49) — but Service.VerifyMagicLink collapses
	// the two into ErrInvalidToken, so the expiry code is not reachable from
	// here. Splitting the sentinel is the fix; both are 401 either way.
	HTTPErrInvalidMagicLink = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusUnauthorized, Message: "Invalid magic link token", Code: CodeInvalidMagicLink}
	HTTPErrTokenMismatch    = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusUnauthorized, Message: "Token mismatch", Code: CodeTokenMismatch}

	// The two "Invalid TOTP code" entries differ only in status: /2fa/verify
	// answers 401 (auth.router.ts:869-872), /2fa/verify-setup answers 400
	// (:847-850).
	HTTPErrInvalidTOTPCode      = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusUnauthorized, Message: "Invalid TOTP code"}
	HTTPErrInvalidTOTPSetupCode = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "Invalid TOTP code"}
	HTTPErrTOTPNotSetUp         = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "User not found or 2FA not set up"}

	HTTPErrTwoFactorRequiredForUser  = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusForbidden, Message: "Cannot disable 2FA: required for your account", Code: CodeTwoFactorRequired}
	HTTPErrTwoFactorRequiredByPolicy = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusForbidden, Message: "Cannot disable 2FA: required by system policy", Code: CodeTwoFactorRequired}
)

The catalog entries these routes write. Several carry no code: the reference answers those inline rather than through its AuthError path, and the omission is exact, not an oversight (wire-contract §3, "Shared mechanics").

View Source 
var (
	// HTTPErrNoAccessToken and HTTPErrInvalidAccessToken are 403 and carry no
	// code. That looks wrong next to the 401s around them, but it is what the
	// reference middleware emits and the clients are built against it.
	HTTPErrNoAccessToken      = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusForbidden, Message: "No access token provided"}
	HTTPErrInvalidAccessToken = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusForbidden, Message: "Invalid or expired access token"}

	// HTTPErrSessionRevoked is the family's fast-logout signal: both browser
	// clients stop refreshing and log out on this exact code, so nothing else
	// may be returned for a revoked session.
	HTTPErrSessionRevoked = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusUnauthorized, Message: "Session has been revoked", Code: CodeSessionRevoked}

	HTTPErrNoRefreshToken      = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusUnauthorized, Message: "No refresh token provided"}
	HTTPErrInvalidRefreshToken = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusUnauthorized, Message: "Invalid refresh token"}
	HTTPErrExpiredRefreshToken = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusUnauthorized, Message: "Invalid or expired refresh token", Code: CodeInvalidRefreshToken}

	HTTPErrInvalidCredentials = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusUnauthorized, Message: "Invalid credentials", Code: CodeInvalidCredentials}
	HTTPErrEmailNotVerified   = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusForbidden, Message: "Email address is not verified", Code: CodeEmailNotVerified}
	HTTPErrTwoFactorRequired  = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusForbidden, Message: "Two-factor authentication required", Code: CodeTwoFactorRequired}
	HTTPErrInvalidToken       = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusUnauthorized, Message: "Invalid or expired token", Code: CodeInvalidToken}
	HTTPErrCSRFInvalid        = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusForbidden, Message: "CSRF token validation failed", Code: CodeCSRFInvalid}
	// HTTPErrUserNotFound carries no code: every reference site that emits the
	// literal "User not found" emits it code-less (GET /me, /change-password,
	// /sms/send, the magic-link 2fa branch). The one coded USER_NOT_FOUND in the
	// reference is a different message ("Target user not found", /link-request),
	// so a route reusing this value must not gain a code by accident.
	HTTPErrUserNotFound   = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusNotFound, Message: "User not found"}
	HTTPErrNotImplemented = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusNotImplemented, Message: "Feature not supported by the configured stores", Code: CodeNotImplemented}

	// HTTPErrInternal deliberately carries neither a code nor the underlying
	// error text: an unexpected failure must not describe itself to the caller.
	HTTPErrInternal = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusInternalServerError, Message: "Internal server error"}

	HTTPErrUserExists   = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusConflict, Message: "User already exists", Code: CodeUserExists}
	HTTPErrWeakPassword = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "Password is too weak", Code: CodeWeakPassword}
	HTTPErrInvalidBody  = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "Invalid request body", Code: CodeInvalidBody}
)

The error catalog. Messages are the reference's own strings, because a client that surfaces the server message must not read differently per implementation.

View Source 
var (
	// HTTPErrResetTokenStoreMissing and the two below it are 500, not 501: the
	// reference reports a store that cannot perform the flow as an internal
	// error (auth.router.ts:805-808, 937-940, 1000-1003, 1042-1045). A client
	// that treats 501 as "feature absent" and 500 as "server broken" therefore
	// has to see 500 here, which is why these routes do not go through
	// HTTPErrorFor's ErrFeatureNotSupported → 501 mapping.
	HTTPErrResetTokenStoreMissing        = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusInternalServerError, Message: "UserStore does not implement findByResetToken"}
	HTTPErrEmailVerificationStoreMissing = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusInternalServerError, Message: "UserStore does not implement email verification"}
	HTTPErrChangeEmailStoreMissing       = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusInternalServerError, Message: "UserStore does not implement change-email"}

	HTTPErrInvalidResetToken       = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "Invalid reset token"}
	HTTPErrInvalidVerifyToken      = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "Invalid verification token"}
	HTTPErrInvalidEmailChangeToken = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "Invalid email-change token"}
	HTTPErrVerifyTokenRequired     = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "Token is required"}
	HTTPErrEmailAlreadyVerified    = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "Email is already verified"}

	// HTTPErrCurrentPasswordIncorrect is a 401 with no code, unlike the coded
	// INVALID_CREDENTIALS a failed login returns. Reproduced as-is even though it
	// is a known hazard: /change-password is absent from the Angular
	// interceptor's no-retry list, so a wrong current password costs a pointless
	// refresh-and-replay round trip (wire-contract §2, [MISMATCH]).
	HTTPErrCurrentPasswordIncorrect = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusUnauthorized, Message: "Current password is incorrect"}
	HTTPErrNewPasswordRequired      = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusBadRequest, Message: "New password is required"}

	// HTTPErrEmailInUse carries no code, so a client cannot branch on it — only
	// on the 409 status.
	HTTPErrEmailInUse = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusConflict, Message: "Email address is already in use"}

	HTTPErrPasswordRequired = HTTPError{
		Status:  http.StatusForbidden,
		Message: "You must set a password before you can change your email address.",
		Code:    CodePasswordRequired,
	}
)

The §2 error catalog. Messages are the reference's own strings, down to the "UserStore does not implement …" wording it uses for an incapable store.

View Source 
var ErrDeliveryFailed = errors.New("auth: delivery failed after the credential was stored")

ErrDeliveryFailed marks a send that failed after the credential was already stored. It is joined to the transport's own error rather than replacing it, so a caller can still read the cause, and it exists for exactly one reason: /forgot-password has to tell a delivery failure apart from a store failure in order to swallow the first and report the second (Auth.ForgotPassword).

It maps to no catalog entry of its own. HTTPErrorFor does not know it, so it falls through to the generic 500 — which is what the reference answers for a throwing mailer, and what the two authenticated routes therefore answer.

View Source 
var ErrMagicLinkOwnerMismatch = errors.New("auth: magic link belongs to another user")

ErrMagicLinkOwnerMismatch is a valid magic link presented as a second factor for somebody else: the link verified, but it does not belong to the user the step-up token names. It is a distinct sentinel rather than ErrInvalidToken because the wire answer differs (TOKEN_MISMATCH, not INVALID_MAGIC_LINK) and because the two failures mean different things — one is a bad link, the other is a good link on the wrong account.

View Source 
var HTTPErrSessionNotFound = HTTPError{Status: http.StatusNotFound, Message: "Session not found"}

HTTPErrSessionNotFound is the answer to DELETE /sessions/{handle} for a handle that does not exist and for one that belongs to somebody else — deliberately the same body, so the route cannot be used to probe for live sessions (auth.router.ts:762-767). It is written by the route rather than mapped in HTTPErrorFor, because ErrSessionNotFound means "unusable refresh token" (401) everywhere else.

Functions

func APIKeyMiddleware 

func APIKeyMiddleware(store APIKeyStore, requiredScopes []string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler

func AccessTokenFromRequest added in v0.2.0 

func AccessTokenFromRequest(r *http.Request) string

AccessTokenFromRequest applies the reference's extraction order: the Authorization header first, then the access-token cookie.

func BearerToken added in v0.2.0 

func BearerToken(header string) string

BearerToken extracts the token from an Authorization header.

func CSRFMiddleware 

func CSRFMiddleware(cfg HTTPConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler

CSRFMiddleware distributes and enforces the double-submit token.

Distribution mirrors the reference's router-level auto-init: a request that arrives without a readable CSRF cookie gets a fresh one.

Enforcement follows the reference matrix. A request is checked when it is an unsafe method, on a mounted route, that route is not exempt, the request presents no bearer credential, and either it carries an access-token cookie or the route does its own manual check in the reference: 

enforced = mutating && mounted && !exempt && !usingBearerCredential
           && (accessTokenCookiePresent || manualCheckRoute)

Safe methods, bearer requests, the unauthenticated routes in csrfExemptRoutes and — for every route but csrfManualCheckRoutes — requests with no cookie credential are passed through. The last of those is the reference's ordering: see csrfEnforced.

func CookieValue added in v0.2.0 

func CookieValue(r *http.Request, base string) string

CookieValue reads a cookie honouring the family's __Host- → __Secure- → bare priority. Every read site must go through it, otherwise a deployment that switches Secure on stops recognising its own cookies.

func DecodeOptionalJSON added in v0.2.0 

func DecodeOptionalJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, dst any) bool

DecodeOptionalJSON decodes a JSON request body into dst, tolerating an absent or empty one, and writes the error envelope when the body is present but malformed.

Every route in this group accepts an empty body: the reference runs express.json(), which leaves req.body as {} rather than failing, and the Flutter client posts /send-verification-email with no body at all. Rejecting a malformed body with 400 INVALID_BODY is the port's own convention, already applied by /register and /login.

func DecodeOptionalJSONBody added in v0.2.0 

func DecodeOptionalJSONBody(r *http.Request, dst any) error

DecodeOptionalJSONBody decodes r's JSON body into dst, treating an absent or zero-length body as the empty object rather than as an error.

The reference runs behind express.json(), which leaves req.body = {} when the request carried no body at all; PATCH /profile and POST /add-phone then read optional fields off it, so a bodyless call is a 200 no-op there and not a 400 (§3.5, §3.6). Without a shared decoder the four adapters disagree about exactly this: echo's Bind returns nil for a zero-length body, while encoding/json and gin's ShouldBindJSON both surface io.EOF as a decode error.

A body that is present but is not valid JSON is still an error: express.json() rejects that too, and tolerating it would let a typo'd payload be silently applied as "change nothing".

func EmailChangeConfirmURL added in v0.3.0 

func EmailChangeConfirmURL(base, token string) string

EmailChangeConfirmURL builds the change-email confirmation link.

func EmailVerificationURL added in v0.3.0 

func EmailVerificationURL(base, token string) string

EmailVerificationURL builds the verify-email link.

func GenerateOpenAPISpec 

func GenerateOpenAPISpec(info OpenAPIInfo) map[string]any

GenerateOpenAPISpec returns an OpenAPI 3.0 spec for the mounted auth endpoints.

func IsBearerRequest added in v0.2.0 

func IsBearerRequest(r *http.Request) bool

IsBearerRequest reports whether the caller asked for token delivery in the response body instead of cookies.

func MagicLinkURL added in v0.3.0 

func MagicLinkURL(base, token string) string

MagicLinkURL builds the link the reference mails: the base with any trailing slash removed, then "/magic-link/verify?token=<token>" (magic-link.strategy.ts:23-27). Reproduced here so that a deployment writing its own sender does not have to guess the shape the verify route and the shipped clients expect.

base is the address the auth routes are reachable at from a mailbox — "https://app.example.com/auth". The reference derives it per request from email.siteUrl and the request Origin (resolveSiteUrl / buildUiLink, wire-contract §4); this port has neither a siteUrl config field nor origin resolution yet, so the base is the sender's to supply. An empty base yields a relative link, which the reference also produces when siteUrl is unset — it is a misconfiguration in both, not a special case handled here.

The token is interpolated raw. randomToken emits base64url, whose alphabet needs no query escaping, and the reference interpolates its hex token raw for the same reason.

func OAuthNotConfiguredError added in v0.2.0 

func OAuthNotConfiguredError(provider string) error

OAuthNotConfiguredError is the "<Provider> OAuth not configured" stub as an error, so an adapter can answer it without reaching into the flow methods.

func PasswordResetURL added in v0.3.0 

func PasswordResetURL(base, token string) string

PasswordResetURL, EmailVerificationURL and EmailChangeConfirmURL build the links the reference mails, so a deployment writing its own sender does not have to guess the shape.

base is the address the auth routes are reachable at from a mailbox. The reference derives it per request (resolveSiteUrl / buildUiLink, wire-contract §4); this port has neither a siteUrl config field nor origin resolution yet, so the base is the sender's to supply, exactly as for MagicLinkURL.

One caveat carries over from the reference and is worth knowing before these links reach a real mailbox: /reset-password and /change-email/confirm are POST-only routes, so a browser following either link lands on something it cannot GET (wire-contract §2 notes the same about the reference with its UI disabled). A deployment points base at the front end that owns those two pages; /verify-email is a GET and works directly.

func RefreshTokenFromRequest added in v0.2.0 

func RefreshTokenFromRequest(r *http.Request) string

RefreshTokenFromRequest applies the reference's acceptance order for /refresh: a refreshToken in the body wins, otherwise the cookie. A missing or empty body is not an error — cookie-mode refresh sends no body at all.

func SMSCodeMessage added in v0.3.0 

func SMSCodeMessage(code string) string

SMSCodeMessage is the text the reference texts (sms.strategy.ts:20). It is on a wire of its own — a real handset — so the literal is reproduced rather than reworded, and it lives here so a custom SMSCodeSender can reuse it instead of drifting from the rest of the family.

func ServeAdminUI 

func ServeAdminUI() http.Handler

ServeAdminUI returns an http.Handler serving the embedded admin dashboard HTML.

func ServeAuthJS 

func ServeAuthJS() http.Handler

ServeAuthJS returns an http.Handler serving the embedded auth.js browser SDK.

func ServeAuthUI 

func ServeAuthUI() http.Handler

ServeAuthUI returns an http.Handler serving the embedded auth UI HTML (login/register).

func ServeSSE 

func ServeSSE(hub *SseHub, channel string) http.HandlerFunc

ServeSSE is an http.HandlerFunc that streams SSE to a connected client. channel is typically the authenticated user's ID.

func SessionHandleParam added in v0.2.0 

func SessionHandleParam(r *http.Request, raw string) string

SessionHandleParam normalises the {handle} path parameter: exactly one percent-decode, the way the reference's decodeURIComponent does (auth.router.ts:761). One family client URI-escapes the handle and the other posts it verbatim, so both forms have to name the same session.

