Documentation
¶
Overview ¶
Package dkim2 provides verification and signing for draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-09.
A Verifier requires an injected PublicKeyProvider. VerifyRequest owns cloned raw RFC 5322 bytes; those bytes are the sole authority for message and DKIM2 protocol fields. Bracketed SMTP reverse-path and forward-path bytes are separate current-envelope evidence and are never inferred from headers. Results and requests expose copies rather than caller-owned mutable storage.
Verify returns exactly PASS, FAIL, PERMERROR, or TEMPERROR. Caller context cancellation and API misuse return a zero result with a Go error. Message, parser, limit, protocol, key, provider, timestamp, envelope, custody, hash, and cryptographic outcomes return a populated result with a nil Go error. The precedence is caller/API error, PERMERROR, FAIL, TEMPERROR, then PASS; these states do not prescribe local MTA acceptance policy.
EvaluatePolicy applies a separate immutable local policy decision to the sealed projection embedded in a library-created VerifyResult. Verification state remains authoritative and unchanged. Strict mode is the default; permissive and testing modes require explicit options. A continue verdict is non-terminal and is neither PASS nor accept. Every successful evaluation returns exactly one matching disposition action.
The public verifier authenticates every inherited signature flag on aggregate PASS. Draft-07 Section 10.10 removed the donotmodify and donotexplode flags: received spellings are inert unknown flags, signing never emits them, and policy derives no compliance state from them. Feedback output is bounded intent without a destination or route. The retired DNS key-record t= tag carries no policy meaning; only the explicitly configured local testing mode relaxes a verdict. Pre-target malformed, missing, sequence, or limit outcomes remain valid fact-free PERMERROR results for policy evaluation. Policy results, findings, actions, and errors contain only bounded enums, booleans, counts, and sequence numbers, never message, identity, selector, key, provider, or route material.
Provider status is exactly found, missing, invalid, ambiguous, revoked, unsupported_key_type, or algorithm_mismatch, and a declared status accompanies a nil error. Found results contain a matching *rsa.PublicKey or ed25519.PublicKey; accepted public material is cloned before use. Private keys, crypto.Signer, open-ended material, mismatched algorithms, and inconsistent status/material pairs are not accepted. Provider failures are classified only through typed temporary or permanent errors, never error text. An error matching the active caller context remains Go control flow. Missing, invalid, ambiguous, revoked, unsupported, mismatch, typed permanent, and contract failures produce structured PERMERROR results. Typed temporary failure produces TEMPERROR only without a higher-priority fact. A provider-owned deadline while the caller context is live is temporary only when explicitly typed temporary; otherwise it is a provider contract error.
NewDNSPublicKeyProvider constructs the DNS-backed provider for the tested draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns-02 behavior baseline. The 2026-09-14 migration from the individual DNS draft changed identifiers, not normative behavior. The provider derives an absolute <selector>._domainkey.<signing-domain>. owner from signed values, so transports and callers must treat that name as sensitive diagnostic data. TXTTransport returns already-concatenated bytes for one TXT resource record while retaining the RR count. More than one RR is fail-closed ambiguous; records are never selected or concatenated across RR boundaries. NetTXTTransport maps each net.Resolver string to one RR and supplies zero TTL, so it cannot populate the provider cache. TTL-aware injected transports may enable bounded positive, authoritative-negative, and stable-error caching.
Draft-09 Sections 7.1 item 3 and 11.1 also make a From header field Authentic when d= is a subdomain of the From domain, unless the From domain publishes a Section 3.8 Domain Policy Record with f=strict at _domainkey.<domain>. NewVerifier and NewSigner therefore require an explicit choice: a key provider that also implements DomainPolicyProvider (as DNSPublicKeyProvider does through the same resolver, cache, and limits), WithDomainPolicyProvider / WithSignerDomainPolicyProvider, or the documented downward-only WithoutSubdomainFromAuthorization / WithoutSignerSubdomainFromAuthorization. Policy records are queried only after every signature proof passed. Signers themselves choose d= downward only and never query a Domain Policy Record.
DNS key records use PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey DER for RSA, exactly 32 raw bytes for Ed25519, and exactly the 1312-octet raw FIPS 204 public key for the Draft-09 Section 3.4 post-quantum mldsa44 algorithm. DNS-02 defines no key type for it; k=mldsa44 is the documented local interpretation. The Draft-07 mldsa44-ed25519-sha512 composite is no longer defined: such signature sets are ignored as unsupported algorithms and k=mldsa44-ed25519-sha512 records are unsupported key types, exactly like any other unknown token. Empty p= is revoked. Non-empty p= accepts omitted terminal Base64 padding as DNS-02 specifies while still requiring canonical zero pad bits. The parser recognizes lowercase k= as the DNS-02 grammar requires; the inherited DNS-00 ABNF typo is corrected there. The active DKIM2 signature grammar exposes no q= option; DNS TXT is the only lookup binding. The t= tag is retired by DNS-02 Section 3.4.1: it is validated only by the generic tag-list rules and is otherwise ignored, so DNS key records never yield testing or strict-identity semantics. DNSSECStatus is bounded transport diagnostic metadata and never changes key acceptance, cache lifetime, or verification facts.
DNSProviderConfig bounds cache capacity, TTL classes, transport concurrency, coalesced waiters, and lookup duration. Non-final canceled waiters leave a shared lookup independently. The final canceled waiter cancels the transport context and remains cleanup owner until the context-compliant transport returns. A deliberately context-ignoring injected transport can therefore hold that final caller and its single bounded flight slot; no helper goroutine is created to pretend arbitrary Go code can be forcibly canceled.
Aggregate PASS reports scope=chain, authenticated content coverage as complete or partial only for explicit unavailable-body history, and historical signatures as complete. Non-PASS results retain scope=current and do not claim historical coverage. The verifier reconstructs bounded Message-Instance history and verifies every inherited signature after current PASS. Custody structure is reported separately as not_evaluated, not_present, nd_links_evaluated, or terminal_nd_requires_oob. Pre-extraction parser or early-limit uncertainty is not_evaluated, never not_present; not_present is reported only after successful extraction establishes absence. Structural link evaluation is not historical content or signature verification. A terminal current nd= requires unmodeled out-of-band trust and therefore returns PERMERROR.
NewSigner exposes exactly three request paths. SignOriginator creates the initial Message-Instance and DKIM2-Signature. SignExisting consumes only a capability issued by VerifyForRevision and derives hash-unchanged forwarding or revision from the Section 12.1 digest gate; callers cannot select the role. SignNextDomain consumes the same sealed revision evidence plus a fresh, single-use published-next-domain capability and emits one terminal nd= signature. All paths snapshot the raw message plus the independently observed exact outgoing SMTP reverse path and ordered forward paths. Signing requires that envelope observation to equal the authority-issued exact-copy route ticket; it is never inferred from the ticket. All paths also require the closed final_network_form_pre_dot_stuffing transport declaration. Signing profiles contain public verification material and opaque private-key handles; injected private signers receive only one closed algorithm and native SHA-256 digest.
