README
¶
hostebin
Upload a bundle of files, get a URL you can hand to a person.
Your agent just produced a 400-line HTML report. Pasting it into chat is useless.
hostebin up report.html returns a link that opens in a browser.
$ hostebin up report.html
https://paste.example.com/b/9f2a1c7d40b8e35f/
One static Go binary is both the server and the client. Storage is a directory. Reads are public, every mutation needs a bearer token, and the 128-bit bundle ID in the URL is the read capability.
- Bundles, not files. Upload a page with its images and CSS; relative links work.
- Markdown renders to a styled page;
?raw=1gives you the source. - Agent-shaped output.
upprints exactly one URL on stdout, diagnostics on stderr,--jsonfor everything else. Ready-made agent skills included. - Serve it anywhere. Localhost, a VPS with Let's Encrypt, or a tailnet with
embedded Tailscale — no
tailscaled, noNET_ADMIN.
Install
| Go |
|
|---|---|
| Debian/Ubuntu |
|
| Fedora/RHEL, Alpine |
|
| Binary |
|
| Docker |
|
go install, the release binaries, the Linux packages, and the container image work from the first tagged release.
Archives, checksums.txt, and Linux packages are published for Linux, macOS,
Windows, and FreeBSD on amd64, arm64, 386, and armv7. File names carry no version,
so releases/latest/download/... always resolves to the newest release. Verify a
download with sha256sum -c checksums.txt --ignore-missing.
Quick start
1. Start a server (any machine that both you and your agent can reach):
hostebin serve
On first run it generates a token, stores it in the data directory with mode 0600,
and logs it once.
2. Point the client at it:
export HOSTEBIN_SERVER=http://localhost:8080
export HOSTEBIN_TOKEN="$(cat "${XDG_DATA_HOME:-$HOME/.local/share}/hostebin/token")"
3. Upload:
hostebin up report.html # one page
hostebin up report.html img/chart.png # page plus assets
hostebin up ./site/ # a whole directory
echo '# Status' | hostebin up -n status.md - # from stdin
To persist the settings instead of exporting them every session, put them in
~/.config/hostebin/config.json (see Configuration).
Using it from an agent
The skills/ directory contains a drop-in skill that teaches an agent
when and how to publish. For Claude Code:
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && cp -r skills/hostebin ~/.claude/skills/
For any other agent, skills/hostebin/SKILL.md is plain Markdown — append it to
AGENTS.md or your system prompt.
The contract that makes this safe to script:
| Behaviour | Detail |
|---|---|
| stdout | Exactly one line: the bundle URL |
| stderr | Every diagnostic, warning, and error |
--json |
Full response: id, url, entry_url, files[], expires_at |
| exit codes | 0 success, 1 usage/config error, 2 network or server error |
| config | HOSTEBIN_SERVER and HOSTEBIN_TOKEN are all an agent needs |
url=$(hostebin up --ttl 7d --title 'Weekly report' report.html) || exit $?
echo "Report: $url"
Iterate on an artifact without invalidating the link you already shared:
hostebin up --id 9f2a1c7d40b8e35f report.html
Commands
hostebin up [flags] <file|directory|->... upload a bundle, print its URL
hostebin ls [flags] list live bundles
hostebin rm [flags] <id> delete a bundle
hostebin serve [flags] run the server
hostebin version version, commit, build date
up flags:
| Flag | Meaning |
|---|---|
--title TEXT |
Bundle title |
--ttl DURATION |
30m, 12h, 7d, 2w, or never |
--entry PATH |
File served at the bundle root |
--id ID |
Replace an existing bundle in place |
-n, --name PATH |
Name for data read from stdin (required with -) |
--json |
Print the JSON response instead of the URL |
--open |
Open the URL in the system browser |
--quiet |
Suppress optional diagnostics |
--server, --token, --config |
Override the resolved configuration |
Directory uploads strip the directory argument itself and keep the paths below it;
symlinks and non-regular files are refused. --entry picks the root page; otherwise
a single file wins, then index.html, then the first HTML file, then the first
Markdown file, then a generated listing.
Configuration
Precedence: flags → HOSTEBIN_* environment → JSON config → defaults. Every long
flag has an environment variable formed by uppercasing it and replacing - with _
(--max-upload → HOSTEBIN_MAX_UPLOAD).
A 0600 config file is created on first use at
${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-~/.config}/hostebin/config.json (Linux/BSD),
~/Library/Application Support/hostebin/config.json (macOS), or %AppData%\hostebin
(Windows). Override with --config or HOSTEBIN_CONFIG. JSON keys are the long flag
names:
{
"server": "https://hostebin.example.com",
"token": "replace-me",
"host": "",
"port": 8080,
"data": "/home/me/.local/share/hostebin",
"base-url": "",
"tls-addr": ":8443",
"tls-cert": "",
"tls-key": "",
"acme-domain": "",
"acme-email": "",
"tailscale": false,
"funnel": false,
"ts-hostname": "hostebin",
"ts-auth-key": "",
"max-upload": "32MiB",
"max-files": 64,
"default-ttl": "never",
"csp": ""
}
Persistent data (bundles plus the token file) lives in
${XDG_DATA_HOME:-~/.local/share}/hostebin on Linux/BSD and <user config dir>/hostebin/data elsewhere.
