pleno-dlp

README

pleno-dlp

Trufflehog-compatible DLP scanner — secrets and PII — over the local filesystem, git history, and stdin. AGPL-3.0.

go install github.com/plenoai/pleno-dlp/cmd/pleno-dlp@latest

pleno-dlp scan filesystem ./repo
pleno-dlp scan git --repo ./repo --max-depth 200
git diff | pleno-dlp scan stdin --label git-diff
pleno-dlp scan filesystem ./repo --format sarif --verify > findings.sarif
pleno-dlp detectors list                        # audit registered coverage

Single Go binary. Trufflehog-compatible detector interface, archive-aware (zip / tar / tar.gz / gzip), base64 / percent / hex decoder pipeline, per-host verify rate limiter. 602 detectors built-in (598 secrets + 4 PII). Tag pattern vX.Y.Z.

SaaS sources (GitHub / GitLab / Bitbucket / Slack / Notion / Confluence / Jira) are tracked in issues #74–#80 for native Go ports — the previous Python package was retired in v1.0.0.

Detector coverage

602 built-in detectors. Every secret detector that can confirm against an upstream provider implements Verify (run with --verify); the rest emit Verified=false with rotation guidance in the output.

Class	Providers
Cloud / infra	AWS, AWS session token, AWS S3 presigned URL, GCP service-account, GCP API key, GCP OAuth, GCP ID token, GCS signed URL, Azure storage key, Azure SAS, AzureAD, AzureApp, Azure SQL conn-string, AlibabaCloud, TencentCloud, DigitalOcean, Cloudflare, Heroku, Render, Fly.io, Vercel, Netlify, Terraform Cloud, Terraform Cloud Team, Dropbox, kubeconfig
VCS / dev tooling	GitHub PAT, GitHub Container Registry, GitLab PAT, GitLab Deploy, Bitbucket Cloud, Bitbucket Server, npm, PyPI, Hugging Face, Postman, Atlassian, Jira, Confluence, Buildkite, CircleCI, Codecov, Adobe.io, Docker Hub PAT
AI	OpenAI, Anthropic, Cohere, Replicate, Mistral, Groq, OpenRouter, Together
Comms / SaaS	Slack bot, Slack webhook, Discord, Twilio, SendGrid, Mailgun, Mailchimp, Brevo, Postmark, Notion, Linear, Asana, Mixpanel, Segment, Telegram, Okta, HubSpot, Intercom, Salesforce refresh, Spotify, Zoom, Klaviyo, Zendesk, Freshdesk, ClickUp, Monday, Trello, Gitter, LaunchNotes, Clerk
GPU / IaaS	Paperspace, RunPod, Modal, Linode, Vultr, Scaleway
DBaaS / edge	UpstashRedis, PlanetScale, Supabase
Observability	Datadog, Datadog AppKey, Sentry, New Relic, PagerDuty, Opsgenie, Shodan, VirusTotal, Honeycomb, Sumo Logic, Rollbar, Bugsnag
Payments / data	Stripe, Square, PayPal, Plaid, MongoDB Atlas, Snowflake, Databricks
Connection strings	Redis, Postgres, MySQL, MongoDB URI, RabbitMQ, Kafka SASL, basic-auth URL, SMTP
Format-shaped	JWT, PEM private keys, Generic high-entropy (catch-all near credential keywords)
Secrets management / IAM	Doppler, DopplerCLI, Vault, HashiCorpCloud, Algolia, Airtable, Grafana, LaunchDarkly, LaunchDarkly Relay, Auth0, Snyk, Tailscale, Figma, Ngrok
PII (finding_class=pii)	Email, US SSN, Credit card (Luhn-validated), IBAN (mod-97 validated)

Run pleno-dlp detectors list for the live registry, or pleno-dlp detectors list --format json for machine-readable output.

Add org-specific patterns without forking the binary — see Custom rules below.

Severity and CI gating

Every finding carries a Severity:

When	Severity
Verified=true	Critical
Unverified explicit secret detector	High
Generic high-entropy / JWT / PEM unverified	Medium
PII (any kind)	Medium

--fail-on chooses what blocks the build:

pleno-dlp scan filesystem ./repo --fail-on critical    # only Critical = exit 1
pleno-dlp scan filesystem ./repo --fail-on high        # High and Critical
pleno-dlp scan filesystem ./repo                       # default: any finding

SARIF output maps Severity to GitHub Code Scanning levels (Critical/High → error, Medium → warning, Low/Info → note). partialFingerprints carries secret/v1 (sha256(detector|raw)) so GitHub dedups the same leak across PRs.