Fanout planning binds raw pre-sign bytes, envelope paths, disclosure class, route scope, purpose, and revision capability before signing. Signing limits may narrow but never widen the protocol, recipe, verification, route, crypto, and callback owners' hard ceilings. Every successful message is inserted, reparsed, custody-checked, and cryptographically self-verified before its reservation commits to unrestricted completion or the exact restricted-release state.
Internal datasource providers resolve exact immutable signing profiles and administrative policies without becoming protocol authorities. The datasource/signingprofile package is the only bridge to the signing domain: it validates same-snapshot results and maps provider-neutral key-handle IDs through an immutable registry to existing inert PrivateKeyHandle values. Datasource success never replaces the fresh DNS publication check, signing validation, route authorization, or private signer callback. The confined flat-file provider owns a duplicated directory descriptor, strictly decodes bounded versioned JSON, publishes complete snapshots atomically, and stops serving after a failed reload until explicit recovery.
Verifier.EvaluateReceivedDSN exposes the read-only Draft-09 Section 16.4 evaluation of an inbound DKIM2-signed delivery-status notification after the caller verified the outer message as an ordinary message with the same verifier. It takes the exact outer bytes, the observed null reverse path and single forward path, and an optional tenant-bound LocalAuthority, and proves in order RFC 6522 and strict generic RFC 3464 structure, embedded-original verification through the dedicated embedded verifiers, local-hop identity, outer-signer alignment, recipient linkage, failure class, and the previous hop. The completion signature's Section 10.4 window is evaluated at the outer DSN's highest-signature t= instead of the clock, because a DSN may legitimately arrive long after the forwarding it reports on. "Local" is datasource authority over the completion signature's d=, never an address in mf=; a verified foreign signer naming a local address is not_local. The local hop is a run: the completion signature plus every Section 12.3 nd= or same-tenant imaginary-hop member below it, each verified cryptographically; a non-verifying member or an nd= previous hop is an unsupported chain. The result is the closed delivery_status projection with bounded sequence facts and no content; it can never authorize signing. Without an authority the local hop and propagation are not evaluated. WithReceivedDSNEvaluation attaches the evaluation to EvaluatePolicy or EvaluateAuthenticationPolicy, which record the received-DSN mapping-table row as one finding on the single PolicyDecision: reject, tempfail, and continue rows replace the outer verdict, accept rows keep it, and an outer verification or final replay state other than PASS keeps the outer policy unchanged.
Signer.RebuildDSNForPropagation and Signer.SignPropagatedDSN implement Draft-09 Section 16.3 propagation of a received DSN to the previous hop. The signer re-runs the received-DSN evaluation on the exact request bytes with the mandatory tenant-bound LocalAuthority, and only an eligible evaluation is rebuilt: the local hop run's DKIM2-Signature fields and every Message-Instance above the previous hop's instance are removed by tag value, every Section 4 hash-excluded field above the previous hop signature is removed as fixed local policy, the run is descended through the authenticated recipes with every intermediate state re-proven, and the previous hop signature is verified over the reconstructed state with its Section 10.4 window evaluated at the completion signature's t=. Body evidence that was unavailable at any point degrades the embedded part to text/rfc822-headers. The rebuilt header block keeps the pruned wire order for every name the run's recipes did not rewrite, custody is validated over the whole chain below and including the previous hop, and a previous hop mf= or rt= carrying an obsolete source route is not reconstructable. The fresh report carries a fixed English human part with Content-Language en, Reporting-MTA, an optional verbatim Original-Envelope-Id, one recipient group naming the previous hop's single rt= path with Action failed and the 4.X.Y or 5.X.Y status of the propagation group or 5.0.0, and no destination-specific field. The signing domain is the canonical d= of the removed completion signature; the route purpose delivery_status_propagation, disclosure single, class external, binds the null reverse path to the authenticated previous mf=, and the signed DSN carries exactly one Message-Instance m=1 and one DKIM2-Signature i=1 with mf=<> and rt= equal to that address. PropagatedDSN reports SMTPUTF8Required when any header field of the DSN carries a non-ASCII byte and EightBitMIMERequired when only the embedded body does. Not reconstructable, null previous sender, unsupported chain, terminal origin, non-failure, and ineligible states never produce output. ReplayDeriver.DerivePropagation derives the propagation replay coordinate under a distinct domain-separation frame, and ReplayPropagationStore reserves it with a lease and commits it in two phases.
SigningResult is a closed sum. Only UnrestrictedSignedMessage has Bytes. OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage deliberately has no generic byte, marshal, text, or release surface. Its type-specific release method atomically consumes the same ticket lineage only after proving the exact sealed OOB receiver, envelope, and route. A terminal next-domain result remains OOB-restricted until that release or a later authorized ordinary completion. Once an adapter legitimately receives released bytes, it can still duplicate or misroute them; the library does not claim replay prevention outside the bound release arrangement.
Supported PASS plus an unknown algorithm may pass; unknown-only coverage is PERMERROR, and a supported signature or current hash mismatch prevents PASS according to the precedence above. Callers should inspect typed state, ReasonCode, CheckClass, and SignatureSetFact values rather than parse text.
Defaults and hard maxima are 128 MiB raw message bytes, 2,000 current recipients, 16 Message-Instance hash sets, 16 signature sets, 128 retained check facts, and 16 retained signature facts. Options may narrow but never widen these limits. Timestamp policy permits five minutes of future skew as local verification policy, not a draft requirement, and enforces a non-disableable 14-day maximum age.
MAIL FROM comparison uses bracketed paths, ASCII-only domain lowercasing, case-sensitive local parts, and <> matching only <>. Every current recipient must occur in signed rt=; signed extras and order differences are allowed. Signing-domain d= uses relaxed right-label alignment against the signed MAIL FROM domain and is distinct from exact envelope-path comparison.