Running a server
# plain HTTP, the default
hostebin serve --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080 --data /var/lib/hostebin
# your own certificate, with or without plain HTTP alongside
hostebin serve --port 0 --tls-addr :8443 --tls-cert cert.pem --tls-key key.pem
# automatic public HTTPS; owns :80 (ACME challenges + redirect) and :443
hostebin serve --port 0 --acme-domain files.example.com --acme-email ops@example.com
# embedded Tailscale — no tailscaled, no /dev/net/tun, no NET_ADMIN
HOSTEBIN_TS_AUTH_KEY=tskey-auth-... hostebin serve --port 0 --tailscale
HOSTEBIN_TS_AUTH_KEY=tskey-auth-... hostebin serve --port 0 --funnel # public
Tailscale state persists under $HOSTEBIN_DATA/tsnet; the server tries tailnet HTTPS
first and logs an HTTP fallback if HTTPS is not enabled for the tailnet.
--base-url overrides the URL returned by every listener. Without it, Tailscale and
ACME use their known DNS names and other listeners derive links from the request. Behind
a reverse proxy, forward the original Host and set X-Forwarded-Proto.
Useful server settings: --max-upload (default 32MiB), --max-files (default 64),
--default-ttl (default never), --csp (off disables it). Expired bundles 404
immediately; a sweep at startup and every ten minutes reclaims their files.
The .deb, .rpm, and Arch packages install a hardened systemd unit:
sudo systemctl enable --now hostebin
sudo systemctl cat hostebin # data lives in /var/lib/hostebin
Containers
docker run --rm -p 8080:8080 -v hostebin-data:/data ghcr.io/readeem/hostebin
HOSTEBIN_TOKEN=choose-a-secret docker compose --profile plain up
HOSTEBIN_TS_AUTH_KEY=tskey-auth-... HOSTEBIN_TOKEN=choose-a-secret \
docker compose --profile tailscale up
Images are CGO_ENABLED=0 on distroless nonroot, published for linux/amd64 and
linux/arm64. The Tailscale Compose service needs no elevated capabilities.
HTTP API
All /api/v1 routes require Authorization: Bearer TOKEN. Bundle content and
/healthz are public.
curl -sf -H "Authorization: Bearer $HOSTEBIN_TOKEN" \
-H 'X-Hostebin-Filename: report.html' \
--data-binary @report.html \
"$HOSTEBIN_SERVER/api/v1/bundles"
curl -sf -H "Authorization: Bearer $HOSTEBIN_TOKEN" \
-F 'file=@report.html;filename=report.html' \
-F 'file=@img/chart.png;filename=img/chart.png' \
"$HOSTEBIN_SERVER/api/v1/bundles"
| Route | Purpose |
|---|---|
POST /api/v1/bundles |
Create from multipart file parts or a raw body with X-Hostebin-Filename |
PUT /api/v1/bundles/{id}?mode=replace |
Atomically replace a bundle |
PUT /api/v1/bundles/{id}?mode=merge |
Atomically merge named files into a bundle |
GET /api/v1/bundles |
List live bundles |
DELETE /api/v1/bundles/{id} |
Delete a bundle |
GET /b/{id}/... |
Read public content; ?raw=1 disables Markdown rendering |
Raw uploads also accept X-Hostebin-Title, X-Hostebin-Entry, and X-Hostebin-TTL;
multipart uploads use title, entry, and ttl fields.
Content security model
Hosted files are untrusted. The server never uses cookie authentication, sends
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, and serves unknown extensions as downloadable
application/octet-stream. Bundle responses carry this default CSP:
default-src 'self' data: blob: https: 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'; connect-src 'self'; form-action 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'
Inline scripts/styles and HTTPS CDN assets are intentionally allowed because generated reports need them. This is not full isolation: bundles share an origin, so malicious content can reach another bundle whose unguessable ID it knows. Per-bundle origins are out of scope for v1.
Writes stage in hidden temporary directories before an atomic rename; reads go through
os.OpenRoot, so .. and symlinks cannot escape the storage root.
Treat every bundle URL as a secret-bearing link, and never publish credentials or personal data.
Development
just drives everything:
just # list recipes
just build # ./hostebin, version stamped from the current git tag
just check # gofmt, go vet, go test — the CI gate
just test-all # default, notsnet, and -race test runs
just serve # run the server from source
Version lives in exactly one place, internal/version,
and every build path (justfile, Dockerfile, GoReleaser) overrides it with the same
-ldflags target. A build without ldflags falls back to the module version recorded
by the Go toolchain.
Smaller binary that rejects Tailscale flags:
just build-slim # go build -tags notsnet
Releasing
just tag 0.1.0 # tags v0.1.0 and pushes it
The tag triggers release.yml: GoReleaser builds
every target, attaches archives, checksums, and Linux packages to the GitHub release,
updates the Homebrew/Scoop/AUR manifests, and a second job publishes the container
image to GHCR.
License
MIT © Readeem