Scope by detector when one provider is too noisy for a particular repo:

pleno-dlp scan filesystem ./repo --exclude-detectors GenericHighEntropy
pleno-dlp scan filesystem ./repo --include-detectors AWS,GitHub,Stripe

Names match pleno-dlp detectors list --format names (case-insensitive). Unknown names error so a typo can't silently downgrade the scan.

Allowlist (mute known false positives)

--allowlist <path> plus auto-discovery of .pleno-allow.json from the process cwd. Entries match by detector type, raw secret literal, raw secret regex, and path glob (AND across non-empty fields):

{
  "entries": [
    {"detector": "AWS", "raw": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
     "reason": "trufflehog dummy"},
    {"path": "fixtures/**/*.env",
     "reason": "local test fixtures"},
    {"raw_regex": "^sk-test_",
     "reason": "Stripe test-mode keys"},
    {"detector": "PIIEmail", "path": "docs/**",
     "reason": "documented contact emails"}
  ]
}

Suppression count surfaces on stderr (allowlist: suppressed N), flagging stale rules.

Custom rules

JSON file passed via --rules:

[
  {
    "name": "ACME Internal API Key",
    "keywords": ["ACME_API_KEY", "x-acme-token"],
    "regex": "ACME_[A-Z0-9]{20}",
    "entropy_min": 3.5,
    "severity": "high",
    "verify_url": "https://api.acme.example/verify",
    "verify_header": "Authorization: Bearer {{ .Secret }}"
  }
]

keywords are required — they gate the regex from running on every chunk. verify_url is optional; 200 = verified, 401/403 = unverified, transport errors surface as VerificationErr.

pleno-dlp scan filesystem ./repo --rules ./acme-rules.json

Decoding and archives

The engine expands every chunk through:

1. Archive walker — zip, tar, tar.gz, plain gzip, recursively up to depth 4 (configurable). Inner entries carry ExtraData["archive_path"] = "outer.zip!inner.tar.gz!leak.env" so the trail is visible in output.
2. Decoder pipeline — base64 (std + url-safe), percent-encoded, hex (≥40 chars). Decoded variants are scanned alongside the original; hits stamp ExtraData["decoded_from"].

A printable-byte gate keeps binary noise from reaching detectors. Hard limits (50 MiB per entry, 200 MiB total expanded, depth cap) defuse zip-bomb DoS.

Sources

# Filesystem (recursive walk)
pleno-dlp scan filesystem ./repo \
  --include 'src/**' --exclude '**/*_test.go' \
  --no-default-excludes  # opt-in: re-scan .git, node_modules, vendor, ...

# Local git history
pleno-dlp scan git --repo ./repo --branch main --max-depth 500
pleno-dlp scan git --repo ./repo --since 2024-01-01T00:00:00Z

# Stdin (one chunk read from os.Stdin)
git diff | pleno-dlp scan stdin --label git-diff
kubectl get secret app-config -o yaml | pleno-dlp scan stdin

Default filesystem excludes (.git, .hg, .svn, node_modules, vendor, target, dist, build, __pycache__, .venv, .tox) keep most scans tractable; pass --no-default-excludes to opt out.

Output formats

--format table       # human-readable, default
--format json        # array of findings, machine-parseable
--format sarif       # SARIF 2.1.0, GitHub Code Scanning compliant

Pipe SARIF to GitHub Code Scanning:

# .github/workflows/secret-scan.yml
- run: pleno-dlp scan filesystem . --format sarif > findings.sarif
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
  with:
    sarif_file: findings.sarif

For full workflows (PR-only diff scan, --fail-on critical, SARIF upload, verify rate limiting, pre-commit hook, GitLab CI), see docs/recipes/.

Shell completions

source <(pleno-dlp completion bash)
pleno-dlp completion zsh > "${fpath[1]}/_pleno-dlp"
pleno-dlp completion fish | source
pleno-dlp completion powershell | Out-String | Invoke-Expression

Install

# Latest release
go install github.com/plenoai/pleno-dlp/cmd/pleno-dlp@latest

# Pre-built archive (linux / darwin / windows × amd64 / arm64)
# https://github.com/plenoai/pleno-dlp/releases — every release
# ships a syft SBOM alongside each archive.

# From source
git clone https://github.com/plenoai/pleno-dlp
cd pleno-dlp
go build ./cmd/pleno-dlp

Development

go test ./... -race    # full test suite, race-clean
go build ./...

Releases trigger exclusively on tag push:

• vX.Y.Z → Go binary release via GoReleaser trusted publishing.

main push runs build + tests only.

License

AGPL-3.0 — matching pleno-anonymize.