Index ¶
- Constants
- func EnvelopePathDomain(path []byte) (string, bool)
- func HeaderFromDomain(rawMessage []byte) (string, bool)
- func IsReplayError(err error) bool
- func MLDSA44Available() error
- func MLDSA44SignerOptions() *mldsa.Options
- func MaxCarriedTXTRecords() int
- func NewPermanentProviderError() error
- func NewReplayError(code ReplayErrorCode) error
- func NewTemporaryProviderError() error
- func Observe(ctx context.Context, sink ObservationSink, event ObservationEvent)
- func ProjectedPrivateKeyHandle(handle PrivateKeyHandle) (signing.PrivateKeyHandle, error)
- func ReplayFirstSeenValue(nonce ReplayNonce) (string, error)
- func ReplayPropagationPendingValue(leaseExpiry time.Time, nonce ReplayNonce) (string, error)
- func UseReplayStorageKey(key ReplayKey, use func(storageKey string) error) error
- func ValidEnvelopePath(path []byte, allowNull bool) bool
- type APIError
- type APIErrorCode
- type Algorithm
- type AuthenticationReason
- type AuthenticationReplayClass
- type AuthenticationResult
- func (AuthenticationResult) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (AuthenticationResult) GoString() string
- func (r AuthenticationResult) PrimaryReason() AuthenticationReason
- func (r AuthenticationResult) ReplayClass() AuthenticationReplayClass
- func (r AuthenticationResult) State() ResultState
- func (AuthenticationResult) String() string
- func (r AuthenticationResult) Valid() bool
- func (r AuthenticationResult) Verification() VerifyResult
- type Authenticator
- type AuthenticatorOption
- type BodyUnavailablePolicy
- type CheckClass
- type CheckFact
- type ClassifiedProviderError
- type CustodyStructure
- type DNSProviderConfig
- type DNSPublicKeyProvider
- func (DNSPublicKeyProvider) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (DNSPublicKeyProvider) GoString() string
- func (p *DNSPublicKeyProvider) LookupDomainPolicy(ctx context.Context, query DomainPolicyQuery) (DomainPolicyStatus, error)
- func (p *DNSPublicKeyProvider) LookupPublicKey(ctx context.Context, query PublicKeyQuery) (PublicKeyResult, error)
- func (DNSPublicKeyProvider) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
- func (DNSPublicKeyProvider) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
- func (DNSPublicKeyProvider) String() string
- type DNSResolverLimits
- type DNSSECStatus
- type DSNEvidenceError
- type DSNEvidenceStage
- type DSNIdentity
- type DSNProfileSource
- type DSNPropagationError
- type DSNPropagationEvidence
- func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) EightBitMIMERequired() bool
- func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) Evaluation() ReceivedDSNEvaluation
- func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) GoString() string
- func (DSNPropagationEvidence) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
- func (DSNPropagationEvidence) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
- func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) NextHopRecipient() []byte
- func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) OriginalForm() ReceivedDSNOriginalForm
- func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) Outcome() DSNPropagationOutcome
- func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) Rebuilt() bool
- func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) SMTPUTF8Required() bool
- func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) SigningDomain() string
- func (DSNPropagationEvidence) String() string
- func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) Valid() bool
- type DSNPropagationOutcome
- type DSNPropagationRequest
- type DSNPropagationSigningRequest
- type DSNPropagationStage
- type DSNSigningEvidence
- type DSNSigningEvidenceRequest
- type DSNSigningRequest
- type DomainPolicyProvider
- type DomainPolicyQuery
- type DomainPolicyStatus
- type Ed25519SigningCredential
- type ExistingSigningRequest
- type HeaderFromNullSenderClass
- type HistoricalState
- type LocalAuthority
- type LocalAuthorityStatus
- type MLDSA44SigningCredential
- type ManagedReplayStore
- type NetTXTTransport
- func (NetTXTTransport) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (NetTXTTransport) GoString() string
- func (t *NetTXTTransport) LookupTXT(ctx context.Context, absoluteName string) (TXTLookupResult, error)
- func (NetTXTTransport) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
- func (NetTXTTransport) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
- func (NetTXTTransport) String() string
- type NextDomainPublicationRequest
- func NewEd25519NextDomainPublicationRequest(domain string, credential Ed25519SigningCredential) NextDomainPublicationRequest
- func NewMLDSA44NextDomainPublicationRequest(domain string, credential MLDSA44SigningCredential) NextDomainPublicationRequest
- func NewRSANextDomainPublicationRequest(domain string, credential RSASigningCredential) NextDomainPublicationRequest
- type NextDomainSigningRequest
- type NoopObservationSink
- type ObservationAlgorithm
- type ObservationBucket
- type ObservationCacheResult
- type ObservationErrorClass
- type ObservationEvent
- type ObservationKind
- type ObservationOperation
- type ObservationReason
- type ObservationResult
- type ObservationSink
- type OriginatorSigningRequest
- type OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage
- func (m OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) Facts() SignedMessageFacts
- func (m OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (m OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) GoString() string
- func (m OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) ReleaseForOutOfBandAcceptance(ctx context.Context, ticket RouteCopyTicket, reversePath []byte, ...) ([]byte, error)
- func (m OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) String() string
- func (m OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) Valid() bool
- type PolicyAction
- type PolicyActionKind
- type PolicyActionPlan
- type PolicyDecision
- func (d PolicyDecision) ActionPlan() PolicyActionPlan
- func (d PolicyDecision) FeedbackIntent() PolicyFeedbackIntent
- func (d PolicyDecision) Findings() []PolicyFinding
- func (PolicyDecision) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (PolicyDecision) GoString() string
- func (d PolicyDecision) IsZero() bool
- func (PolicyDecision) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
- func (PolicyDecision) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
- func (d PolicyDecision) Mode() PolicyMode
- func (d PolicyDecision) PrimaryReason() PolicyReason
- func (PolicyDecision) String() string
- func (d PolicyDecision) Valid() bool
- func (d PolicyDecision) Verdict() PolicyVerdict
- func (d PolicyDecision) VerificationState() ResultState
- type PolicyError
- type PolicyErrorCode
- type PolicyFeedbackIntent
- func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) GoString() string
- func (i PolicyFeedbackIntent) HistoryCoverage() PolicyHistoryCoverage
- func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
- func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
- func (i PolicyFeedbackIntent) RelayRequired() bool
- func (i PolicyFeedbackIntent) RelaySequence() uint64
- func (i PolicyFeedbackIntent) Requested() bool