The decode deliberately does not start from the router's own path parameter, because the four routers disagree about what they hand over: chi (via r.PathValue, which chi populates from its escaped route path) and echo (which routes on r.URL.RawPath when it is set) pass the segment still encoded, while net/http and gin pass it already decoded. Unescaping whatever arrives is therefore one decode on two adapters and two on the other two, and no inspection of the string can tell the cases apart — "ses_50%25off" is both a valid decoded handle and the encoded form of "ses_50%off".

r.URL.EscapedPath() is router-independent (RawPath when the request carried one, the re-encoded Path otherwise), so taking the last segment of it and decoding once gives all four adapters the same handle. raw is kept as the fallback for a path that yields no segment.

A handle containing an encoded slash is still not recoverable — the path has already been split on it — but the handles this package issues are "ses_" plus hex.

func TwoFactorMode added in v0.2.0 

func TwoFactorMode(mode string) bool

TwoFactorMode reports whether a magic-link or SMS request asked for the second-factor branch.

The comparison is literal and case-sensitive because the reference's is (`mode === '2fa'`, auth.router.ts:1087, :1134, :1192, :1255): "login", the empty string, and anything else all take the login branch. That is what makes the two shipped clients interchangeable — Angular sends mode:"login", Flutter omits the field — so loosening this comparison silently reroutes one of them.

func VerifyEmailToken added in v0.2.0 

func VerifyEmailToken(r *http.Request) string

VerifyEmailToken reads the token GET /verify-email carries. It is a query parameter, not a body field, and the route is the only GET in this group.

The value is used exactly as sent: the reference tests it with `if (!token)` (auth.router.ts:972), so a token of one space is truthy there and fails the lookup with 400 "Invalid verification token" rather than 400 "Token is required". Trimming here would be friendlier but would move that request into the other error, so the reference's answer wins.

func VerifyWebhookSignature 

func VerifyWebhookSignature(secret string, body []byte, sigHeader string) error

VerifyWebhookSignature validates an inbound webhook signature.

func WriteHTTPError added in v0.2.0 

func WriteHTTPError(w http.ResponseWriter, e HTTPError)

WriteHTTPError writes the error envelope.

func WriteJSON added in v0.2.0 

func WriteJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, payload any)

WriteJSON writes payload as the entire response body.

func WriteServiceError added in v0.2.0 

func WriteServiceError(w http.ResponseWriter, err error)

WriteServiceError maps a service sentinel and writes it.

func WriteSuccess added in v0.2.0 

func WriteSuccess(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, extra map[string]any)

WriteSuccess writes the {"success": true} envelope, merging any extra top-level fields a route contributes.

func WriteTwoFactorChallenge added in v0.3.0 

func WriteTwoFactorChallenge(w http.ResponseWriter, challenge TwoFactorChallenge)

WriteTwoFactorChallenge writes the login challenge as the entire response body.

No cookie is set on either branch, in either delivery mode: nothing has been issued yet, so there is nothing to deliver. That is the reference's behaviour too — the 2FA branch returns before issueTokens is ever reached (auth.router.ts:571-578 precedes :580-581).

Types

type APICompatibilityNotes added in v0.3.0 

type APICompatibilityNotes struct {
	// ContractTarget names the clients the wire shape is pinned to.
	ContractTarget string `json:"contractTarget"`
	// ReferenceRevision is ReferenceRevision, carried in the value so a caller
	// that serialises these notes ships the revision its citations need.
	ReferenceRevision string `json:"referenceRevision"`
	// CookieConventions and BearerConventions summarise the two delivery modes.
	CookieConventions string `json:"cookieConventions"`
	BearerConventions string `json:"bearerConventions"`
	// KnownDeviations is the register, in no significant order.
	KnownDeviations []Deviation `json:"knownDeviations"`
}

APICompatibilityNotes is the contract this port targets, plus every known deviation from it.

func CompatibilityNotes added in v0.3.0 

func CompatibilityNotes() APICompatibilityNotes

CompatibilityNotes returns the wire contract this port targets and the known deviations from it.

The result is freshly built on every call and shares nothing with the package, so a caller may sort, filter or edit it without affecting anyone else's view.

type APIKeyRecord 

type APIKeyRecord struct {
	ID         string
	Prefix     string
	Name       string
	ServiceID  string
	KeyHash    string
	Scopes     []string
	AllowedIPs []string
	IsActive   bool
	ExpiresAt  *time.Time
	LastUsedAt *time.Time
}

APIKeyRecord stores hashed key material and policy constraints.

type APIKeyService 

type APIKeyService struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

APIKeyService issues and verifies API keys. Create stores a bcrypt hash of the key, so it carries the same cost knob as Config.BcryptCost — an operator who raises the password cost would otherwise still get key hashes pinned at the default, with no way to reach them.

func NewAPIKeyService 

func NewAPIKeyService(bcryptCost int) *APIKeyService

NewAPIKeyService returns a service that hashes new keys at bcryptCost.

As with Config.BcryptCost, zero means unset and resolves to bcrypt.DefaultCost. Verify does not hash, so a service used only for verification may be built with 0 regardless of the cost its keys were created at: bcrypt reads the cost out of the stored hash.

func (*APIKeyService) Create 

func (s *APIKeyService) Create(ctx context.Context, store APIKeyStore, name, serviceID string, scopes, allowedIPs []string, expiresAt *time.Time) (rawKey string, record APIKeyRecord, err error)

func (*APIKeyService) Verify 

func (s *APIKeyService) Verify(ctx context.Context, store APIKeyStore, rawKey string, ip string, requiredScopes []string) (APIKeyRecord, error)

type APIKeyStore 

type APIKeyStore interface {
	Save(ctx context.Context, key APIKeyRecord) error
	FindByPrefix(ctx context.Context, prefix string) (APIKeyRecord, error)
	Revoke(ctx context.Context, id string) error
	UpdateLastUsed(ctx context.Context, id string, when time.Time) error
}

APIKeyStore persists and resolves API keys.

type AddPhoneInput added in v0.2.0 

type AddPhoneInput struct {
	UserID      string
	TenantID    string
	PhoneNumber string
}

AddPhoneInput is the payload behind POST /add-phone. An empty PhoneNumber clears the number, as the reference's nullable phoneNumber does.

type Auth 

type Auth struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

Auth is the top-level entrypoint configured with functional options.

func New 

func New(opts ...Option) (*Auth, error)

New creates a configured Auth instance from the package defaults.

func NewWithConfig added in v0.2.0 

func NewWithConfig(cfg Config, opts ...Option) (*Auth, error)

NewWithConfig creates a configured Auth instance from a pre-populated Config, with any Options applied in order on top of it.

New builds its Config internally and the exported Option set has always been narrower than Config, so fields with no matching Option — the individual TTLs, EmailVerificationMode, and until now BcryptCost — were unreachable from outside the package (#25). Accepting the struct closes that whole class of gap at once and cannot drift as Config grows, which one-Option-per-field would. The Options remain as sugar and still compose with a supplied Config.

cfg is validated by NewService exactly as New's is; a hand-built Config that omits, say, the TTLs is rejected rather than silently defaulted.

func (*Auth) ChangePassword added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) ChangePassword(ctx context.Context, in ChangePasswordInput) error

ChangePassword performs POST /change-password.

A passwordless account — OAuth-only, or magic-link-only — skips the current-password comparison entirely and may set an initial password by supplying newPassword alone: in the reference the compare sits inside `if (user.password)` and the `else if` only fires when *both* fields are falsy, so such a caller falls through to the hash-and-store (wire-contract §2 "Passwordless-account path", auth.router.ts:916-928). It is the only way an account with no password ever acquires one.

Service.ChangePassword compares unconditionally (service.go:276), and verifyPassword("", "") is a bcrypt error, so delegating the passwordless case to it reports a password the account does not have as incorrect. The passwordless half is therefore handled here rather than by widening Service.ChangePassword: a library consumer calling the service directly may deliberately not want a caller setting a password without presenting one, and this PR's contract is the HTTP surface. The service-level divergence is filed upstream.

func (*Auth) CleanupExpiredSessions added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) CleanupExpiredSessions(ctx context.Context) (int, error)

CleanupExpiredSessions delegates to Service.CleanupExpiredSessions.

func (*Auth) ConfirmEmailChange added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) ConfirmEmailChange(ctx context.Context, in ConfirmEmailChangeInput) error

ConfirmEmailChange delegates to Service.ConfirmEmailChange.

func (*Auth) DeleteAccount 

func (a *Auth) DeleteAccount(ctx context.Context, in DeleteAccountInput) error

DeleteAccount delegates to Service.DeleteAccount.

func (*Auth) DisableTOTP added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) DisableTOTP(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error

DisableTOTP delegates to Service.DisableTOTP.

func (*Auth) FindUser added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) FindUser(ctx context.Context, userID, email, tenantID string) (User, error)

FindUser delegates to Service.FindUser.

func (*Auth) ForgotPassword added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) ForgotPassword(ctx context.Context, in ForgotPasswordInput) (string, error)

ForgotPassword delegates to Service.ForgotPassword and then throws away one class of failure: a send that failed after the token was stored. The route answers 200 {"success":true} for it, exactly as it does for an address that does not exist.

This is a deliberate divergence, and the only one on this route. The reference's send sits inside the route's try block, so a throwing mailer reaches handleError and answers 500 (auth.router.ts:787-798) — which means a known address 500s while an unknown one 200s, and an attacker with a broken mail gateway has the enumeration oracle the route exists to deny. The spec records exactly that and marks it [UNTESTED] (wire-contract §2, "Anti-enumeration caveat: a throwing mailer produces a 500 only for existing users, which is an observable oracle"), so no client can depend on it. The port already refuses to ship an oracle the reference leaves open elsewhere — SMSVerifyHTTPError answers 401 where the reference would answer 404 for the same reason.

Store failures are NOT swallowed: those still 500, and that oracle *is* reproduced (see ForgotPasswordHTTPError and the suite case that pins it). The difference is that a store that cannot persist a reset token has minted no credential and served no request correctly, while a stored-but-undelivered token is harmless — unguessable, single-use, expiring — so silence costs the caller nothing but a mail that never arrives.

Divergence from Service.ForgotPassword is the same arrangement as Auth.ChangePassword's: the Auth methods are the HTTP surface, and a library consumer calling the service directly still learns that delivery failed.

func (*Auth) IssueTempToken added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) IssueTempToken(ctx context.Context, user User) (string, error)

IssueTempToken delegates to Service.IssueTempToken.

func (*Auth) IssueTokensForUser added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) IssueTokensForUser(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) (User, AuthTokens, error)

IssueTokensForUser delegates to Service.IssueTokensForUser.

func (*Auth) LinkRequest added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) LinkRequest(ctx context.Context, in LinkRequestInput) (LinkRequestResult, error)

LinkRequest issues a single-use account-link token and hands the verification link to the configured delivery hook.

func (*Auth) LinkVerify added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) LinkVerify(ctx context.Context, in LinkVerifyInput) (LinkVerifyResult, error)

LinkVerify consumes an account-link token and writes the association.

func (*Auth) ListLinkedAccounts added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) ListLinkedAccounts(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]PublicLinkedAccount, error)

ListLinkedAccounts returns a user's provider associations, always as a non-nil slice so the JSON is [] rather than null.

func (*Auth) ListSessions added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) ListSessions(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) ([]Session, error)

ListSessions returns a user's *active* sessions, which is what the reference's GET /sessions serves: ISessionStore.getSessionsForUser is documented "Return all active sessions for the given user" (session-store.interface.ts:58-61), and because revokeSession is documented to "Invalidate (delete) a single session" (:70-76) — which the family's own store does literally, `async revokeSession(h) { this.sessions.delete(h); }` (ng-awesome-node-auth/src/server/in-memory-session-store.ts:29-31) — a revoked session is simply gone from the next list.

This port's MemorySessionStore tombstones instead of deleting, and correctly so: /refresh needs the tombstone to answer 401 SESSION_REVOKED rather than "not found". The filter therefore has to live above the store, and this is the accessor the routes go through.

Expired-but-not-revoked sessions are deliberately NOT filtered. The reference's store does not filter them out of getSessionsForUser either — only deleteExpiredSessions removes them — so a device-manager UI sees them there too.

func (*Auth) Login 

func (a *Auth) Login(ctx context.Context, in LoginInput) (User, AuthTokens, error)

Login delegates to Service.Login.

func (*Auth) LoginWithChallenge added in v0.3.0 

func (a *Auth) LoginWithChallenge(ctx context.Context, in LoginInput) (LoginResult, error)

LoginWithChallenge delegates to Service.LoginWithChallenge. It is what the adapters call, so that a 2FA-gated account is answered with the challenge rather than with the bare sentinel.

func (*Auth) Logout 

func (a *Auth) Logout(ctx context.Context, refreshToken string) error

Logout delegates to Service.Logout.

func (*Auth) LogoutAccessToken added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) LogoutAccessToken(ctx context.Context, accessToken string) error

LogoutAccessToken revokes the session an access token belongs to. It is the revocation path a cookie client's logout takes, since the refresh cookie is out of scope for <prefix>/logout whenever it is path-scoped.

func (*Auth) LogoutRequest added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) LogoutRequest(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request)

LogoutRequest ends the session the caller presents, best effort, and is the single logout revocation path all four adapters call.

The order matters. A refresh token in the body or the refresh cookie revokes the whole session, so it is tried first. But the refresh cookie is scoped to <prefix>/refresh in every configuration whose name does not resolve to __Host- — a Domain, or a non-root cookie Path — and a browser therefore sends nothing at all to <prefix>/logout. That is why the reference logout reads the *access* token cookie (auth.router.ts:592) and revokes payload.sid: the access cookie is scoped to "/" and is always in scope. Without the fallback, logout answers 200 {"success":true}, clears the cookies, and leaves the refresh token and the session live server-side.

Every failure is swallowed: an absent or already-unusable credential must still leave the caller logged out rather than stranded with live cookies.

func (*Auth) Me 

func (a *Auth) Me(ctx context.Context, accessToken string) (User, error)

Me delegates to Service.Me.

func (*Auth) OAuthBegin added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) OAuthBegin(ctx context.Context, in OAuthBeginInput) (OAuthBeginResult, error)

OAuthBegin mints a signed state, derives the PKCE challenge and builds the provider authorization URL.

func (*Auth) OAuthComplete added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) OAuthComplete(ctx context.Context, in OAuthCompleteInput) (OAuthCompleteResult, error)

OAuthComplete verifies the state, exchanges the code with the PKCE verifier and resolves the user.

func (*Auth) OAuthConfigured added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) OAuthConfigured() bool

OAuthConfigured reports whether the OAuth routes have anything to serve. The adapters mount the routes unconditionally, so they need this to answer the reference's "not configured" stub.

func (*Auth) Refresh 

func (a *Auth) Refresh(ctx context.Context, refreshToken string) (AuthTokens, error)

Refresh delegates to Service.Refresh.

func (*Auth) Register 

func (a *Auth) Register(ctx context.Context, in RegisterInput) (User, AuthTokens, error)

Register delegates to Service.Register.

func (*Auth) RequestEmailChange added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) RequestEmailChange(ctx context.Context, in ChangeEmailRequestInput) (string, error)

RequestEmailChange delegates to Service.RequestEmailChange.

func (*Auth) ResetPassword added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) ResetPassword(ctx context.Context, in ResetPasswordInput) error

ResetPassword delegates to Service.ResetPassword.

func (*Auth) ResolveHTTPConfig added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) ResolveHTTPConfig(cfg HTTPConfig) HTTPConfig

ResolveHTTPConfig fills cfg's derived defaults from this instance's token lifetimes. Adapters call it once at mount time.

func (*Auth) RevokeUserSession added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) RevokeUserSession(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID, sessionID string) error

RevokeUserSession delegates to Service.RevokeUserSession.

func (*Auth) SMSConfigured added in v0.3.0 

func (a *Auth) SMSConfigured() bool

SMSConfigured reports whether the deployment can deliver an SMS code.