- func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) String() string
- func (i PolicyFeedbackIntent) Valid() bool
- type PolicyFinding
- func (PolicyFinding) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (PolicyFinding) GoString() string
- func (PolicyFinding) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
- func (PolicyFinding) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
- func (f PolicyFinding) Reason() PolicyReason
- func (f PolicyFinding) Sequence() (uint64, bool)
- func (f PolicyFinding) Severity() PolicyFindingSeverity
- func (PolicyFinding) String() string
- func (f PolicyFinding) Valid() bool
- type PolicyFindingSeverity
- type PolicyHistoryCoverage
- type PolicyMode
- type PolicyOption
- type PolicyReason
- type PolicyVerdict
- type PrivateKeyHandle
- type PrivateKeySignRequest
- func (r PrivateKeySignRequest) Algorithm() Algorithm
- func (r PrivateKeySignRequest) Digest() []bytedeprecated
- func (r PrivateKeySignRequest) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (r PrivateKeySignRequest) GoString() string
- func (r PrivateKeySignRequest) MessageRepresentative() []byte
- func (r PrivateKeySignRequest) String() string
- func (r PrivateKeySignRequest) Valid() bool
- type PrivateKeySignResult
- type PrivateKeySigner
- type PropagatedDSN
- func (p PropagatedDSN) Bytes() []byte
- func (p PropagatedDSN) EightBitMIMERequired() bool
- func (p PropagatedDSN) Facts() SignedMessageFacts
- func (p PropagatedDSN) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (p PropagatedDSN) GoString() string
- func (PropagatedDSN) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
- func (PropagatedDSN) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
- func (p PropagatedDSN) NextHopRecipient() []byte
- func (p PropagatedDSN) SMTPUTF8Required() bool
- func (p PropagatedDSN) SigningDomain() string
- func (PropagatedDSN) String() string
- func (p PropagatedDSN) Valid() bool
- type ProviderErrorClass
- type PublicKeyProvider
- type PublicKeyQuery
- func (q PublicKeyQuery) Algorithm() Algorithm
- func (PublicKeyQuery) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (PublicKeyQuery) GoString() string
- func (PublicKeyQuery) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
- func (PublicKeyQuery) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
- func (q PublicKeyQuery) Selector() string
- func (q PublicKeyQuery) SigningDomain() string
- func (PublicKeyQuery) String() string
- type PublicKeyResult
- func AlgorithmMismatchPublicKey(algorithm Algorithm) PublicKeyResult
- func AmbiguousPublicKey(algorithm Algorithm) PublicKeyResult
- func FoundEd25519PublicKey(key ed25519.PublicKey) PublicKeyResult
- func FoundMLDSA44PublicKey(raw []byte) PublicKeyResult
- func FoundRSAPublicKey(key *rsa.PublicKey) PublicKeyResult
- func InvalidPublicKey(algorithm Algorithm) PublicKeyResult
- func MissingPublicKey(algorithm Algorithm) PublicKeyResult
- func RevokedPublicKey(algorithm Algorithm) PublicKeyResult
- func UnsupportedKeyTypePublicKey(algorithm Algorithm) PublicKeyResult
- func (r PublicKeyResult) Algorithm() Algorithm
- func (r PublicKeyResult) Ed25519PublicKey() (ed25519.PublicKey, bool)
- func (PublicKeyResult) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (PublicKeyResult) GoString() string
- func (r PublicKeyResult) IsZero() bool
- func (r PublicKeyResult) MLDSA44PublicKey() ([]byte, bool)
- func (PublicKeyResult) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
- func (PublicKeyResult) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
- func (r PublicKeyResult) PublicKeySPKI() ([]byte, bool)
- func (r PublicKeyResult) RSAPublicKey() (*rsa.PublicKey, bool)
- func (r PublicKeyResult) Status() PublicKeyStatus
- func (PublicKeyResult) String() string
- type PublicKeyStatus
- type PublishedNextDomainCapability
- type RSASigningCredential
- type ReasonCode
- type ReceivedDSNEmbedded
- type ReceivedDSNError
- type ReceivedDSNEvaluation
- func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) CompletionSequence() uint64
- func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) Embedded() ReceivedDSNEmbedded
- func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) GoString() string
- func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) LocalHop() ReceivedDSNLocalHop
- func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) LocalHopRunLength() int
- func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
- func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
- func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) OriginalForm() ReceivedDSNOriginalForm
- func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) OuterAlignment() ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment
- func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) Propagation() ReceivedDSNPropagation
- func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) RecipientLinkage() ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage
- func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) String() string
- func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) Structure() ReceivedDSNStructure
- func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) Valid() bool
- type ReceivedDSNLocalHop
- type ReceivedDSNOriginalForm
- type ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment
- type ReceivedDSNPropagation
- type ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage
- type ReceivedDSNRequest
- type ReceivedDSNStage
- type ReceivedDSNStructure
- type RecipeLiteralPolicy
- type RecordedHop
- func (RecordedHop) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (RecordedHop) GoString() string
- func (h RecordedHop) IntroducesInstance() bool
- func (h RecordedHop) MessageInstance() uint64
- func (h RecordedHop) Recipe() VerifierRecipeDescriptor
- func (h RecordedHop) RecipeMode() string
- func (h RecordedHop) Sequence() uint64
- func (h RecordedHop) SignerDomain() string
- func (RecordedHop) String() string
- func (h RecordedHop) Valid() bool
- type ReplayCheck
- type ReplayClock
- type ReplayClockFunc
- type ReplayCountingPolicy
- type ReplayDeriver
- type ReplayDisabledStore
- type ReplayError
- type ReplayErrorCode
- type ReplayIdentity
- type ReplayIdentitySet
- type ReplayKey
- type ReplayLease
- type ReplayLimits
- type ReplayMemoryConfig
- type ReplayMemoryStore
- type ReplayNonce
- type ReplayPropagationCommit
- type ReplayPropagationReservation
- type ReplayPropagationState
- type ReplayPropagationStore
- type ReplayRetention
- type ReplayStore
- type ReplayStoreState
- type ResultState
- type RevisionVerification
- type RevisionVerificationStatus
- type RouteAuthorityResult
- type RouteAuthorityStatus
- type RouteCopyTicket
- type RouteDisclosure
- type RouteEntry
- func NewDeliveryStatusPropagationRouteEntry(source SigningSource, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, ...) (RouteEntry, error)
- func NewDeliveryStatusRouteEntry(source SigningSource, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, ...) (RouteEntry, error)
- func NewExistingRouteEntry(capability VerifiedRevisionInput, source SigningSource, reversePath []byte, ...) (RouteEntry, error)
- func NewInControlExistingRouteEntry(capability VerifiedRevisionInput, source SigningSource, reversePath []byte, ...) (RouteEntry, error)
- func NewNextDomainContinuationRouteEntry(capability VerifiedRevisionInput, source SigningSource, reversePath []byte, ...) (RouteEntry, error)
- func NewNextDomainRouteEntry(capability VerifiedRevisionInput, source SigningSource, reversePath []byte, ...) (RouteEntry, error)
- func NewOriginatorRouteEntry(source SigningSource, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, ...) (RouteEntry, error)
- func NewReceiverBoundExistingRouteEntry(capability VerifiedRevisionInput, source SigningSource, reversePath []byte, ...) (RouteEntry, error)
- type RouteFanoutAuthority
- type RouteFanoutPlan
- type RouteFanoutRequest
- type RouteFinalizeQuery
- type RouteTicketQuery
- func (q RouteTicketQuery) BindingIdentity() [sha256.Size]byte
- func (q RouteTicketQuery) CapabilitySeal() [sha256.Size]byte
- func (q RouteTicketQuery) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (q RouteTicketQuery) GoString() string
- func (q RouteTicketQuery) ParentIdentity() [sha256.Size]byte
- func (q RouteTicketQuery) String() string
- func (q RouteTicketQuery) TicketIdentity() [sha256.Size]byte
- func (q RouteTicketQuery) Valid() bool
- type SignatureSetFact
- func (f SignatureSetFact) Algorithm() Algorithm
- func (SignatureSetFact) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (SignatureSetFact) GoString() string
- func (f SignatureSetFact) Reason() ReasonCode
- func (f SignatureSetFact) Selector() (string, bool)
- func (f SignatureSetFact) Status() SignatureStatus
- func (SignatureSetFact) String() string
- type SignatureStatus
- type SignedMessageFacts
- func (f SignedMessageFacts) Algorithms() []Algorithm
- func (f SignedMessageFacts) Authorizations() []SigningAuthorizationFact
- func (f SignedMessageFacts) BodyUnavailable() bool
- func (f SignedMessageFacts) BodyUnavailableReason() SigningBodyUnavailableReason
- func (f SignedMessageFacts) EnvelopeForm() SigningEnvelopeForm
- func (f SignedMessageFacts) Flags() []SignedMessageFlag
- func (f SignedMessageFacts) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (f SignedMessageFacts) GoString() string
- func (f SignedMessageFacts) Multiplicity() int
- func (f SignedMessageFacts) NewInstanceNumber() uint64
- func (f SignedMessageFacts) RecipeOutcome() SigningRecipeOutcome
- func (f SignedMessageFacts) Restriction() SigningRestriction
- func (f SignedMessageFacts) Role() SigningRole
- func (f SignedMessageFacts) Sequence() uint64
- func (f SignedMessageFacts) String() string
- func (f SignedMessageFacts) Valid() bool
- type SignedMessageFlag
- type Signer
- func (s *Signer) EvaluateDSNForSigning(ctx context.Context, request DSNSigningEvidenceRequest) (DSNSigningEvidence, error)
- func (s *Signer) IssueNextDomainPublication(ctx context.Context, request NextDomainPublicationRequest) (PublishedNextDomainCapability, error)
- func (s *Signer) PlanPropagationRoute(ctx context.Context, evidence DSNPropagationEvidence, routeScope []byte) (RouteCopyTicket, error)
- func (s *Signer) PlanRouteFanout(ctx context.Context, request RouteFanoutRequest) (RouteFanoutPlan, []RouteCopyTicket, error)
- func (s *Signer) RebuildDSNForPropagation(ctx context.Context, request DSNPropagationRequest) (DSNPropagationEvidence, error)
- func (s *Signer) ResolveDSNSigningIdentity(ctx context.Context, evidence DSNSigningEvidence, source DSNProfileSource) (DSNSigningEvidence, SigningProfile, error)
- func (s *Signer) SignDSN(ctx context.Context, request DSNSigningRequest) (SigningResult, SigningRecovery, error)
- func (s *Signer) SignExisting(ctx context.Context, request ExistingSigningRequest) (SigningResult, SigningRecovery, error)
- func (s *Signer) SignNextDomain(ctx context.Context, request NextDomainSigningRequest) (SigningResult, SigningRecovery, error)
- func (s *Signer) SignOriginator(ctx context.Context, request OriginatorSigningRequest) (SigningResult, SigningRecovery, error)
- func (s *Signer) SignPropagatedDSN(ctx context.Context, request DSNPropagationSigningRequest) (PropagatedDSN, SigningRecovery, error)
- func (s *Signer) VerifyForRevision(ctx context.Context, request VerifyRequest) (RevisionVerification, VerifiedRevisionInput, error)
- type SignerOption
- type SigningAuthorizationFact
- func (f SigningAuthorizationFact) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (f SigningAuthorizationFact) GoString() string
- func (f SigningAuthorizationFact) Purpose() SigningAuthorizationPurpose
- func (f SigningAuthorizationFact) Restriction() SigningRestriction
- func (f SigningAuthorizationFact) Status() SigningAuthorizationStatus
- func (f SigningAuthorizationFact) String() string
- func (f SigningAuthorizationFact) Valid() bool
- type SigningAuthorizationPurpose
- type SigningAuthorizationQuery
- func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) Binding() [sha256.Size]byte
- func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) GoString() string
- func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) OutOfBandFacts() (SigningOutOfBandFacts, bool)
- func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) PolicyFacts() (SigningModificationFacts, SigningRestriction, bool)
- func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) Purpose() SigningAuthorizationPurpose
- func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) Recipients() [][]byte
- func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) String() string
- func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) Valid() bool
- type SigningAuthorizationResult
- type SigningAuthorizationStatus
- type SigningAuthorizer
- type SigningBodyUnavailableReason
- type SigningCredential
- type SigningEnvelopeForm
- type SigningError
- type SigningErrorCode
- type SigningFlag
- type SigningLimits
- type SigningMetadata
- type SigningModificationFacts
- func (f SigningModificationFacts) BodyChanged() bool
- func (f SigningModificationFacts) ExistingHeadersChanged() bool
- func (f SigningModificationFacts) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (f SigningModificationFacts) GoString() string
- func (f SigningModificationFacts) String() string
- func (f SigningModificationFacts) Valid() bool
- type SigningOutOfBandFacts
- func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) ForwardPaths() [][]byte
- func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) GoString() string
- func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) PredecessorDomain() string
- func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) PredecessorKind() SigningPredecessorKind
- func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) ProfileDomain() string
- func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) ProposedNextDomain() string
- func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) ReceiverBinding() []byte
- func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) ReversePath() []byte
- func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) RouteScope() []byte
- func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) String() string
- func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) Valid() bool
- type SigningPredecessorKind
- type SigningProfile
- func NewDualSigningProfile(domain string, rsaCredential RSASigningCredential, ...) (SigningProfile, error)