/sms/send has to ask before it does anything else, because the reference checks config.sms at the very top of the route (auth.router.ts:1178-1181) and not in the strategy behind it. The ordering is client-visible, and not in a cosmetic way: the route answers 200 to an unknown address as an anti-enumeration measure, so a handler that only found out at the service call would tell an unconfigured deployment's caller "sent" for every address it does not have. The magic-link route needs no equivalent — the reference checks email configuration inside the strategy there, which Service.SendMagicLink reproduces, and WriteServiceError maps the sentinel. 

func (a *Auth) SendMagicLink(ctx context.Context, in MagicLinkSendInput) (string, error)

SendMagicLink delegates to Service.SendMagicLink.

func (*Auth) SendSMSCode added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) SendSMSCode(ctx context.Context, in SMSCodeSendInput) (string, error)

SendSMSCode delegates to Service.SendSMSCode.

func (*Auth) SendVerificationEmailToken added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) SendVerificationEmailToken(ctx context.Context, in EmailVerificationInput) (string, error)

SendVerificationEmailToken delegates to Service.SendVerificationEmailToken. An empty token with no error means the address is already verified.

func (*Auth) Service 

func (a *Auth) Service() *Service

Service exposes the configured core service.

func (*Auth) StartTOTPEnrolment added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) StartTOTPEnrolment(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) (TOTPSetup, error)

StartTOTPEnrolment delegates to Service.StartTOTPEnrolment.

func (*Auth) StepUpSubject added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) StepUpSubject(tempToken string, missing, invalid HTTPError) (TempTokenSubject, HTTPError, bool)

StepUpSubject resolves the tempToken a 2FA-mode request carries, reporting the envelope to write when it cannot.

The two error arguments are what keeps the reference's inconsistency reproducible without spreading it through the handlers: the magic-link and SMS routes pass HTTPErrTempTokenRequired and HTTPErrInvalidTempToken, while /2fa/verify passes HTTPErrInvalidStepUpToken for both — it has no missing-token branch at all, so an absent tempToken simply fails verification there.

func (*Auth) TwoFactorPolicy added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) TwoFactorPolicy() bool

TwoFactorPolicy reports whether the deployment requires a second factor of every user. It is the port's equivalent of the reference's settingsStore require2FA flag, which is what /2fa/disable refuses on.

func (*Auth) UnlinkAccount added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) UnlinkAccount(ctx context.Context, userID, provider, providerAccountID string) error

UnlinkAccount removes one provider association.

The reference performs no existence check and answers success unconditionally (wire-contract.md §4, DELETE /linked-accounts). This keeps that, and adds the ownership check the reference gets for free by passing the user id into its store: a link that belongs to somebody else is left alone.

func (*Auth) UpdatePhoneNumber added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) UpdatePhoneNumber(ctx context.Context, in AddPhoneInput) (User, error)

UpdatePhoneNumber delegates to Service.UpdatePhoneNumber.

func (*Auth) UpdateProfile 

func (a *Auth) UpdateProfile(ctx context.Context, in UpdateProfileInput) (User, error)

UpdateProfile delegates to Service.UpdateProfile.

func (*Auth) VerifyEmail added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) VerifyEmail(ctx context.Context, in VerifyEmailInput) error

VerifyEmail delegates to Service.VerifyEmail. 

func (a *Auth) VerifyMagicLink(ctx context.Context, in MagicLinkVerifyInput) (User, AuthTokens, error)

VerifyMagicLink delegates to Service.VerifyMagicLink.

func (*Auth) VerifyMagicLinkForUser added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) VerifyMagicLinkForUser(ctx context.Context, in MagicLinkVerifyInput, userID string) (User, AuthTokens, error)

VerifyMagicLinkForUser delegates to Service.VerifyMagicLinkForUser. The step-up branch of POST /magic-link/verify uses it so that a link belonging to another user is refused before a session exists.

func (*Auth) VerifySMSCode added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) VerifySMSCode(ctx context.Context, in SMSCodeVerifyInput) (User, AuthTokens, error)

VerifySMSCode delegates to Service.VerifySMSCode.

func (*Auth) VerifyTOTP added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) VerifyTOTP(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID, code string) (User, AuthTokens, error)

VerifyTOTP delegates to Service.VerifyTOTP.

func (*Auth) VerifyTOTPSetup added in v0.2.0 

func (a *Auth) VerifyTOTPSetup(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID, secret, code string) error

VerifyTOTPSetup delegates to Service.VerifyTOTPSetup.

type AuthTokens 

type AuthTokens struct {
	AccessToken  string
	RefreshToken string
	ExpiresIn    time.Duration
}

AuthTokens are the issued access/refresh pair.

type CSRFConfig 

type CSRFConfig struct {
	// Enabled gates both enforcement and cookie distribution, mirroring the
	// reference's config.csrf.enabled.
	Enabled    bool
	CookieName string
	HeaderName string
}

CSRFConfig configures the cookie+header double-submit CSRF protection. The cookie attributes come from HTTPConfig.Cookies so that the CSRF cookie is serialised by the same matrix as the token cookies.

func DefaultCSRFConfig 

func DefaultCSRFConfig() CSRFConfig

DefaultCSRFConfig returns defaults compatible with browser cookie auth flows.

type ChangeEmailRequestInput 

type ChangeEmailRequestInput struct {
	UserID   string
	TenantID string
	NewEmail string
}

type ChangePasswordInput 

type ChangePasswordInput struct {
	UserID          string
	TenantID        string
	CurrentPassword string
	NewPassword     string
}

type Config 

type Config struct {
	Secret          string
	Issuer          string
	AccessTokenTTL  time.Duration
	RefreshTokenTTL time.Duration
	SessionCheckOn  string
	ClockSkew       time.Duration
	MinPasswordLen  int
	// BcryptCost is the bcrypt cost used for every password hash the library
	// writes. It is this port's spelling of the reference's
	// AuthConfig.bcryptSaltRounds; "cost" is what x/crypto/bcrypt calls the
	// parameter, and what bcrypt.DefaultCost, MinCost and MaxCost name.
	//
	// Zero means unset, and unset means bcrypt.DefaultCost — never
	// bcrypt.MinCost. A Config that was never told a cost must not silently get
	// the weakest one. Any other value must lie in
	// [bcrypt.MinCost, bcrypt.MaxCost]; validate rejects the rest.
	BcryptCost            int
	ResetTokenTTL         time.Duration
	MagicLinkTTL          time.Duration
	SMSCodeTTL            time.Duration
	EmailVerificationTTL  time.Duration
	EmailVerificationMode string
	EmailChangeTTL        time.Duration
	TempTokenTTL          time.Duration
	Require2FA            bool
	BuildTokenClaims      func(ctx context.Context, user User) (map[string]any, error)
	// SendMagicLink and SendSMSCode are the delivery seam. Both are optional to
	// construct a service with and required to use the route that needs them:
	// leaving one nil is what makes POST <prefix>/magic-link/send answer 500
	// EMAIL_NOT_CONFIGURED and POST <prefix>/sms/send answer 500
	// SMS_NOT_CONFIGURED. See delivery.go for why they live here.
	SendMagicLink MagicLinkSender
	SendSMSCode   SMSCodeSender
	// SendPasswordReset, SendEmailVerification and SendEmailChange are the other
	// half of the same seam, for POST <prefix>/forgot-password,
	// POST <prefix>/send-verification-email and POST <prefix>/change-email/request.
	//
	// Leaving one nil is silence rather than an error: the reference's routes send
	// no mail and still answer 200 when neither a callback nor a mailer is
	// configured, so these three have no NOT_CONFIGURED code. See
	// delivery_password_email.go.
	SendPasswordReset     PasswordResetSender
	SendEmailVerification EmailVerificationSender
	SendEmailChange       EmailChangeSender
	Logger                func(format string, args ...any)
}

Config contains security and token settings for the auth service.

func DefaultConfig 

func DefaultConfig(secret string) Config

DefaultConfig returns secure defaults for development and production bootstrap.

type ConfirmEmailChangeInput 

type ConfirmEmailChangeInput struct {
	Token string
}

type CookieOptions added in v0.2.0 

type CookieOptions struct {
	Secure   bool
	SameSite http.SameSite
	Path     string
	Domain   string
	// RefreshTokenPath scopes the refresh cookie. Empty resolves to
	// <APIPrefix>/refresh, matching the reference's router-time default.
	RefreshTokenPath   string
	AccessTokenMaxAge  time.Duration
	RefreshTokenMaxAge time.Duration
	CSRFTokenMaxAge    time.Duration
}

CookieOptions is the cookie serialisation matrix. Every adapter writes cookies through it, so the attributes cannot diverge between frameworks.

func DefaultCookieOptions added in v0.2.0 

func DefaultCookieOptions() CookieOptions

DefaultCookieOptions returns the port's defaults. Secure defaults to true — stricter than the reference's false — because every cookie here is either a credential or a CSRF token.

func (CookieOptions) ClearAuthCookies added in v0.2.0 

func (o CookieOptions) ClearAuthCookies(w http.ResponseWriter, includeCSRF bool)

ClearAuthCookies expires every name variant of the auth cookies. Expiring a cookie requires an exact name+path+domain match, so a cookie written under a different prefix — by an older release, or before Secure was switched on — would otherwise survive logout.

func (CookieOptions) CookieName added in v0.2.0 

func (o CookieOptions) CookieName(base string) string

CookieName resolves the prefix a cookie must carry: an insecure cookie stays bare, a secure cookie that is host-scoped to "/" earns __Host-, and any other secure cookie earns __Secure-. The refresh cookie is resolved from Path, not RefreshTokenPath, exactly as the reference does.

func (CookieOptions) SetAccessTokenCookie added in v0.2.0 

func (o CookieOptions) SetAccessTokenCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, value string)

SetAccessTokenCookie writes the access-token cookie.

func (CookieOptions) SetCSRFTokenCookie added in v0.2.0 

func (o CookieOptions) SetCSRFTokenCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, value string)

SetCSRFTokenCookie writes the CSRF cookie. It is deliberately not HttpOnly: double-submit requires the page to read it and mirror it into the header.

func (CookieOptions) SetRefreshTokenCookie added in v0.2.0 

func (o CookieOptions) SetRefreshTokenCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, value string)

SetRefreshTokenCookie writes the refresh-token cookie.

type DeleteAccountInput 

type DeleteAccountInput struct {
	UserID   string
	TenantID string
}

type Deviation added in v0.3.0 

type Deviation struct {
	// ID is the stable handle for this deviation. It never changes once
	// published: the README keys its mirror on it and the tests pin the set, so
	// renaming one is a deliberate, visible act rather than a silent edit.
	ID string `json:"id"`
	// Title is the one-line heading a human reads first. It becomes the README
	// section heading for this entry.
	Title string `json:"title"`
	// Surface is the route or API surface affected, written as it is mounted —
	// paths are relative to the configured prefix, spelled <prefix> here.
	Surface string `json:"surface"`
	// Behaviour is what this port does.
	Behaviour string `json:"behaviour"`
	// Reference is what awesome-node-auth does instead.
	Reference string `json:"reference"`
	// Citations locate Reference in the reference source, as file:line or
	// file:line-line, resolved against ReferenceRevision.
	Citations []string `json:"citations"`
	// Why is the reason the standing rule was set aside. An entry without one is
	// not a decision, it is a bug that has not been recognised yet.
	Why string `json:"why"`
	// Notes carries any further labelled paragraphs this entry needs beyond the
	// four above — how to observe the difference, what a host can do about it.
	// Most entries need none.
	Notes []DeviationNote `json:"notes,omitempty"`
}

Deviation is one place this port deliberately answers differently from the reference.

The two behaviours are recorded separately, and the reference's carries a citation, so that a reader can check the claim rather than take it — and so that a maintainer who changes one of them has to come here and say so.

type DeviationNote added in v0.3.0 

type DeviationNote struct {
	Label string `json:"label"`
	Text  string `json:"text"`
}

DeviationNote is one extra labelled paragraph on a Deviation.

type EmailChangeDelivery added in v0.3.0 

type EmailChangeDelivery struct {
	UserID   string
	TenantID string
	// NewEmail is the pending address the message goes to.
	NewEmail string
	// Token is the plaintext token POST <prefix>/change-email/confirm accepts.
	Token     string
	ExpiresAt time.Time
}

EmailChangeDelivery is what an EmailChangeSender is handed.

NewEmail is the only address here, and it is the recipient: this message verifies that the new mailbox exists, so it goes to the new mailbox (auth.router.ts:1027-1032 mails newEmail; wire-contract §2 "sent to the new address"). The current address is deliberately absent — the delivery carries only what the message needs, and a sender that wants the old address has UserID to read it back with.

The reference also mails the *old* address a notice once the change is applied (config.email.sendEmailChanged from /change-email/confirm, auth.router.ts:1060-1066). This port has no sender for that notice and no template for it either — MailTemplater's email_change template is the confirm-the-new-address mail, not the notice — so the gap is recorded here rather than filled by inventing one. It belongs with a template addition.

type EmailChangeMailer added in v0.3.0 

type EmailChangeMailer struct{ TokenMailer }

EmailChangeMailer is the ready-made EmailChangeSender. It mails the pending address and renders the built-in email_change template.