- func NewEd25519SigningProfile(domain string, credential Ed25519SigningCredential) (SigningProfile, error)
- func NewMLDSA44SigningProfile(domain string, credential MLDSA44SigningCredential) (SigningProfile, error)
- func NewProjectedSigningProfile(projected signing.Profile) (SigningProfile, error)
- func NewRSASigningProfile(domain string, credential RSASigningCredential) (SigningProfile, error)
- func NewSigningProfile(domain string, credentials ...SigningCredential) (SigningProfile, error)
- type SigningRecipeOutcome
- type SigningRecovery
- func (r SigningRecovery) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (r SigningRecovery) GoString() string
- func (r SigningRecovery) Recover(ctx context.Context) (RouteCopyTicket, error)
- func (r SigningRecovery) RecoveryPending() bool
- func (r SigningRecovery) ReplacementReady() bool
- func (r SigningRecovery) String() string
- func (r SigningRecovery) Valid() bool
- type SigningRestriction
- type SigningResult
- func (r SigningResult) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (r SigningResult) GoString() string
- func (r SigningResult) OutOfBandAcceptance() (OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage, bool)
- func (r SigningResult) String() string
- func (r SigningResult) Unrestricted() (UnrestrictedSignedMessage, bool)
- func (r SigningResult) Valid() bool
- type SigningRole
- type SigningSource
- type SigningTransportForm
- type TXTAbsenceClass
- type TXTLookupResult
- func NewAbsentTXTLookupResult(absence TXTAbsenceClass, ttl time.Duration, dnssec DNSSECStatus) (TXTLookupResult, error)
- func NewAmbiguousTXTLookupResult(recordCount int, ttl time.Duration, dnssec DNSSECStatus) (TXTLookupResult, error)
- func NewFoundTXTLookupResult(payloads [][]byte, ttl time.Duration, dnssec DNSSECStatus) (TXTLookupResult, error)
- func (r TXTLookupResult) Absence() TXTAbsenceClass
- func (r TXTLookupResult) DNSSECStatus() DNSSECStatus
- func (TXTLookupResult) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (TXTLookupResult) GoString() string
- func (r TXTLookupResult) IsZero() bool
- func (TXTLookupResult) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
- func (TXTLookupResult) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
- func (r TXTLookupResult) NegativeTTL() time.Duration
- func (r TXTLookupResult) PositiveTTL() time.Duration
- func (r TXTLookupResult) RecordCount() int
- func (r TXTLookupResult) Records() []TXTRecord
- func (r TXTLookupResult) Status() TXTLookupStatus
- func (TXTLookupResult) String() string
- type TXTLookupStatus
- type TXTRecord
- type TXTTransport
- type UnrestrictedSignedMessage
- func (m UnrestrictedSignedMessage) Bytes() []byte
- func (m UnrestrictedSignedMessage) Facts() SignedMessageFacts
- func (m UnrestrictedSignedMessage) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (m UnrestrictedSignedMessage) GeneratedFields() [][]byte
- func (m UnrestrictedSignedMessage) GoString() string
- func (m UnrestrictedSignedMessage) SigningIdentity() (domain string, timestamp uint64, err error)
- func (m UnrestrictedSignedMessage) String() string
- func (m UnrestrictedSignedMessage) Valid() bool
- type VerificationAssessment
- func (a VerificationAssessment) Applicable() bool
- func (VerificationAssessment) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (VerificationAssessment) GoString() string
- func (VerificationAssessment) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
- func (VerificationAssessment) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
- func (VerificationAssessment) String() string
- func (a VerificationAssessment) Valid() bool
- func (a VerificationAssessment) Verification() (VerifyResult, bool)
- type VerificationLimits
- func (l VerificationLimits) MaxCheckFacts() int
- func (l VerificationLimits) MaxInstanceHashSets() int
- func (l VerificationLimits) MaxRawMessageBytes() int
- func (l VerificationLimits) MaxRecipients() int
- func (l VerificationLimits) MaxSignatureFacts() int
- func (l VerificationLimits) MaxSignatureSets() int
- type VerificationScope
- type VerificationTarget
- func (VerificationTarget) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (VerificationTarget) GoString() string
- func (t VerificationTarget) Instance() uint64
- func (VerificationTarget) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
- func (VerificationTarget) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
- func (t VerificationTarget) Sequence() uint64
- func (VerificationTarget) String() string
- type VerifiedRevisionInput
- type Verifier
- func (v *Verifier) Assess(ctx context.Context, request VerifyRequest) (output VerificationAssessment, resultErr error)
- func (v *Verifier) EvaluateReceivedDSN(ctx context.Context, request ReceivedDSNRequest) (ReceivedDSNEvaluation, error)
- func (Verifier) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (Verifier) GoString() string
- func (Verifier) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
- func (Verifier) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
- func (Verifier) String() string
- func (v *Verifier) Verify(ctx context.Context, request VerifyRequest) (output VerifyResult, resultErr error)
- type VerifierHop
- func (h VerifierHop) BodyAvailability() string
- func (h VerifierHop) CustodyTransition() string
- func (h VerifierHop) Exploded() bool
- func (h VerifierHop) FeedHere() bool
- func (h VerifierHop) Feedback() bool
- func (VerifierHop) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (VerifierHop) GoString() string
- func (h VerifierHop) HistoryBodyState() string
- func (h VerifierHop) HistoryHeaderState() string
- func (h VerifierHop) HopBinding() [32]byte
- func (h VerifierHop) MessageInstance() uint64
- func (h VerifierHop) Recipe() VerifierRecipeDescriptor
- func (h VerifierHop) RecipeMode() string
- func (h VerifierHop) Sequence() uint64
- func (h VerifierHop) SignatureAlgorithms() []string
- func (h VerifierHop) SignerDomain() string
- func (VerifierHop) String() string
- func (h VerifierHop) Valid() bool
- type VerifierOption
- func WithDomainPolicyProvider(provider DomainPolicyProvider) VerifierOption
- func WithMaxCheckFacts(limit int) VerifierOption
- func WithMaxInstanceHashSets(limit int) VerifierOption
- func WithMaxRawMessageBytes(limit int) VerifierOption
- func WithMaxRecipients(limit int) VerifierOption
- func WithMaxSignatureFacts(limit int) VerifierOption
- func WithMaxSignatureSets(limit int) VerifierOption
- func WithObservationSink(sink ObservationSink) VerifierOption
- func WithVerificationClock(clock func() time.Time) VerifierOption
- func WithoutSubdomainFromAuthorization() VerifierOption
- type VerifierProjection
- func (p VerifierProjection) Binding() [32]byte
- func (p VerifierProjection) Draft() string
- func (VerifierProjection) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (VerifierProjection) GoString() string
- func (p VerifierProjection) Hops() []VerifierHop
- func (p VerifierProjection) Schema() string
- func (VerifierProjection) String() string
- func (p VerifierProjection) Valid() bool
- type VerifierRecipeDescriptor
- func (d VerifierRecipeDescriptor) AffectedHeaderCount() int
- func (d VerifierRecipeDescriptor) AffectedHeaders() []string