The reference has no template of its own here: it reuses its verification sender and verification template for this mail (wire-contract §2, "there is no dedicated change-email template"). This port ships email_change already, in en and it, and nothing called it until now — so the better-worded template wins. The choice is invisible on the wire: the route answers {"success":true} either way, and only the mail body differs.

func NewEmailChangeMailer added in v0.3.0 

func NewEmailChangeMailer(transport MailerTransport, appName, baseURL string) *EmailChangeMailer

NewEmailChangeMailer builds an EmailChangeMailer with the built-in templates.

func (*EmailChangeMailer) Send added in v0.3.0 

func (m *EmailChangeMailer) Send(ctx context.Context, delivery EmailChangeDelivery) error

Send renders and delivers the email-change mail to the new address. Its signature is EmailChangeSender's.

type EmailChangeSender added in v0.3.0 

type EmailChangeSender func(ctx context.Context, delivery EmailChangeDelivery) error

EmailChangeSender delivers an email-change token to the pending address. See EmailVerificationSender for the failure contract.

type EmailChangeStore 

type EmailChangeStore interface {
	UpdateEmailChangeToken(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID, pendingEmail, tokenHash string, expiry time.Time) error
	GetUserByEmailChangeTokenHash(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) (User, error)
	ApplyEmailChange(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error
	ClearEmailChangeToken(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error
}

EmailChangeStore persists pending email change flow.

type EmailVerificationDelivery added in v0.3.0 

type EmailVerificationDelivery struct {
	UserID   string
	TenantID string
	Email    string
	// Token is the plaintext token GET <prefix>/verify-email accepts.
	Token     string
	ExpiresAt time.Time
}

EmailVerificationDelivery is what an EmailVerificationSender is handed. The route behind it is authenticated, so Email is the caller's own stored address.

type EmailVerificationInput 

type EmailVerificationInput struct {
	UserID   string
	TenantID string
}

type EmailVerificationMailer added in v0.3.0 

type EmailVerificationMailer struct{ TokenMailer }

EmailVerificationMailer is the ready-made EmailVerificationSender, rendering the built-in verify_email template. See PasswordResetMailer for the usage shape.

func NewEmailVerificationMailer added in v0.3.0 

func NewEmailVerificationMailer(transport MailerTransport, appName, baseURL string) *EmailVerificationMailer

NewEmailVerificationMailer builds an EmailVerificationMailer with the built-in templates.

func (*EmailVerificationMailer) Send added in v0.3.0 

func (m *EmailVerificationMailer) Send(ctx context.Context, delivery EmailVerificationDelivery) error

Send renders and delivers the verification mail. Its signature is EmailVerificationSender's.

type EmailVerificationSender added in v0.3.0 

type EmailVerificationSender func(ctx context.Context, delivery EmailVerificationDelivery) error

EmailVerificationSender delivers an email-verification token. An error fails the route with the reference's generic 500 and leaves the stored token in place, as MagicLinkSender does.

type EmailVerificationStore 

type EmailVerificationStore interface {
	UpdateEmailVerificationToken(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID, tokenHash string, expiry time.Time) error
	GetUserByEmailVerificationTokenHash(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) (User, error)
	MarkEmailVerified(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string, verified bool) error
	ClearEmailVerificationToken(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error
}

EmailVerificationStore persists verification flow.

type Event 

type Event struct {
	Name      string
	UserID    string
	TenantID  string
	Timestamp time.Time
	Data      map[string]any
}

Event is a generic auth domain event payload.

type EventBus 

type EventBus struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

EventBus is a tiny in-process pub/sub for auth events.

func NewEventBus 

func NewEventBus() *EventBus

func (*EventBus) Publish 

func (b *EventBus) Publish(ev Event)

func (*EventBus) Subscribe 

func (b *EventBus) Subscribe(event string, handler func(Event))

type ForgotPasswordInput 

type ForgotPasswordInput struct {
	Email    string
	TenantID string
}

type HTTPConfig added in v0.2.0 

type HTTPConfig struct {
	APIPrefix string
	Cookies   CookieOptions
	CSRF      CSRFConfig
}

HTTPConfig is the wire configuration an adapter mounts with. The four adapters take the same value, so a change here reaches all of them.

func DefaultHTTPConfig added in v0.2.0 

func DefaultHTTPConfig() HTTPConfig

DefaultHTTPConfig returns the conventions an adapter uses when the host app does not configure them.

func (HTTPConfig) Prefix added in v0.2.0 

func (c HTTPConfig) Prefix() string

Prefix returns the normalised mount prefix.

func (HTTPConfig) WriteTokens added in v0.2.0 

func (c HTTPConfig) WriteTokens(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, status int, tokens AuthTokens, extra map[string]any)

WriteTokens delivers an issued token pair. A bearer caller gets the tokens in the body and no cookies; a cookie caller gets the cookies and a body that never contains a token. extra carries any route-specific top-level fields, such as register's userId.

type HTTPError added in v0.2.0 

type HTTPError struct {
	Status  int    `json:"-"`
	Message string `json:"error"`
	Code    string `json:"code,omitempty"`
}

HTTPError is the family error envelope together with its status code.

The "code" field is omitted when the reference emits no code for that failure; clients are documented not to pattern-match on an absent code.

func AccessHTTPError added in v0.2.0 

func AccessHTTPError(err error) HTTPError

AccessHTTPError maps an access-token verification failure the way the reference auth middleware does.

func ChangeEmailConfirmHTTPError added in v0.2.0 

func ChangeEmailConfirmHTTPError(err error) HTTPError

ChangeEmailConfirmHTTPError maps a Service.ConfirmEmailChange failure.

func ChangeEmailInlineError added in v0.2.0 

func ChangeEmailInlineError(user User) (HTTPError, bool)

ChangeEmailInlineError reproduces the reference's PASSWORD_REQUIRED guard on /change-email/request: an account whose only credential is the address itself may not move that address (auth.router.ts:1015-1021).

The reference runs this check after the 409 and 404 branches; here it runs before them, because the service persists the pending change in the same call that would report those two failures and there is no point at which the guard could still run without leaving a token behind. The status and code are therefore exact, and only the precedence between two simultaneous failures differs.

func ChangeEmailRequestHTTPError added in v0.2.0 

func ChangeEmailRequestHTTPError(err error) HTTPError

ChangeEmailRequestHTTPError maps a Service.RequestEmailChange failure.

As on /send-verification-email, the 404 branch is a store-race path only: this port's auth gate answers 403 where the reference's handler would answer 404.

func ChangePasswordHTTPError added in v0.2.0 

func ChangePasswordHTTPError(err error) HTTPError

ChangePasswordHTTPError maps a Service.ChangePassword failure.

ErrInvalidCredentials becomes 401 "Current password is incorrect" rather than the reference's 404 "User not found", because the service returns the same sentinel for both and the auth middleware resolved this user from the store moments earlier: a wrong password is the reachable case, a row that vanished in between is not.

func ChangePasswordInlineError added in v0.2.0 

func ChangePasswordInlineError(user User, currentPassword, newPassword string) (HTTPError, bool)

ChangePasswordInlineError reproduces the reference's inline validation on /change-password: an account with no stored password that submits neither field gets 400 "New password is required" (auth.router.ts:922-925). An account that does have a password never reaches it — a missing current password fails the comparison instead.

func ForgotPasswordHTTPError added in v0.2.0 

func ForgotPasswordHTTPError(error) HTTPError

ForgotPasswordHTTPError maps a Service.ForgotPassword failure.

Every failure is a bare 500: the reference has no error branch on this route at all, so a throwing store reaches handleError and becomes {"error":"Internal server error"} (auth.router.ts:796-798). ErrFeatureNotSupported is included on purpose — a store that cannot persist a reset token is a deployment fault, not a feature the caller can be told about, and answering 501 would tell an anonymous caller something the 200-always rule is there to hide.

A failed *delivery* never reaches this mapper: Auth.ForgotPassword absorbs it so the route keeps answering 200. See there for why that one diverges.

func HTTPErrorFor added in v0.2.0 

func HTTPErrorFor(err error) HTTPError

HTTPErrorFor maps a service sentinel onto the envelope. Routes whose failure means something more specific than the sentinel says — /refresh and the auth middleware both narrow "invalid token" — use their own mapper below.

Anything unmapped becomes a 500, so a sentinel that reaches a route before it reaches this switch turns a client-visible failure into an internal error. The sentinels deliberately left out are the ones whose reference wire string is route-specific and must not be guessed here: ErrInvalidCode is "Invalid or expired SMS code" on /sms/verify and "Invalid TOTP code" on /2fa/verify (both 401, both code-less), and ErrTenantNotFound / ErrRoleNotFound belong to admin routes. A route that can return one of those has to write it itself. TestUnmappedSentinelsAreDeliberate keeps that list honest.

func MagicLinkVerifyHTTPError added in v0.2.0 

func MagicLinkVerifyHTTPError(err error) HTTPError

MagicLinkVerifyHTTPError maps a Service.VerifyMagicLink or Service.VerifyMagicLinkForUser failure. See HTTPErrInvalidMagicLink for why the expiry code does not appear.

func OAuthHTTPError added in v0.2.0 

func OAuthHTTPError(err error) HTTPError

OAuthHTTPError maps a flow failure from this file onto the wire envelope. Routes call it instead of WriteServiceError because every literal here is route-specific: HTTPErrorFor would turn each of them into a 500.

func RefreshHTTPError added in v0.2.0 

func RefreshHTTPError(err error) HTTPError

RefreshHTTPError maps a Service.Refresh failure. A revoked session stays distinguishable from an unusable token, which is the whole point of the code.

func ResetPasswordHTTPError added in v0.2.0 

func ResetPasswordHTTPError(err error) HTTPError

ResetPasswordHTTPError maps a Service.ResetPassword failure.

func SMSVerifyHTTPError added in v0.2.0 

func SMSVerifyHTTPError(err error) HTTPError

SMSVerifyHTTPError maps a Service.VerifySMSCode failure.

ErrInvalidCredentials means the userId or tempToken named a user the store does not have, and that is 401 "Invalid or expired SMS code", not 404. The reference looks the user up inside the strategy, where a miss is indistinguishable from a bad code: sms.strategy.ts:24-25 returns false for an unknown id, and the router turns false into 401 {"error":"Invalid or expired SMS code"} (auth.router.ts:1275-1279). Its 404 (:1281-1284) sits *after* that check and only fires if the user vanished between the verify and the follow-up findById — a race this port cannot reproduce, because Service.VerifySMSCode does both in one call. Answering 404 here would both change the status a client sees for a stale userId and turn an unauthenticated route into a user-existence oracle the reference does not have.

func SendVerificationEmailHTTPError added in v0.2.0 

func SendVerificationEmailHTTPError(err error) HTTPError

SendVerificationEmailHTTPError maps a Service.SendVerificationEmailToken failure.

The 404 "User not found" branch is not reachable over HTTP in this port and is kept only for a store race: the reference's auth gate trusts the JWT and never reads the store (auth.middleware.ts:60), so its handler's own lookup can miss and answer 404, whereas this port's gate resolves the user through Me() and answers 403 "Invalid or expired access token" for a row that no longer exists. The divergence belongs to the shared middleware, not to this route.

func TOTPSetupHTTPError added in v0.2.0 

func TOTPSetupHTTPError(err error) HTTPError

TOTPSetupHTTPError maps a Service.VerifyTOTPSetup failure (POST /2fa/verify-setup), where a bad code is a 400 rather than the 401 the step-up route answers.

func TOTPVerifyHTTPError added in v0.2.0 

func TOTPVerifyHTTPError(err error) HTTPError

TOTPVerifyHTTPError maps a Service.VerifyTOTP failure (POST /2fa/verify).

func VerifyEmailHTTPError added in v0.2.0 

func VerifyEmailHTTPError(err error) HTTPError

VerifyEmailHTTPError maps a Service.VerifyEmail failure.

func (HTTPError) Error added in v0.2.0 

func (e HTTPError) Error() string

type HTTPMailerTransport 

type HTTPMailerTransport struct {
	EndpointURL string
	Secret      string
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

HTTPMailerTransport sends mail via any HTTP endpoint (no SMTP needed).

func NewHTTPMailerTransport 

func NewHTTPMailerTransport(endpointURL, secret string) *HTTPMailerTransport

NewHTTPMailerTransport creates a transport that POSTs to a webhook-style HTTP endpoint.

func (*HTTPMailerTransport) Send 

func (t *HTTPMailerTransport) Send(ctx context.Context, msg MailMessage) error

type HTTPSMSTransport added in v0.3.0 

type HTTPSMSTransport struct {
	EndpointURL string
	APIKey      string
	Username    string
	Password    string
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

HTTPSMSTransport talks to the gateway contract the rest of this family talks to: a GET against the endpoint carrying username, password, phone and message as query parameters, with the API key in an X-API-Key header (awesome-node-auth src/services/sms.service.ts:16-46, documented in config-schema.md §1.6).

The credentials travel in the URL. That is a real hazard — query strings reach access logs, proxies and Referer headers — and the spec calls it out as one (config-schema.md §1.6, "credentials-in-URL hazard the product must fix"). It is reproduced here anyway, because the endpoint on the other side is the deployment's existing gateway and it is the request that gateway is built to accept; a "fixed" request would simply fail to send. The fix belongs at the gateway, and until it happens the way out is the seam itself: Config.SendSMSCode takes any SMSCodeSender, so a deployment whose provider accepts a safer shape supplies its own transport and never constructs this one.

func NewHTTPSMSTransport added in v0.3.0 

func NewHTTPSMSTransport(endpointURL, apiKey, username, password string) *HTTPSMSTransport

NewHTTPSMSTransport creates a transport for a query-parameter SMS gateway.

func (*HTTPSMSTransport) Send added in v0.3.0 

func (t *HTTPSMSTransport) Send(ctx context.Context, phone, message string) error

type IDP 

type IDP struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

IDP is an OIDC Identity Provider.

func NewIDP 

func NewIDP(cfg IDPConfig, authSvc *Service, clients ...IDPClient) (*IDP, error)

NewIDP creates a new OIDC IDP backed by the given auth service.

func (*IDP) RegisterHandlers 

func (idp *IDP) RegisterHandlers(mux *http.ServeMux, basePath string)

RegisterHandlers mounts OIDC endpoints on the given mux.

type IDPClient 

type IDPClient struct {
	ClientID     string
	ClientSecret string
	RedirectURIs []string
	Name         string
}

IDPClient represents a registered OIDC client application.

type IDPConfig 

type IDPConfig struct {
	Issuer         string
	AccessTokenTTL time.Duration
	IDTokenTTL     time.Duration
}

IDPConfig configures the OIDC Identity Provider.

type LinkRequestInput added in v0.2.0 

type LinkRequestInput struct {
	Email    string
	Provider string
	// EmailLang is the reference's third body field. It selects the language of
	// the verification mail and is forwarded verbatim to DeliverLinkToken, the way
	// the reference passes it as sendVerificationEmail's fourth argument
	// (auth.router.ts:1530-1535).
	EmailLang   string
	AccessToken string
	// Origin and Referer resolve which origin the verification link points at, as
	// the reference's resolveSiteUrl(req, config, allowedOrigins) does
	// (auth.router.ts:1528). A multi-origin deployment must email a link back to
	// the origin the request came from, not always to the default one.
	Origin  string
	Referer string
	// APIPrefix is the mount prefix, needed to build the verification link.
	APIPrefix string
}

LinkRequestInput is POST <prefix>/link-request.

type LinkRequestResult added in v0.2.0 

type LinkRequestResult struct {
	Token string
	URL   string
}

LinkRequestResult reports what was issued. The token never reaches the HTTP response; it is returned so an embedder driving the service directly can send it themselves.

type LinkTokenDelivery added in v0.2.0 

type LinkTokenDelivery struct {
	Email    string
	Provider string
	Token    string
	URL      string
	// EmailLang is the /link-request body's emailLang, passed through untouched so
	// the host's mail transport can localise. Empty when the caller omitted it.
	EmailLang string
}

LinkTokenDelivery is the payload handed to OAuthWiring.DeliverLinkToken. The four members are the reference's sendVerificationEmail(email, token, link, emailLang) arguments, plus the provider the link records.

type LinkVerifyInput added in v0.2.0 

type LinkVerifyInput struct {
	Token             string
	LoginAfterLinking bool
}

LinkVerifyInput is POST <prefix>/link-verify.

type LinkVerifyResult added in v0.2.0 

type LinkVerifyResult struct {
	User     User
	Tokens   AuthTokens
	LoggedIn bool
}

LinkVerifyResult carries the tokens when loginAfterLinking was asked for.

type LinkedAccountStore 

type LinkedAccountStore interface {
	Save(ctx context.Context, link OAuthLinkedAccount) error
	FindByProvider(ctx context.Context, provider, providerID string) (OAuthLinkedAccount, error)
	ListForUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]OAuthLinkedAccount, error)
	Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error
}

LinkedAccountStore persists OAuth provider associations per user.

type LoginInput 

type LoginInput struct {
	Email    string
	Password string
	TenantID string
}

LoginInput is the payload used for user authentication.

type LoginResult added in v0.3.0 

type LoginResult struct {
	// User is whose password verified. It is populated on both outcomes, because
	// on both outcomes the password did verify and a host that audit-logs a
	// challenge has to know whose it was.
	User User
	// Tokens is the issued session. It is zero when Challenge is set: a challenge
	// is not a login, and no session exists until the second factor lands.
	Tokens AuthTokens
	// Challenge is nil for a login that completed.
	Challenge *TwoFactorChallenge
}

LoginResult is the outcome of a password login: either a session, or a second-factor challenge.

type MCPServer 

type MCPServer struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

MCPServer exposes auth configuration as MCP tools for AI editors. It speaks JSON-RPC 2.0 over HTTP and implements the Model Context Protocol tools/list and tools/call methods.

func NewMCPServer 

func NewMCPServer(authSvc *Service) *MCPServer

NewMCPServer creates an MCP server wrapping an auth service.

func (*MCPServer) ServeHTTP 

func (m *MCPServer) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)

ServeHTTP handles MCP JSON-RPC 2.0 requests (tools/list, tools/call).

type MagicLinkDelivery added in v0.3.0 

type MagicLinkDelivery struct {
	UserID   string
	TenantID string
	Email    string
	// Token is the plaintext token the matching verify route accepts.
	Token string
	// ExpiresAt is the stored expiry, Config.MagicLinkTTL from now. Verification
	// additionally allows Config.ClockSkew past it, so a message that quotes this
	// value understates the window slightly rather than overstating it.
	ExpiresAt time.Time
}

MagicLinkDelivery is what a MagicLinkSender is handed.

It carries the plaintext magic-link token — the store only ever sees its hash — and deliberately nothing else that is credential material. A sender is host code that may log or forward what it receives, so it is given the one secret it has to transmit and no other: no password hash, no TOTP secret, no User. A sender that needs more about the recipient has UserID and TenantID to read it back with.

type MagicLinkMailer added in v0.3.0 

type MagicLinkMailer struct {
	// Transport delivers the rendered message. Required.
	Transport MailerTransport
	// BaseURL is what MagicLinkURL builds the link under.
	BaseURL string
	// Locale selects the built-in template set: "en" (the default) or "it". An
	// unknown locale falls back to English, as MailTemplater.Render does.
	//
	// It is static because the reference's per-request override (the emailLang
	// body field) has no counterpart on these routes yet: the port's send
	// requests do not carry the field, so threading a locale from the wire is a
	// change to the request shape and belongs with the rest of the template
	// configuration.
	Locale string
	// Templates renders subject and body. NewMagicLinkMailer fills this in.
	Templates *MailTemplater
}

MagicLinkMailer is the ready-made MagicLinkSender: it renders the built-in magic_link template and hands the result to a MailerTransport. It is the port's equivalent of the reference's config.email.mailer path, where a deployment configures a transport instead of writing a callback.

Use it as a sender through its Send method: 

auth.WithMagicLinkSender(auth.NewMagicLinkMailer(
	auth.NewHTTPMailerTransport(endpoint, secret),
	"Example App",
	"https://app.example.com/auth",
).Send)

func NewMagicLinkMailer added in v0.3.0 

func NewMagicLinkMailer(transport MailerTransport, appName, baseURL string) *MagicLinkMailer

NewMagicLinkMailer builds a MagicLinkMailer with the built-in templates. appName is the name those templates greet the recipient with.

func (*MagicLinkMailer) Send added in v0.3.0 

func (m *MagicLinkMailer) Send(ctx context.Context, delivery MagicLinkDelivery) error

Send renders and delivers the magic-link mail. Its signature is MagicLinkSender's.

type MagicLinkSendInput 

type MagicLinkSendInput struct {
	Email    string
	TenantID string
}

type MagicLinkSender added in v0.3.0 

type MagicLinkSender func(ctx context.Context, delivery MagicLinkDelivery) error

MagicLinkSender delivers a magic link. An error fails the route with the reference's generic 500 — a transport failure must not describe itself to the caller — and leaves the stored token in place, which is what the reference does too: an undelivered token is unguessable and expires on its own.

type MagicLinkStore 

type MagicLinkStore interface {
	UpdateMagicLinkToken(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID, tokenHash string, expiry time.Time) error
	GetUserByMagicLinkTokenHash(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) (User, error)
	ClearMagicLinkToken(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error
}

MagicLinkStore persists magic link state.

type MagicLinkVerifyInput 

type MagicLinkVerifyInput struct {
	Token string
}

type MailMessage 

type MailMessage struct {
	To      string
	Subject string
	Body    string
	IsHTML  bool
}

MailMessage is a single email to be sent.

type MailTemplateData 

type MailTemplateData struct {
	AppName  string
	UserName string
	Token    string
	URL      string
	Code     string
	Extra    map[string]any
}

MailTemplateData holds the common variables injected into mail templates.

type MailTemplater 

type MailTemplater struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

MailTemplater renders localized mail templates.

func NewMailTemplater 

func NewMailTemplater(appName string) *MailTemplater

NewMailTemplater creates a templater with built-in en and it templates.

func (*MailTemplater) Render 

func (m *MailTemplater) Render(locale, name string, data MailTemplateData) (subject, body string, err error)

Render produces the subject and HTML body for the given locale and template name.

type MailerTransport 

type MailerTransport interface {
	Send(ctx context.Context, msg MailMessage) error
}

MailerTransport delivers email messages.

type MemoryLinkedAccounts 

type MemoryLinkedAccounts struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

MemoryLinkedAccounts is an in-memory implementation of LinkedAccountStore, suitable for development, testing, and embedded deployments.

func NewMemoryLinkedAccounts 

func NewMemoryLinkedAccounts() *MemoryLinkedAccounts

NewMemoryLinkedAccounts creates an in-memory LinkedAccountStore.

func (*MemoryLinkedAccounts) Delete 

func (m *MemoryLinkedAccounts) Delete(_ context.Context, id string) error

func (*MemoryLinkedAccounts) FindByProvider 

func (m *MemoryLinkedAccounts) FindByProvider(_ context.Context, provider, providerID string) (OAuthLinkedAccount, error)

func (*MemoryLinkedAccounts) ListForUser 

func (m *MemoryLinkedAccounts) ListForUser(_ context.Context, userID string) ([]OAuthLinkedAccount, error)

func (*MemoryLinkedAccounts) Save 

func (m *MemoryLinkedAccounts) Save(_ context.Context, link OAuthLinkedAccount) error

type MemoryMetadataStore 

type MemoryMetadataStore struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

MemoryMetadataStore is an in-memory implementation of UserMetadataStore.

func NewMemoryMetadataStore 

func NewMemoryMetadataStore() *MemoryMetadataStore

func (*MemoryMetadataStore) ClearMetadata 

func (s *MemoryMetadataStore) ClearMetadata(_ context.Context, userID string) error

func (*MemoryMetadataStore) GetMetadata 

func (s *MemoryMetadataStore) GetMetadata(_ context.Context, userID string) (map[string]any, error)

func (*MemoryMetadataStore) UpdateMetadata 

func (s *MemoryMetadataStore) UpdateMetadata(_ context.Context, userID string, metadata map[string]any) error
type MemoryPendingLinks struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

MemoryPendingLinks is an in-memory PendingLinkStore, the counterpart of MemoryLinkedAccounts. It enforces the ttl, which is what makes an OAuth state nonce single-use and an account-link token expire. 

func NewMemoryPendingLinks() *MemoryPendingLinks

NewMemoryPendingLinks creates an in-memory PendingLinkStore.

func (*MemoryPendingLinks) Delete added in v0.2.0 

func (m *MemoryPendingLinks) Delete(_ context.Context, key string) error

func (*MemoryPendingLinks) Get added in v0.2.0 

func (m *MemoryPendingLinks) Get(_ context.Context, key string) (OAuthPendingMeta, error)

func (*MemoryPendingLinks) Save added in v0.2.0 

func (m *MemoryPendingLinks) Save(_ context.Context, key string, meta OAuthPendingMeta, ttl time.Duration) error

type MemoryRolesPermissionsStore 

type MemoryRolesPermissionsStore struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

MemoryRolesPermissionsStore is an in-memory RBAC store.

func NewMemoryRolesPermissionsStore 

func NewMemoryRolesPermissionsStore() *MemoryRolesPermissionsStore

func (*MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) AddPermissionToRole 

func (s *MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) AddPermissionToRole(_ context.Context, role, permission string) error

func (*MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) AddRoleToUser 

func (s *MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) AddRoleToUser(_ context.Context, userID, role string, tenantID string) error

func (*MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) CreateRole 

func (s *MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) CreateRole(_ context.Context, role string, permissions []string) error

func (*MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) DeleteRole 

func (s *MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) DeleteRole(_ context.Context, role string) error

func (*MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) GetPermissionsForRole 

func (s *MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) GetPermissionsForRole(_ context.Context, role string) ([]string, error)

func (*MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) GetPermissionsForUser 

func (s *MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) GetPermissionsForUser(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) ([]string, error)

func (*MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) GetRolesForUser 

func (s *MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) GetRolesForUser(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID string) ([]string, error)

func (*MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) RemovePermissionFromRole 

func (s *MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) RemovePermissionFromRole(_ context.Context, role, permission string) error

func (*MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) RemoveRoleFromUser 

func (s *MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) RemoveRoleFromUser(_ context.Context, userID, role string, tenantID string) error

func (*MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) UserHasPermission 

func (s *MemoryRolesPermissionsStore) UserHasPermission(ctx context.Context, userID, permission, tenantID string) (bool, error)

type MemorySessionStore 

type MemorySessionStore struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

MemorySessionStore is a thread-safe in-memory implementation of SessionStore.

func NewMemorySessionStore 

func NewMemorySessionStore() *MemorySessionStore

func (*MemorySessionStore) CreateSession 

func (s *MemorySessionStore) CreateSession(_ context.Context, session Session) (Session, error)

func (*MemorySessionStore) DeleteExpiredSessions 

func (s *MemorySessionStore) DeleteExpiredSessions(_ context.Context, now time.Time) (int, error)

func (*MemorySessionStore) GetSessionByID 

func (s *MemorySessionStore) GetSessionByID(_ context.Context, sessionID string) (Session, error)

func (*MemorySessionStore) GetSessionByRefreshTokenHash 

func (s *MemorySessionStore) GetSessionByRefreshTokenHash(_ context.Context, tokenHash string) (Session, error)

func (*MemorySessionStore) ListSessionsForUser 

func (s *MemorySessionStore) ListSessionsForUser(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID string) ([]Session, error)

func (*MemorySessionStore) RevokeSessionByID 

func (s *MemorySessionStore) RevokeSessionByID(_ context.Context, sessionID string) error

func (*MemorySessionStore) UpdateSession 

func (s *MemorySessionStore) UpdateSession(_ context.Context, session Session) error

type MemoryTelemetryStore 

type MemoryTelemetryStore struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

MemoryTelemetryStore is an in-memory implementation of TelemetryStore.

func NewMemoryTelemetryStore 

func NewMemoryTelemetryStore() *MemoryTelemetryStore

NewMemoryTelemetryStore creates an in-memory telemetry store.

func (*MemoryTelemetryStore) Query 

func (m *MemoryTelemetryStore) Query(_ context.Context, f TelemetryFilter) ([]TelemetryEvent, error)

func (*MemoryTelemetryStore) Record 

func (m *MemoryTelemetryStore) Record(_ context.Context, event TelemetryEvent) error

type MemoryTenantStore 

type MemoryTenantStore struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

MemoryTenantStore is an in-memory tenant/membership store.

func NewMemoryTenantStore 

func NewMemoryTenantStore() *MemoryTenantStore

func (*MemoryTenantStore) AssociateUserWithTenant 

func (s *MemoryTenantStore) AssociateUserWithTenant(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error

func (*MemoryTenantStore) CreateTenant 

func (s *MemoryTenantStore) CreateTenant(_ context.Context, tenant Tenant) (Tenant, error)

func (*MemoryTenantStore) DeleteTenant 

func (s *MemoryTenantStore) DeleteTenant(_ context.Context, id string) error

func (*MemoryTenantStore) DisassociateUserFromTenant 

func (s *MemoryTenantStore) DisassociateUserFromTenant(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error

func (*MemoryTenantStore) GetAllTenants 

func (s *MemoryTenantStore) GetAllTenants(_ context.Context) ([]Tenant, error)

func (*MemoryTenantStore) GetTenantByID 

func (s *MemoryTenantStore) GetTenantByID(_ context.Context, id string) (Tenant, error)

func (*MemoryTenantStore) GetTenantsForUser 

func (s *MemoryTenantStore) GetTenantsForUser(_ context.Context, userID string) ([]Tenant, error)

func (*MemoryTenantStore) GetUsersForTenant 

func (s *MemoryTenantStore) GetUsersForTenant(_ context.Context, tenantID string) ([]string, error)

func (*MemoryTenantStore) UpdateTenant 

func (s *MemoryTenantStore) UpdateTenant(_ context.Context, id string, update Tenant) error

type MemoryUserStore 

type MemoryUserStore struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

MemoryUserStore is a thread-safe in-memory implementation of UserStore.

func NewMemoryUserStore 

func NewMemoryUserStore() *MemoryUserStore

func (*MemoryUserStore) ApplyEmailChange 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) ApplyEmailChange(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error

func (*MemoryUserStore) ClearEmailChangeToken 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) ClearEmailChangeToken(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error

func (*MemoryUserStore) ClearEmailVerificationToken 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) ClearEmailVerificationToken(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error

func (*MemoryUserStore) ClearMagicLinkToken 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) ClearMagicLinkToken(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error

func (*MemoryUserStore) ClearResetToken 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) ClearResetToken(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error

func (*MemoryUserStore) ClearSMSCode 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) ClearSMSCode(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error

func (*MemoryUserStore) CreateUser 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) CreateUser(_ context.Context, user User) (User, error)

func (*MemoryUserStore) DeleteUser 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) DeleteUser(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error

func (*MemoryUserStore) GetUserByEmail 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) GetUserByEmail(_ context.Context, email, tenantID string) (User, error)

func (*MemoryUserStore) GetUserByEmailChangeTokenHash 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) GetUserByEmailChangeTokenHash(_ context.Context, tokenHash string) (User, error)

func (*MemoryUserStore) GetUserByEmailVerificationTokenHash 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) GetUserByEmailVerificationTokenHash(_ context.Context, tokenHash string) (User, error)

func (*MemoryUserStore) GetUserByID 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) GetUserByID(_ context.Context, id, tenantID string) (User, error)

func (*MemoryUserStore) GetUserByMagicLinkTokenHash 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) GetUserByMagicLinkTokenHash(_ context.Context, tokenHash string) (User, error)

func (*MemoryUserStore) GetUserByResetTokenHash 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) GetUserByResetTokenHash(_ context.Context, tokenHash string) (User, error)

func (*MemoryUserStore) GetUserBySMSCodeHash 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) GetUserBySMSCodeHash(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID, codeHash string) (User, error)

func (*MemoryUserStore) MarkEmailVerified 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) MarkEmailVerified(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID string, verified bool) error

func (*MemoryUserStore) UpdateEmailChangeToken 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) UpdateEmailChangeToken(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID, pendingEmail, tokenHash string, expiry time.Time) error

func (*MemoryUserStore) UpdateEmailVerificationToken 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) UpdateEmailVerificationToken(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID, tokenHash string, expiry time.Time) error

func (*MemoryUserStore) UpdateMagicLinkToken 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) UpdateMagicLinkToken(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID, tokenHash string, expiry time.Time) error

func (*MemoryUserStore) UpdatePassword 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) UpdatePassword(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID, passwordHash string) error

func (*MemoryUserStore) UpdatePhoneNumber added in v0.2.0 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) UpdatePhoneNumber(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID, phoneNumber string) (User, error)

UpdatePhoneNumber makes MemoryUserStore satisfy UserPhoneStore. It lives beside the interface rather than in memory_store.go so that the capability and its in-memory implementation stay in one place.

func (*MemoryUserStore) UpdateProfile 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) UpdateProfile(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID, firstName, lastName string) (User, error)

func (*MemoryUserStore) UpdateResetToken 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) UpdateResetToken(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID, tokenHash string, expiry time.Time) error

func (*MemoryUserStore) UpdateSMSCode 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) UpdateSMSCode(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID, codeHash string, expiry time.Time) error

func (*MemoryUserStore) UpdateTOTPSecret 

func (s *MemoryUserStore) UpdateTOTPSecret(_ context.Context, userID, tenantID, secret string, enabled bool) error

type OAuthBeginInput added in v0.2.0 

type OAuthBeginInput struct {
	Provider   string
	ReturnPath string
	Origin     string
	Referer    string
}

OAuthBeginInput is GET <prefix>/oauth/{provider}.