- func (d VerifierRecipeDescriptor) BodyMode() string
- func (d VerifierRecipeDescriptor) ChangeClasses() []string
- func (d VerifierRecipeDescriptor) ChangeCount() int
- func (d VerifierRecipeDescriptor) Digest() [32]byte
- func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) GoString() string
- func (d VerifierRecipeDescriptor) HasHeaderChanges() bool
- func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) String() string
- func (d VerifierRecipeDescriptor) Valid() bool
- type VerifyRequest
- func (VerifyRequest) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (r VerifyRequest) ForwardPaths() [][]byte
- func (VerifyRequest) GoString() string
- func (VerifyRequest) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
- func (VerifyRequest) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
- func (r VerifyRequest) RawMessage() []byte
- func (r VerifyRequest) ReversePath() []byte
- func (VerifyRequest) String() string
- type VerifyResult
- func (r VerifyResult) CheckCount() int
- func (r VerifyResult) Checks() []CheckFact
- func (r VerifyResult) CustodyStructure() CustodyStructure
- func (r VerifyResult) Draft() string
- func (VerifyResult) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
- func (VerifyResult) GoString() string
- func (r VerifyResult) HistoricalContent() HistoricalState
- func (r VerifyResult) HistoricalSignatures() HistoricalState
- func (VerifyResult) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
- func (VerifyResult) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
- func (r VerifyResult) PrimaryReason() ReasonCode
- func (r VerifyResult) Scope() VerificationScope
- func (r VerifyResult) SignatureSetCount() int
- func (r VerifyResult) SignatureSets() []SignatureSetFact
- func (r VerifyResult) State() ResultState
- func (VerifyResult) String() string
- func (r VerifyResult) Target() VerificationTarget
- func (r VerifyResult) Valid() bool
- func (r VerifyResult) VerifierProjection() (VerifierProjection, bool)
Examples ¶
Constants ¶
const ( // ObservationVerifyCompleted identifies a completed verification observation. ObservationVerifyCompleted = internalobs.KindVerifyCompleted // ObservationDNSLookupCompleted identifies a completed DNS lookup observation. ObservationDNSLookupCompleted = internalobs.KindDNSLookupCompleted // ObservationOperationVerify identifies signature verification work. ObservationOperationVerify = internalobs.OperationVerify // ObservationOperationDNSLookup identifies DNS key lookup work. ObservationOperationDNSLookup = internalobs.OperationDNSLookup // ObservationResultSuccess identifies successful work. ObservationResultSuccess = internalobs.ResultSuccess // ObservationResultFailure identifies a closed expected failure. ObservationResultFailure = internalobs.ResultFailure // ObservationResultTemporary identifies temporary failure. ObservationResultTemporary = internalobs.ResultTemporary // ObservationResultInternal identifies contained internal failure. ObservationResultInternal = internalobs.ResultInternal // ObservationReasonNone identifies an outcome without a failure reason. ObservationReasonNone = internalobs.ReasonNone // ObservationReasonProtocol identifies protocol-driven failure. ObservationReasonProtocol = internalobs.ReasonProtocol // ObservationReasonPolicy identifies local-policy failure. ObservationReasonPolicy = internalobs.ReasonPolicy ObservationReasonUnavailable = internalobs.ReasonUnavailable // ObservationErrorNone identifies an outcome without an error. ObservationErrorNone = internalobs.ErrorNone // ObservationErrorCanceled identifies caller cancellation. ObservationErrorCanceled = internalobs.ErrorCanceled // ObservationErrorDeadline identifies deadline expiry. ObservationErrorDeadline = internalobs.ErrorDeadline // ObservationErrorTemporary identifies retryable failure. ObservationErrorTemporary = internalobs.ErrorTemporary // ObservationErrorPermanent identifies non-retryable failure. ObservationErrorPermanent = internalobs.ErrorPermanent // ObservationErrorInternal identifies contained internal failure. ObservationErrorInternal = internalobs.ErrorInternal // ObservationAlgorithmNone identifies absence of an algorithm. ObservationAlgorithmNone = internalobs.AlgorithmNone // ObservationAlgorithmRSA identifies the RSA family. ObservationAlgorithmRSA = internalobs.AlgorithmRSA // ObservationAlgorithmEd25519 identifies the Ed25519 family. ObservationAlgorithmEd25519 = internalobs.AlgorithmEd25519 // ObservationAlgorithmMLDSA44 identifies the pure ML-DSA-44 family. ObservationAlgorithmMLDSA44 = internalobs.AlgorithmMLDSA44 // ObservationAlgorithmUnknown identifies a bounded unknown family. ObservationAlgorithmUnknown = internalobs.AlgorithmUnknown // ObservationCacheNotUsed identifies a lookup without caching. ObservationCacheNotUsed = internalobs.CacheNotUsed // ObservationCacheHit identifies a cache hit. ObservationCacheHit = internalobs.CacheHit // ObservationCacheMiss identifies a cache miss. ObservationCacheMiss = internalobs.CacheMiss // ObservationBucketNone identifies an empty or absent quantity. ObservationBucketNone = internalobs.BucketNone // ObservationBucketSmall identifies a bounded small quantity. ObservationBucketSmall = internalobs.BucketSmall // ObservationBucketMedium identifies a bounded medium quantity. ObservationBucketMedium = internalobs.BucketMedium // ObservationBucketLarge identifies a bounded large quantity. ObservationBucketLarge = internalobs.BucketLarge // ObservationBucketOverflow identifies a quantity above the largest bound. ObservationBucketOverflow = internalobs.BucketOverflow )
const ( // HardMaxPolicyAuthenticatedHops bounds authenticated facts consumed by one public evaluation. HardMaxPolicyAuthenticatedHops = 128 // HardMaxPolicyFindings bounds retained findings returned by one public evaluation. HardMaxPolicyFindings = 128 )
const ( // ReplayKeyAlgorithm identifies the frozen privacy-preserving replay-key algorithm. ReplayKeyAlgorithm = replay.KeyAlgorithm // ReplayStoredValue is the legacy nonce-free first-seen marker that // ParseReplayFirstSeenValue still accepts as a foreign record. ReplayStoredValue = replay.StoredValue // ReplayFirstSeenValuePrefix starts the nonce-bearing first-seen value. ReplayFirstSeenValuePrefix = replay.FirstSeenValuePrefix )
const ( // ReplayCheckFirstSeen means the identity was atomically retained for the first time. ReplayCheckFirstSeen = replay.CheckFirstSeen // ReplayCheckReplayed means the identity already existed without retention extension. ReplayCheckReplayed = replay.CheckReplayed // ReplayCheckDisabled means explicit local policy selected no replay storage. ReplayCheckDisabled = replay.CheckDisabled )
const ( // ReplayStoreReady permits enabled storage operations. ReplayStoreReady = replay.StoreReady // ReplayStoreDegraded reports a fail-closed enabled provider impairment. ReplayStoreDegraded = replay.StoreDegraded // ReplayStoreDisabled reports an explicitly selected disabled provider. ReplayStoreDisabled = replay.StoreDisabled // ReplayStoreClosing rejects new operations while admitted work drains. ReplayStoreClosing = replay.StoreClosing // ReplayStoreClosed rejects all later operations. ReplayStoreClosed = replay.StoreClosed )