There is deliberately no "link to the caller's account" field. The reference's /oauth/{provider} has no auth gate and reads no credential (wire-contract.md §4: "Auth gate: none"); the intent is not carried in the state either, and the callback resolves the identity purely through the provider account. Reading the initiating request's access token and linking the provider identity to it is an account-takeover shape: whoever happened to be signed in when the flow started would get the session, and the (provider, providerAccountId) binding would be re-pointed at them. Linking an existing account to a provider goes through /link-request and /link-verify, where an emailed token proves the address.

type OAuthBeginResult added in v0.2.0 

type OAuthBeginResult struct {
	AuthorizationURL string
	State            string
}

OAuthBeginResult is what the route redirects to.

type OAuthCompleteInput added in v0.2.0 

type OAuthCompleteInput struct {
	Provider string
	Code     string
	State    string
}

OAuthCompleteInput is GET <prefix>/oauth/{provider}/callback.

type OAuthCompleteResult added in v0.2.0 

type OAuthCompleteResult struct {
	User       User
	Tokens     AuthTokens
	RedirectTo string
}

OAuthCompleteResult carries the issued session and where to send the browser.

type OAuthLinkedAccount 

type OAuthLinkedAccount struct {
	ID         string
	UserID     string
	Provider   string
	ProviderID string
	Email      string
	Name       string
	Picture    string
	CreatedAt  time.Time
}

OAuthLinkedAccount stores a linked provider<->user association.

Email, Name and Picture are the reference's optional LinkedAccount profile columns (linked-accounts-store.interface.ts:9-14). GET /linked-accounts projects all three, and clients render them: the family admin UI falls back through `a.name || a.email || a.providerAccountId`. The library fills Email at every link it writes, as the reference's linkAccount calls do; Name and Picture are left for a host store that wants to keep them, again as in the reference.

type OAuthPendingMeta 

type OAuthPendingMeta struct {
	Provider    string
	RedirectURL string
	TenantID    string
	UserID      string // non-empty when linking to existing account
	// Email and ProviderAccountID carry the account-linking stash: the address
	// a /link-request token was issued for, and the provider account a callback
	// conflict parked for it.
	Email             string
	ProviderAccountID string
	// ExpiresAt lets a consumer enforce the deadline itself rather than trusting
	// the store to have honoured the ttl argument.
	ExpiresAt time.Time
}

OAuthPendingMeta is the metadata stored during OAuth flow.

type OAuthProvider 

type OAuthProvider struct {
	Name         string
	ClientID     string
	ClientSecret string
	RedirectURL  string
	AuthURL      string
	TokenURL     string
	UserInfoURL  string
	Scopes       []string
}

OAuthProvider holds configuration for a single OAuth 2.0 provider.

func GitHubProvider 

func GitHubProvider(clientID, clientSecret, redirectURL string) OAuthProvider

GitHubProvider builds a pre-configured GitHub OAuth2 provider.

func GoogleProvider 

func GoogleProvider(clientID, clientSecret, redirectURL string) OAuthProvider

GoogleProvider builds a pre-configured Google OAuth2 provider.

type OAuthService 

type OAuthService struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

OAuthService handles OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow.

func NewOAuthService 

func NewOAuthService(providers ...OAuthProvider) *OAuthService

NewOAuthService creates an OAuthService for the given providers.

func (*OAuthService) AuthorizeURL 

func (s *OAuthService) AuthorizeURL(providerName, state string) (string, error)

AuthorizeURL builds the redirect URL for the given provider and state token.

func (*OAuthService) AuthorizeURLPKCE added in v0.2.0 

func (s *OAuthService) AuthorizeURLPKCE(providerName, state, codeChallenge string) (string, error)

AuthorizeURLPKCE builds the redirect URL and, when codeChallenge is non-empty, binds the exchange to it with the S256 method (RFC 7636). The HTTP routes always pass a challenge; the plain AuthorizeURL stays for embedders driving the service themselves.

func (*OAuthService) ExchangeCode 

func (s *OAuthService) ExchangeCode(ctx context.Context, providerName, code string) (OAuthUserInfo, error)

ExchangeCode exchanges an authorization code for user info.

func (*OAuthService) ExchangeCodePKCE added in v0.2.0 

func (s *OAuthService) ExchangeCodePKCE(ctx context.Context, providerName, code, codeVerifier string) (OAuthUserInfo, error)

ExchangeCodePKCE exchanges an authorization code, sending the PKCE verifier when one was used to build the authorization URL.

func (*OAuthService) HandleCallback 

func (s *OAuthService) HandleCallback(
	ctx context.Context,
	authSvc *Service,
	linkedAccounts LinkedAccountStore,
	info OAuthUserInfo,
	tenantID string,
	linkToUserID string,
) (User, AuthTokens, error)

HandleCallback resolves/creates a user after OAuth callback. If linkToUserID is non-empty the provider is linked to that existing account.

func (*OAuthService) Has added in v0.2.0 

func (s *OAuthService) Has(name string) bool

Has reports whether a provider is registered.

type OAuthUserInfo 

type OAuthUserInfo struct {
	ProviderID string
	Provider   string
	Email      string
	Name       string
	AvatarURL  string
	Raw        map[string]any
}

OAuthUserInfo is the normalized profile returned after token exchange.

type OAuthWiring added in v0.2.0 

type OAuthWiring struct {
	// Service resolves providers, builds authorization URLs and exchanges codes.
	Service *OAuthService
	// LinkedAccounts persists the provider ↔ user associations the
	// /linked-accounts routes read and write.
	LinkedAccounts LinkedAccountStore
	// PendingLinks is the stash. It carries two kinds of entry, both keyed by an
	// opaque string and both single-use: the in-flight OAuth state (so a nonce
	// cannot be replayed) and the account-link token issued by /link-request.
	PendingLinks PendingLinkStore
	// AllowedOrigins is the redirect allowlist. An empty allowlist accepts the
	// origin embedded in the state, matching the reference — safe here only
	// because the state is signed.
	AllowedOrigins []string
	// SiteURL is the fallback redirect target, the reference's first
	// config.email.siteUrl entry.
	SiteURL string
	// TenantID scopes users created or resolved by the callback.
	TenantID string
	// StateTTL bounds how long a signed state stays acceptable. Default 10m.
	StateTTL time.Duration
	// LinkTokenTTL bounds the /link-request token. Default 1h, as the reference.
	LinkTokenTTL time.Duration
	// DeliverLinkToken hands the /link-request verification link to the host's
	// mail transport. The route answers success either way, as the reference
	// does when no transport is configured.
	DeliverLinkToken func(ctx context.Context, delivery LinkTokenDelivery) error
}

OAuthWiring is everything the OAuth and account-linking routes need beyond the core service. The reference gates each route on the presence of the corresponding option; the equivalent here is that an absent member turns its routes into NOT_IMPLEMENTED rather than leaving them unmounted, because a single dynamic /oauth/{provider} route cannot be registered per provider.

type OpenAPIInfo 

type OpenAPIInfo struct {
	Title       string
	Description string
	Version     string
	ServerURL   string
	// APIPrefix is where the routes are mounted. Empty means DefaultAPIPrefix,
	// and it must match the HTTPConfig the adapter was mounted with, otherwise
	// the spec documents paths the server does not serve.
	APIPrefix string
}

OpenAPIInfo holds metadata for the generated OpenAPI spec.

type Option 

type Option func(*authBuilder) error

Option configures Auth initialization.

func WithBcryptCost added in v0.2.0 

func WithBcryptCost(cost int) Option

WithBcryptCost sets the bcrypt cost used for every password hash the library writes. See Config.BcryptCost.

Unlike the zero value of Config.BcryptCost, which means "unset" and resolves to bcrypt.DefaultCost, calling this Option with 0 is an error: an explicit setter reached with an unset value is a caller mistake, not a request for the default. Omit the Option to get the default.

func WithEmailChangeSender added in v0.3.0 

func WithEmailChangeSender(sender EmailChangeSender) Option

WithEmailChangeSender wires delivery for POST <prefix>/change-email/request. The message goes to the *new* address: it is a verification of the new mailbox. Without it the route mails nothing and still answers 200.

Pass a callback, or EmailChangeMailer.Send for the built-in email_change template.

func WithEmailVerificationSender added in v0.3.0 

func WithEmailVerificationSender(sender EmailVerificationSender) Option

WithEmailVerificationSender wires verification delivery for POST <prefix>/send-verification-email. Without it the route mails nothing and still answers 200.

Pass a callback, or EmailVerificationMailer.Send for the built-in verify_email template.

func WithIssuer 

func WithIssuer(issuer string) Option

WithIssuer configures token issuer.

func WithLogger 

func WithLogger(fn func(format string, args ...any)) Option

WithLogger provides optional library logging callback.

func WithMagicLinkSender added in v0.3.0 

func WithMagicLinkSender(sender MagicLinkSender) Option

WithMagicLinkSender wires magic-link delivery. Without it POST <prefix>/magic-link/send answers 500 EMAIL_NOT_CONFIGURED, because the route cannot put the link in its response body.

Pass a callback to send the mail yourself, or MagicLinkMailer.Send to use the built-in templates over a MailerTransport.

func WithMetadataProvider 

func WithMetadataProvider(store UserMetadataStore) Option

WithMetadataProvider wires optional metadata support.

func WithOAuth added in v0.2.0 

func WithOAuth(wiring OAuthWiring) Option

WithOAuth wires the OAuth service and the linking stores.

func WithPasswordResetSender added in v0.3.0 

func WithPasswordResetSender(sender PasswordResetSender) Option

WithPasswordResetSender wires password-reset delivery for POST <prefix>/forgot-password. Without it the route still answers 200 {"success":true} and mails nothing, which is what a reference deployment with no email block does — see delivery_password_email.go.

Pass a callback to send the mail yourself, or PasswordResetMailer.Send to use the built-in reset_password template over a MailerTransport.

func WithRBACProvider 

func WithRBACProvider(store RolesPermissionsStore) Option

WithRBACProvider wires optional role/permission support.

func WithRequire2FA 

func WithRequire2FA(enabled bool) Option

WithRequire2FA enables mandatory second-factor login checks.

func WithSMSCodeSender added in v0.3.0 

func WithSMSCodeSender(sender SMSCodeSender) Option

WithSMSCodeSender wires SMS delivery. Without it POST <prefix>/sms/send answers 500 SMS_NOT_CONFIGURED.

Pass a callback to send the message yourself, or SMSTransportSender over an SMSTransport such as HTTPSMSTransport.

func WithSecret 

func WithSecret(secret string) Option

WithSecret configures the JWT signing secret.

func WithSessionCheckOn added in v0.2.0 

func WithSessionCheckOn(mode string) Option

WithSessionCheckOn selects when a session's revocation state is re-checked: allcalls, refresh (the default) or none. Without allcalls the auth middleware cannot report a revoked session, so a client that relies on the SESSION_REVOKED signal has to opt in here.

func WithSessionStore 

func WithSessionStore(store SessionStore) Option

WithSessionStore sets a custom SessionStore implementation.

func WithTenantProvider 

func WithTenantProvider(store TenantStore) Option

WithTenantProvider wires optional tenant support.

func WithTokenClaimsBuilder 

func WithTokenClaimsBuilder(fn func(ctx context.Context, user User) (map[string]any, error)) Option

WithTokenClaimsBuilder customizes token claims creation.

func WithTokenTTLs 

func WithTokenTTLs(access, refresh time.Duration) Option

WithTokenTTLs configures access and refresh TTL.

func WithUserStore 

func WithUserStore(store UserStore) Option

WithUserStore sets a custom UserStore implementation.

type PasswordResetDelivery added in v0.3.0 

type PasswordResetDelivery struct {
	UserID   string
	TenantID string
	// Email is the stored address of the account the reset was requested for,
	// not the address as the request spelled it. An unknown address never
	// reaches a sender at all: the route is silent about who is registered.
	Email string
	// Token is the plaintext token POST <prefix>/reset-password accepts.
	Token string
	// ExpiresAt is the stored expiry, Config.ResetTokenTTL from now (1 hour, as
	// in the reference). Verification allows Config.ClockSkew past it, so a
	// message quoting this value understates the window rather than overstating
	// it.
	ExpiresAt time.Time
}

PasswordResetDelivery is what a PasswordResetSender is handed.

Like MagicLinkDelivery it carries the plaintext token — the store holds only its hash — plus the address the mail goes to and the ids a sender needs to read anything else back with. No User, no password hash: a sender is host code that may log what it receives.

type PasswordResetMailer added in v0.3.0 

type PasswordResetMailer struct{ TokenMailer }

PasswordResetMailer is the ready-made PasswordResetSender: it renders the built-in reset_password template and hands the result to a MailerTransport.

Use it as a sender through its Send method: 

auth.WithPasswordResetSender(auth.NewPasswordResetMailer(
	auth.NewHTTPMailerTransport(endpoint, secret),
	"Example App",
	"https://app.example.com/auth",
).Send)

func NewPasswordResetMailer added in v0.3.0 

func NewPasswordResetMailer(transport MailerTransport, appName, baseURL string) *PasswordResetMailer

NewPasswordResetMailer builds a PasswordResetMailer with the built-in templates. appName is the name those templates greet the recipient with.

func (*PasswordResetMailer) Send added in v0.3.0 

func (m *PasswordResetMailer) Send(ctx context.Context, delivery PasswordResetDelivery) error

Send renders and delivers the reset mail. Its signature is PasswordResetSender's.

type PasswordResetSender added in v0.3.0 

type PasswordResetSender func(ctx context.Context, delivery PasswordResetDelivery) error

PasswordResetSender delivers a password-reset token.

An error does NOT fail POST <prefix>/forgot-password: that route answers 200 {"success":true} whatever happens. See Auth.ForgotPassword.

type PendingLinkStore 

type PendingLinkStore interface {
	Save(ctx context.Context, state string, meta OAuthPendingMeta, ttl time.Duration) error
	Get(ctx context.Context, state string) (OAuthPendingMeta, error)
	Delete(ctx context.Context, state string) error
}

PendingLinkStore holds temporary OAuth link state.

type PublicLinkedAccount added in v0.2.0 

type PublicLinkedAccount struct {
	Provider          string    `json:"provider"`
	ProviderAccountID string    `json:"providerAccountId"`
	Email             string    `json:"email,omitempty"`
	Name              string    `json:"name,omitempty"`
	Picture           string    `json:"picture,omitempty"`
	LinkedAt          time.Time `json:"linkedAt"`
}

PublicLinkedAccount is the wire projection of a linked account. The field names and their optionality are the reference's LinkedAccount interface (linked-accounts-store.interface.ts:4-17), which is what the Angular client, the served auth.js and the family admin UI read.

Email is populated by every link the library writes, because the reference's linkAccount calls always pass `email: user.email` from the callback profile (auth.router.ts:1336-1343, :1578-1583). Name and Picture are optional in the reference's interface and its own linkAccount calls never set them, so they only ever appear when a host-supplied LinkedAccountStore fills them in; the admin UI's `a.name || a.email || a.providerAccountId` therefore falls through to the email, as it does against the reference.

type PublicSession added in v0.2.0 

type PublicSession struct {
	SessionHandle string    `json:"sessionHandle"`
	UserID        string    `json:"userId"`
	TenantID      string    `json:"tenantId,omitempty"`
	CreatedAt     time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
	ExpiresAt     time.Time `json:"expiresAt"`
}

PublicSession is the response-safe projection of Session, and the only session shape an adapter may serialise: Session carries the refresh-token hash, which is credential material and must never reach a response body.

The field names and the key set are the reference's SessionInfo (session.model.ts:8-27, wire-contract §3.9): sessionHandle, userId, createdAt, expiresAt and an optional tenantId. Both browser clients read sessionHandle off each entry and post it straight back to DELETE /sessions/{handle}.

There is deliberately no revokedAt key. SessionInfo has no such field, so no shipped client knows it exists or could filter on it, and the reference never needs one: revokeSession deletes the record, so a revoked session is absent from the next list rather than flagged in it. Emitting the tombstone as an extra key would be an unrequested addition to the contract and, worse, the only way a client could tell a live session from a dead one — see Auth.ListSessions, which drops them instead.

func NewPublicSession added in v0.2.0 

func NewPublicSession(session Session) PublicSession

NewPublicSession projects a Session onto its response-safe representation.

func NewPublicSessions added in v0.2.0 

func NewPublicSessions(sessions []Session) []PublicSession

NewPublicSessions projects a session list. The result is never nil: a store that returns no sessions must serialise as [] and not as null, because a client iterating response.sessions breaks on null.

type PublicTenant 

type PublicTenant struct {
	ID        string    `json:"id"`
	Name      string    `json:"name"`
	IsActive  bool      `json:"isActive"`
	CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
}

PublicTenant is the response-safe projection of Tenant. The tenant Config blob is server-side configuration and is never serialised.

type PublicUser 

type PublicUser struct {
	// Sub is the identifier under the name the reference uses and the shipped
	// clients require. Both cast it non-nullably — awesome-node-auth-flutter
	// does `json['sub'] as String` (auth_user.dart:76) and ng-awesome-node-auth
	// declares `sub: string` (auth.service.ts:10) — so omitting it does not
	// degrade a client, it throws inside one. It duplicates ID rather than
	// replacing it because `id` shipped in 0.2.0 and both clients read that as
	// optional, so emitting both breaks nobody.
	Sub   string `json:"sub"`
	ID    string `json:"id"`
	Email string `json:"email"`
	// Role is the reference's single-role field, distinct from Roles. Omitted
	// when empty, which it always is until something writes it.
	Role            string         `json:"role,omitempty"`
	TenantID        string         `json:"tenantId,omitempty"`
	FirstName       string         `json:"firstName,omitempty"`
	LastName        string         `json:"lastName,omitempty"`
	PhoneNumber     string         `json:"phoneNumber,omitempty"`
	IsEmailVerified bool           `json:"isEmailVerified"`
	IsTOTPEnabled   bool           `json:"isTotpEnabled"`
	Roles           []string       `json:"roles,omitempty"`
	Permissions     []string       `json:"permissions,omitempty"`
	Tenants         []PublicTenant `json:"tenants,omitempty"`
	Metadata        map[string]any `json:"metadata,omitempty"`
	CustomClaims    map[string]any `json:"customClaims,omitempty"`
	CreatedAt       time.Time      `json:"createdAt"`
}

PublicUser is the response-safe projection of User. It is the only user shape adapters may serialise: credential material (password hash, TOTP secret, one-time token hashes and the pending email change) is deliberately absent.

func NewPublicUser 

func NewPublicUser(user User) PublicUser

NewPublicUser projects a User onto its response-safe representation.

type RegisterInput 

type RegisterInput struct {
	Email    string
	Password string
	TenantID string
}

RegisterInput is the payload to create a user and initial session.

type ResetPasswordInput 

type ResetPasswordInput struct {
	Token       string
	NewPassword string
}

type RolesPermissionsStore 

type RolesPermissionsStore interface {
	AddRoleToUser(ctx context.Context, userID, role string, tenantID string) error
	RemoveRoleFromUser(ctx context.Context, userID, role string, tenantID string) error
	GetRolesForUser(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) ([]string, error)
	CreateRole(ctx context.Context, role string, permissions []string) error
	DeleteRole(ctx context.Context, role string) error
	AddPermissionToRole(ctx context.Context, role, permission string) error
	RemovePermissionFromRole(ctx context.Context, role, permission string) error
	GetPermissionsForRole(ctx context.Context, role string) ([]string, error)
	GetPermissionsForUser(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) ([]string, error)
	UserHasPermission(ctx context.Context, userID, permission, tenantID string) (bool, error)
}

RolesPermissionsStore manages RBAC assignments and permissions.

type SMSCodeDelivery added in v0.3.0 

type SMSCodeDelivery struct {
	UserID   string
	TenantID string
	// Phone is the recipient's stored number. The send route refuses a user
	// without one before it gets this far (PHONE_NOT_SET), so it is never empty.
	Phone string
	// Code is the plaintext one-time code; the store holds only its hash.
	Code      string
	ExpiresAt time.Time
}

SMSCodeDelivery is what an SMSCodeSender is handed. See MagicLinkDelivery for why it carries so little.

type SMSCodeSendInput 

type SMSCodeSendInput struct {
	UserID   string
	Email    string
	TenantID string
}

type SMSCodeSender added in v0.3.0 

type SMSCodeSender func(ctx context.Context, delivery SMSCodeDelivery) error

SMSCodeSender delivers an SMS one-time code. See MagicLinkSender for the failure contract.

func SMSTransportSender added in v0.3.0 

func SMSTransportSender(transport SMSTransport) SMSCodeSender

SMSTransportSender adapts an SMSTransport into an SMSCodeSender, formatting the code with SMSCodeMessage. It is the SMS counterpart of MagicLinkMailer.

type SMSCodeVerifyInput 

type SMSCodeVerifyInput struct {
	UserID   string
	Email    string
	TenantID string
	Code     string
}

type SMSStore 

type SMSStore interface {
	UpdateSMSCode(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID, codeHash string, expiry time.Time) error
	GetUserBySMSCodeHash(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID, codeHash string) (User, error)
	ClearSMSCode(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error
}

SMSStore persists sms code state.

type SMSTransport added in v0.3.0 

type SMSTransport interface {
	Send(ctx context.Context, phone, message string) error
}

SMSTransport delivers a text message to a handset. It is the SMS counterpart of MailerTransport: SMSTransportSender turns one into the SMSCodeSender that Config.SendSMSCode wants.

type Service 

type Service struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

Service is the main entry point for authentication operations.

func NewService 

func NewService(cfg Config, users UserStore, sessions SessionStore, opts ...ServiceOption) (*Service, error)

NewService builds an auth service with validated configuration.

func (*Service) AddUserToTenant 

func (s *Service) AddUserToTenant(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error

func (*Service) AssignRole 

func (s *Service) AssignRole(ctx context.Context, userID, role, tenantID string) error

func (*Service) ChangePassword 

func (s *Service) ChangePassword(ctx context.Context, in ChangePasswordInput) error

func (*Service) CleanupExpiredSessions 

func (s *Service) CleanupExpiredSessions(ctx context.Context) (int, error)

func (*Service) ConfirmEmailChange 

func (s *Service) ConfirmEmailChange(ctx context.Context, in ConfirmEmailChangeInput) error

func (*Service) CreateRole 

func (s *Service) CreateRole(ctx context.Context, role string, permissions []string) error

func (*Service) CreateTenant 

func (s *Service) CreateTenant(ctx context.Context, name string, config map[string]any) (Tenant, error)

func (*Service) DeleteAccount 

func (s *Service) DeleteAccount(ctx context.Context, in DeleteAccountInput) error

DeleteAccount runs the reference's account cleanup in the reference's order (auth.router.ts:1597-1636): sessions, then role assignments, then tenant memberships, then metadata, and the user record last. The order is not cosmetic — deleting the identity first and failing anywhere afterwards leaves sessions that still authenticate a user who no longer exists.

func (*Service) DisableTOTP 

func (s *Service) DisableTOTP(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error

func (*Service) FindUser added in v0.2.0 

func (s *Service) FindUser(ctx context.Context, userID, email, tenantID string) (User, error)

FindUser resolves a user by id, or by email when no id is given. The passwordless routes need it because they have to tell "no such user" apart from "that user has no phone number" — two different statuses in the contract — and the send calls answer both with silence.

func (*Service) ForgotPassword 

func (s *Service) ForgotPassword(ctx context.Context, in ForgotPasswordInput) (string, error)

func (*Service) GetMetadata 

func (s *Service) GetMetadata(ctx context.Context, userID string) (map[string]any, error)

func (*Service) IssueTempToken added in v0.2.0 

func (s *Service) IssueTempToken(ctx context.Context, user User) (string, error)

IssueTempToken mints the step-up token a 2FA challenge hands the client. Its lifetime is Config.TempTokenTTL, 5 minutes by default, matching the reference's hardcoded '5m'.

func (*Service) IssueTokensForUser added in v0.2.0 

func (s *Service) IssueTokensForUser(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) (User, AuthTokens, error)

IssueTokensForUser starts a session for an identity that has already been proven by something other than a password — here, an emailed account-link token. It is the one service method this route group needed and the core did not have: every other issuance path (Register, Login, VerifyMagicLink, VerifySMSCode, VerifyTOTP) reaches newSessionTokens through a credential check that does not apply.

func (*Service) ListSessions 

func (s *Service) ListSessions(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) ([]Session, error)

func (*Service) Login 

func (s *Service) Login(ctx context.Context, in LoginInput) (User, AuthTokens, error)

Login verifies a password and issues a session, reporting a 2FA-gated account as ErrTwoFactorRequired.

It is the narrow form of LoginWithChallenge, which is what the HTTP adapters call: the sentinel can say that a second factor is needed and nothing more, and the step-up routes need the token that comes with the challenge. Kept as it was for direct callers. See login_2fa.go.

It shares the password path with LoginWithChallenge but stops at the decision rather than at the built challenge, so the sentinel is reported whenever a second factor is *required* and not merely whenever one could be minted. Going through the challenge would make this wrapper fail wherever minting fails — Config.BuildTokenClaims returning an error is enough (token.go:66-71) — and answer a 2FA account with that error instead of ErrTwoFactorRequired. Nothing is minted here: the token this call cannot return is never built.

func (*Service) LoginWithChallenge added in v0.3.0 

func (s *Service) LoginWithChallenge(ctx context.Context, in LoginInput) (LoginResult, error)

LoginWithChallenge is the full POST /login path: it verifies the password and then either issues a session or mints the step-up challenge.

Service.Login is the narrower form of the same call, kept for direct callers: it collapses a challenge back into ErrTwoFactorRequired, which says a second factor is needed and cannot say anything more.

A challenge that cannot be minted is returned as the error, not as a challenge with an empty TempToken and not as ErrTwoFactorRequired. This call's whole point is the token: a client handed a challenge without one would believe it had a step-up credential and be refused by every §3 route, and the sentinel would spell the 403 2FA_REQUIRED body this PR removed from /login — a wire answer no longer served on this route, telling the client to step up with a token it was never given. So the failure surfaces: HTTPErrorFor maps it to HTTPErrInternal (wire.go:172-173), which is what a broken host hook is.

func (*Service) Logout 

func (s *Service) Logout(ctx context.Context, refreshToken string) error

func (*Service) LogoutAccessToken added in v0.2.0 

func (s *Service) LogoutAccessToken(ctx context.Context, accessToken string) error

LogoutAccessToken revokes the session named by an access token's sid claim.

func (*Service) Me 

func (s *Service) Me(ctx context.Context, accessToken string) (User, error)

func (*Service) Refresh 

func (s *Service) Refresh(ctx context.Context, refreshToken string) (AuthTokens, error)

func (*Service) Register 

func (s *Service) Register(ctx context.Context, in RegisterInput) (User, AuthTokens, error)

func (*Service) RequestEmailChange 

func (s *Service) RequestEmailChange(ctx context.Context, in ChangeEmailRequestInput) (string, error)

func (*Service) ResetPassword 

func (s *Service) ResetPassword(ctx context.Context, in ResetPasswordInput) error

func (*Service) RevokeSessionByID 

func (s *Service) RevokeSessionByID(ctx context.Context, sessionID string) error

func (*Service) RevokeUserSession added in v0.2.0 

func (s *Service) RevokeUserSession(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID, sessionID string) error

RevokeUserSession revokes one of a user's own sessions. Ownership is part of the lookup rather than a check bolted on afterwards: a handle belonging to another user is indistinguishable from one that never existed.

A handle that resolves to a session which is already revoked, or which has expired, is also indistinguishable from one that never existed. The reference resolves the handle with getSession, documented to return null "when the session does not exist or has expired" (session-store.interface.ts:51-54), and its revokeSession deletes the record — so both cases reach the same `if (!session || …) → 404` as an unknown handle (auth.router.ts:762-767). A second DELETE of the same handle is therefore *not* idempotently successful, and neither is a DELETE of an expired one. 

func (s *Service) SendMagicLink(ctx context.Context, in MagicLinkSendInput) (string, error)

SendMagicLink mints a magic link, stores its hash and delivers it through Config.SendMagicLink.

The returned plaintext token is redundant for an HTTP caller — the routes answer {"success":true} and drop it — and is kept for a direct caller that delivers the link itself, and for tests.

func (*Service) SendSMSCode 

func (s *Service) SendSMSCode(ctx context.Context, in SMSCodeSendInput) (string, error)

SendSMSCode mints a one-time code, stores its hash and delivers it through Config.SendSMSCode. See SendMagicLink on the returned plaintext.

The HTTP routes refuse an unconfigured deployment before they reach this call (Auth.SMSConfigured), because the reference checks config.sms at the top of the route rather than in the strategy. This check is what protects a direct caller, and it is why a handler that skipped the precheck still cannot store a code nobody can deliver.

func (*Service) SendVerificationEmailToken 

func (s *Service) SendVerificationEmailToken(ctx context.Context, in EmailVerificationInput) (string, error)

func (*Service) SetupTOTP 

func (s *Service) SetupTOTP(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) (string, error)

func (*Service) StartTOTPEnrolment added in v0.2.0 

func (s *Service) StartTOTPEnrolment(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) (TOTPSetup, error)

StartTOTPEnrolment mints an enrolment secret and its provisioning URI.

func (*Service) TokenTTLs added in v0.2.0 

func (s *Service) TokenTTLs() (access, refresh time.Duration)

TokenTTLs reports the configured access and refresh token lifetimes. The HTTP layer needs them to give the auth cookies the same lifetime as the tokens they carry.

func (*Service) UpdateMetadata 

func (s *Service) UpdateMetadata(ctx context.Context, userID string, metadata map[string]any) error

func (*Service) UpdatePhoneNumber added in v0.2.0 

func (s *Service) UpdatePhoneNumber(ctx context.Context, in AddPhoneInput) (User, error)

UpdatePhoneNumber sets or clears a user's phone number.

func (*Service) UpdateProfile 

func (s *Service) UpdateProfile(ctx context.Context, in UpdateProfileInput) (User, error)

UpdateProfile applies a partial profile update: a nil field in the input is one the caller did not submit and must be left as it is stored (§3.5).

UserAccountStore.UpdateProfile takes both names by value, so a nil field is resolved against the current record before the write rather than by widening the store interface — a store written against this package keeps compiling and still gets partial semantics. The read-modify-write is not atomic; two concurrent partial patches of *different* fields can still lose one. Making it atomic needs a store-level patch primitive, which is a breaking interface change and its own item; silently erasing a field on every single partial call is the failure this closes.

func (*Service) UserHasPermission 

func (s *Service) UserHasPermission(ctx context.Context, userID, permission, tenantID string) (bool, error)

func (*Service) VerifyEmail 

func (s *Service) VerifyEmail(ctx context.Context, in VerifyEmailInput) error
func (s *Service) VerifyMagicLink(ctx context.Context, in MagicLinkVerifyInput) (User, AuthTokens, error)

func (*Service) VerifyMagicLinkForUser added in v0.2.0 

func (s *Service) VerifyMagicLinkForUser(ctx context.Context, in MagicLinkVerifyInput, userID string) (User, AuthTokens, error)

VerifyMagicLinkForUser consumes a magic link that must belong to userID, the step-up case: the caller has already identified the user through a step-up token and the link is only the second factor.

It exists because the identity check has to happen before a session is created. Service.VerifyMagicLink issues one as part of verifying, so a caller that compared the ids afterwards would refuse the request on the wire and still leave a live session for the link's owner — a session that shows up in GET /sessions and that only the owner can revoke. A mismatch here returns ErrMagicLinkOwnerMismatch and issues nothing.

The link is consumed even on a mismatch, matching the reference, which burns it in the strategy before the router compares ids (magic-link.strategy.ts:50 versus auth.router.ts:1150-1152).

func (*Service) VerifySMSCode 

func (s *Service) VerifySMSCode(ctx context.Context, in SMSCodeVerifyInput) (User, AuthTokens, error)

func (*Service) VerifyTOTP 

func (s *Service) VerifyTOTP(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID, code string) (User, AuthTokens, error)

func (*Service) VerifyTOTPSetup 

func (s *Service) VerifyTOTPSetup(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID, secret, code string) error

func (*Service) VerifyTempToken added in v0.2.0 

func (s *Service) VerifyTempToken(token string) (TempTokenSubject, error)

VerifyTempToken resolves the identity a step-up token names, or ErrInvalidToken.

type ServiceOption 

type ServiceOption func(*Service)

func WithMetadataStore 

func WithMetadataStore(store UserMetadataStore) ServiceOption

func WithRolesPermissionsStore 

func WithRolesPermissionsStore(store RolesPermissionsStore) ServiceOption

func WithTenantStore 

func WithTenantStore(store TenantStore) ServiceOption

type Session 

type Session struct {
	ID               string
	UserID           string
	TenantID         string
	RefreshTokenHash string
	CreatedAt        time.Time
	ExpiresAt        time.Time
	RevokedAt        *time.Time
}

Session stores refresh-token bound session metadata.

type SessionAdminStore 

type SessionAdminStore interface {
	ListSessionsForUser(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) ([]Session, error)
	RevokeSessionByID(ctx context.Context, sessionID string) error
	DeleteExpiredSessions(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) (int, error)
}

SessionAdminStore exposes session listing and cleanup primitives.

type SessionLookupStore 

type SessionLookupStore interface {
	GetSessionByID(ctx context.Context, sessionID string) (Session, error)
}

SessionLookupStore resolves sessions by session ID.

type SessionStore 

type SessionStore interface {
	CreateSession(ctx context.Context, session Session) (Session, error)
	GetSessionByRefreshTokenHash(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) (Session, error)
	UpdateSession(ctx context.Context, session Session) error
}

SessionStore persists refresh-token sessions.

type SseDistributor 

type SseDistributor interface {
	Publish(ctx context.Context, channel string, msg SseMessage) error
	Subscribe(ctx context.Context, channel string) (<-chan SseMessage, error)
}

SseDistributor broadcasts SSE messages to all connected clients. Implement this interface for Redis/Kafka-based multi-instance scaling.

type SseHub 

type SseHub struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

SseHub manages in-process SSE subscriptions.

func NewSseHub 

func NewSseHub() *SseHub

NewSseHub creates an in-process SSE hub.

func (*SseHub) Publish 

func (h *SseHub) Publish(_ context.Context, channel string, msg SseMessage) error

Publish sends a message to all subscribers of channel.

func (*SseHub) Subscribe 

func (h *SseHub) Subscribe(_ context.Context, channel string) (<-chan SseMessage, error)

Subscribe registers a new client channel for the given user/channel key.

func (*SseHub) Unsubscribe 

func (h *SseHub) Unsubscribe(channel string, ch <-chan SseMessage)

Unsubscribe removes a client channel from the hub.

type SseMessage 

type SseMessage struct {
	ID    string
	Event string
	Data  map[string]any
}

SseMessage is a single SSE payload.

type TOTPSetup added in v0.2.0 

type TOTPSetup struct {
	Secret     string `json:"secret"`
	OTPAuthURL string `json:"otpauthUrl"`
}

TOTPSetup is the enrolment material POST /2fa/setup hands back. Enrolment is stateless in the reference and stateless here: nothing is persisted until the client returns the secret to /2fa/verify-setup together with a code that verifies against it.

The reference also returns a `qrCode` PNG data URL. It is absent here: the root package is stdlib plus golang.org/x/crypto and a QR encoder is neither. A client renders OTPAuthURL itself, which is what the Rust port of this family does too.

type TOTPStore 

type TOTPStore interface {
	UpdateTOTPSecret(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID, secret string, enabled bool) error
}

TOTPStore persists authenticator setup.

type TelemetryEvent 

type TelemetryEvent struct {
	ID        string
	EventName string
	UserID    string
	TenantID  string
	IP        string
	UserAgent string
	Success   bool
	Error     string
	Timestamp time.Time
	Meta      map[string]any
}

TelemetryEvent represents a single persisted auth event for analytics.

type TelemetryFilter 

type TelemetryFilter struct {
	UserID    string
	TenantID  string
	EventName string
	Since     time.Time
	Until     time.Time
	Limit     int
}

TelemetryFilter restricts query results.

type TelemetryStore 

type TelemetryStore interface {
	Record(ctx context.Context, event TelemetryEvent) error
	Query(ctx context.Context, filter TelemetryFilter) ([]TelemetryEvent, error)
}

TelemetryStore persists auth telemetry events.

type TempTokenSubject added in v0.2.0 

type TempTokenSubject struct {
	UserID   string
	TenantID string
}

TempTokenSubject is the identity a step-up token names. It is deliberately not a User: the routes that accept a tempToken re-read the user from the store, as the reference does, so a flag set since the token was minted is honoured.

type Tenant 

type Tenant struct {
	ID        string
	Name      string
	IsActive  bool
	Config    map[string]any
	CreatedAt time.Time
}

Tenant represents an isolated workspace or organization.

type TenantStore 

type TenantStore interface {
	CreateTenant(ctx context.Context, tenant Tenant) (Tenant, error)
	GetTenantByID(ctx context.Context, id string) (Tenant, error)
	GetAllTenants(ctx context.Context) ([]Tenant, error)
	UpdateTenant(ctx context.Context, id string, update Tenant) error
	DeleteTenant(ctx context.Context, id string) error
	AssociateUserWithTenant(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error
	DisassociateUserFromTenant(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error
	GetTenantsForUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]Tenant, error)
	GetUsersForTenant(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]string, error)
}

TenantStore manages tenants and user memberships.

type TokenMailer added in v0.3.0 

type TokenMailer struct {
	// Transport delivers the rendered message. Required.
	Transport MailerTransport
	// BaseURL is what the URL builders above build the link under.
	BaseURL string
	// Locale selects the built-in template set: "en" (the default) or "it". An
	// unknown locale falls back to English, as MailTemplater.Render does.
	//
	// It is static for the same reason MagicLinkMailer.Locale is: the reference's
	// per-request override is the emailLang body field, which these routes accept
	// on the wire and no adapter threads any further yet.
	Locale string
	// Templates renders subject and body. The constructors fill this in.
	Templates *MailTemplater
}

TokenMailer is the shared body of the three ready-made senders below and the port's equivalent of the reference's config.email.mailer path, where a deployment configures a transport instead of writing a callback. It is MagicLinkMailer's shape, factored out because three copies of it would be three places for a template name or a Content-Type to drift.

type TwoFactorChallenge added in v0.3.0 

type TwoFactorChallenge struct {
	// TempToken is the step-up credential the §3 routes accept. It is typed
	// tokenTypeTemp, so unlike the reference's it is not also an access token —
	// see the tokenTypeTemp comment for why that deliberate difference is kept.
	TempToken string
	// Methods is available2faMethods: the factors this user can use, in the
	// reference's order. It is empty only when SetupRequired is set.
	Methods []string
	// SetupRequired selects the second of the reference's two branches: a policy
	// demands a second factor and the account has no method at all, so the client
	// must enrol one before it can be challenged.
	SetupRequired bool
}

TwoFactorChallenge is what POST /login answers a user who has a second factor: the step-up token, and the factors they can actually present it with.

It carries what goes on the wire and nothing else, for the reason MagicLinkDelivery carries so little (delivery.go): the token is a credential, and a value that also held the User would hand a password hash and a TOTP secret to anything that logs a challenge.

type UpdateProfileInput 

type UpdateProfileInput struct {
	UserID    string
	TenantID  string
	FirstName *string
	LastName  *string
}

UpdateProfileInput is the payload behind PATCH /profile. FirstName and LastName are pointers because the route is a *partial* update: the reference types the body { firstName?: string | null, lastName?: string | null } and passes it through verbatim, so a key the caller omitted arrives at the store as undefined and leaves the stored column alone (wire-contract §3.5, user-store.interface.ts:136).

nil therefore means "not submitted, leave as it is" and a pointer to "" means "clear it" — the distinction a plain string cannot carry, and without which sending only firstName silently erases the stored lastName.

type User 

type User struct {
	ID                           string
	Email                        string
	PasswordHash                 string
	TenantID                     string
	PhoneNumber                  string
	FirstName                    string
	LastName                     string
	Role                         string
	IsEmailVerified              bool
	Require2FA                   bool
	IsTOTPEnabled                bool
	TOTPSecret                   string
	ResetTokenHash               string
	ResetTokenExpiresAt          *time.Time
	MagicLinkTokenHash           string
	MagicLinkTokenExpiresAt      *time.Time
	SMSCodeHash                  string
	SMSCodeExpiresAt             *time.Time
	EmailVerificationTokenHash   string
	EmailVerificationTokenExpiry *time.Time
	PendingEmail                 string
	EmailChangeTokenHash         string
	EmailChangeTokenExpiry       *time.Time
	Metadata                     map[string]any
	Roles                        []string
	Permissions                  []string
	Tenants                      []Tenant
	CustomClaims                 map[string]any
	CreatedAt                    time.Time
	UpdatedAt                    time.Time
}

User is the canonical identity model.

type UserAccountStore 

type UserAccountStore interface {
	UpdateProfile(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID, firstName, lastName string) (User, error)
	DeleteUser(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error
}

UserAccountStore adds account lifecycle operations.

type UserMetadataStore 

type UserMetadataStore interface {
	GetMetadata(ctx context.Context, userID string) (map[string]any, error)
	UpdateMetadata(ctx context.Context, userID string, metadata map[string]any) error
	ClearMetadata(ctx context.Context, userID string) error
}

UserMetadataStore manages arbitrary key/value user metadata.

type UserPasswordStore 

type UserPasswordStore interface {
	UpdatePassword(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID, passwordHash string) error
	UpdateResetToken(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID, tokenHash string, expiry time.Time) error
	GetUserByResetTokenHash(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) (User, error)
	ClearResetToken(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID string) error
}

UserPasswordStore adds password lifecycle methods.

type UserPhoneStore added in v0.2.0 

type UserPhoneStore interface {
	UpdatePhoneNumber(ctx context.Context, userID, tenantID, phoneNumber string) (User, error)
}

UserPhoneStore adds the phone-number update behind POST /add-phone. It is a capability of its own rather than a method on UserAccountStore so that a store written against the existing interface keeps compiling; a store that does not implement it makes the route answer 501, which is the reference's own behaviour when userStore.updatePhoneNumber is absent (auth.router.ts:700-703).

type UserStore 

type UserStore interface {
	CreateUser(ctx context.Context, user User) (User, error)
	GetUserByEmail(ctx context.Context, email, tenantID string) (User, error)
	GetUserByID(ctx context.Context, id, tenantID string) (User, error)
}

UserStore persists and resolves users.

type VerifyEmailInput 

type VerifyEmailInput struct {
	Token string
}

type WebhookDispatcher 

type WebhookDispatcher struct {
	// contains filtered or unexported fields
}

WebhookDispatcher delivers signed webhook payloads.

func NewWebhookDispatcher 

func NewWebhookDispatcher(endpoints ...WebhookEndpoint) *WebhookDispatcher

NewWebhookDispatcher creates a dispatcher for the given endpoints.

func (*WebhookDispatcher) Dispatch 

func (d *WebhookDispatcher) Dispatch(ctx context.Context, event Event)

Dispatch delivers the event to all matching endpoints.

type WebhookEndpoint 

type WebhookEndpoint struct {
	ID     string
	URL    string
	Secret string
	Events []string // event names to forward; empty = all
}

WebhookEndpoint configures a single outbound webhook target.

type WebhookPayload 

type WebhookPayload struct {
	ID        string         `json:"id"`
	Event     string         `json:"event"`
	Timestamp time.Time      `json:"timestamp"`
	Data      map[string]any `json:"data"`
}

WebhookPayload is the envelope sent to webhook targets.

Source Files

View all Source files

Directories

Path Synopsis
adapter
chi
echo
gin
internal/wiretest
Package wiretest is the shared wire-contract conformance suite for the HTTP adapters.
 Package wiretest is the shared wire-contract conformance suite for the HTTP adapters.
nethttp
examples
chi-postgres command
Chi + PostgreSQL example for awesome-go-auth.
 Chi + PostgreSQL example for awesome-go-auth.
echo-sqlite command
Echo + SQLite example for awesome-go-auth.
 Echo + SQLite example for awesome-go-auth.
gin-mongodb command
Gin + MongoDB example for awesome-go-auth.
 Gin + MongoDB example for awesome-go-auth.

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