const ( // ReplayErrorInvalidRequest classifies invalid input or a missing required value. ReplayErrorInvalidRequest = replay.ErrorCodeInvalidRequest // ReplayErrorMisconfigured classifies incomplete or unsafe construction. ReplayErrorMisconfigured = replay.ErrorCodeMisconfigured // ReplayErrorLimitExceeded classifies a hard bounded-resource refusal. ReplayErrorLimitExceeded = replay.ErrorCodeLimitExceeded ReplayErrorUnavailable = replay.ErrorCodeUnavailable // ReplayErrorIndeterminate classifies a write that may have crossed mutation dispatch. ReplayErrorIndeterminate = replay.ErrorCodeIndeterminate // ReplayErrorInconsistent classifies an authoritative contradictory backend outcome. ReplayErrorInconsistent = replay.ErrorCodeInconsistent // ReplayErrorCancelled classifies pre-dispatch caller cancellation. ReplayErrorCancelled = replay.ErrorCodeCancelled // ReplayErrorDeadlineExceeded classifies a pre-dispatch elapsed caller deadline. ReplayErrorDeadlineExceeded = replay.ErrorCodeDeadlineExceeded // ReplayErrorClosed classifies work rejected after close begins. ReplayErrorClosed = replay.ErrorCodeClosed // ReplayErrorInternalInvariant classifies impossible in-process state. ReplayErrorInternalInvariant = replay.ErrorCodeInternalInvariant )
const ( // ReplayPropagationStatePending reports a reserved coordinate whose attempt has not committed. ReplayPropagationStatePending = replay.PropagationStatePending // ReplayPropagationStateCommitted reports a coordinate whose propagated report was accepted. ReplayPropagationStateCommitted = replay.PropagationStateCommitted // ReplayPropagationCommittedValue is the exact stored value of a committed coordinate. ReplayPropagationCommittedValue = replay.PropagationCommittedValue // ReplayPropagationPendingPrefix starts the stored value of a pending coordinate. ReplayPropagationPendingPrefix = replay.PropagationPendingPrefix )
const ( // ReplayPropagationReserved means the coordinate is now pending under a fresh lease. ReplayPropagationReserved = replay.PropagationReserved // ReplayPropagationPending means another attempt holds a live lease. ReplayPropagationPending = replay.PropagationPending // ReplayPropagationAlreadyCommitted means the coordinate was committed within retention. ReplayPropagationAlreadyCommitted = replay.PropagationAlreadyCommitted // ReplayPropagationReservationDisabled means explicit local policy selected no replay storage. ReplayPropagationReservationDisabled = replay.PropagationReservationDisabled )
const ( // ReplayPropagationCommitted means the coordinate is committed. ReplayPropagationCommitted = replay.PropagationCommitted // ReplayPropagationCommitUnresolved means the token resolves to no pending or committed coordinate within retention. ReplayPropagationCommitUnresolved = replay.PropagationCommitUnresolved // ReplayPropagationCommitDisabled means explicit local policy selected no replay storage. ReplayPropagationCommitDisabled = replay.PropagationCommitDisabled )
const ( // HardMaxRawMessageBytes is the public verification maximum raw RFC 5322 message size. HardMaxRawMessageBytes = rawmsg.HardMaxMessageBytes // HardMaxRecipients is the public verification maximum current SMTP recipient count. HardMaxRecipients = 2_000 // HardMaxInstanceHashSets is the public verification maximum hash-set count per Message-Instance. HardMaxInstanceHashSets = 16 // HardMaxSignatureSets is the public verification maximum signature-set count per DKIM2-Signature. HardMaxSignatureSets = 16 // HardMaxCheckFacts is the public verification maximum retained check-fact count. HardMaxCheckFacts = 128 // HardMaxSignatureFacts is the public verification maximum retained signature-set-fact count. HardMaxSignatureFacts = 16 )
const DraftIdentifier = "draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-09"
DraftIdentifier identifies the exact DKIM2 behavior baseline implemented by this verification facade.
const MinSigningRSABits = cryptodkim2.MinSigningRSABits
MinSigningRSABits is the local RSA signing floor: RSA signing credentials and loaded signing profiles require a modulus of at least 2048 bits (Draft-09 Section 3.2 SHOULD made a local MUST). Verification still accepts 1024 to 8192 bits.
const ReplayPropagationKeyDomainLabel = replay.PropagationKeyDomainLabel
ReplayPropagationKeyDomainLabel is the distinct domain-separation frame of propagation coordinates.
const VerifierProjectionSchema = "dkim2.verifier-projection.v1"
VerifierProjectionSchema identifies the stable transport-neutral verifier projection.
Variables ¶
This section is empty.
Functions ¶
func EnvelopePathDomain ¶
EnvelopePathDomain returns the canonical lowercase A-label DNS domain of one non-null SMTP path, converting a U-label domain with the strict IDNA profile (Draft-09 Section 18). Null paths, address literals, and invalid paths report false. Adapters use it to select a signing domain from an SMTPUTF8 envelope without their own IDNA mapping.
func HeaderFromDomain ¶
HeaderFromDomain derives the canonical DNS domain of the single RFC 5322 author mailbox of a message that is eligible for header_from null-sender originator signing; see ClassifyHeaderFromNullSender. The derivation succeeds only for exactly one From header field that holds exactly one mailbox, not a group, whose addr-spec is ASCII and whose domain is a DNS name accepted by the canonicalization used for delivery-status signing identities and d= values. Every other class reports false.
func IsReplayError ¶
IsReplayError reports whether err is one direct member of the closed taxonomy.
func MLDSA44Available ¶
func MLDSA44Available() error
MLDSA44Available reports an error when the cryptographic runtime cannot provide ML-DSA-44, for example a binary built against the FIPS 140-3 Go Cryptographic Module v1.0.0. Verifier construction and mldsa44 signing credentials fail closed in that runtime; daemons call it at startup to report the reason.
func MLDSA44SignerOptions ¶
MLDSA44SignerOptions returns the options every mldsa44 PrivateKeySigner passes to crypto/mldsa PrivateKey.Sign: pure ML-DSA.Sign over the message representative with the Draft-09 Section 3.4 context string "DKIM2". Signers use the default hedged (randomized) Sign, never SignDeterministic.
func MaxCarriedTXTRecords ¶
func MaxCarriedTXTRecords() int
MaxCarriedTXTRecords returns how many TXT resource records of one answer a transport hands over with their payloads. Draft-09 Sections 3.7 and 3.8 ignore records that begin with a foreign v= tag before deciding uniqueness, so every record up to this bound must be inspectable; a larger answer is reported count-only and stays ambiguous.
func NewPermanentProviderError ¶
func NewPermanentProviderError() error
NewPermanentProviderError constructs a cause-free permanent provider error.
func NewReplayError ¶
func NewReplayError(code ReplayErrorCode) error
NewReplayError constructs one stable replay failure without protected detail.
func NewTemporaryProviderError ¶
func NewTemporaryProviderError() error
NewTemporaryProviderError constructs a cause-free temporary provider error.
func Observe ¶
func Observe(ctx context.Context, sink ObservationSink, event ObservationEvent)
Observe invokes one sink while containing invalid input and sink panics.
func ProjectedPrivateKeyHandle ¶
func ProjectedPrivateKeyHandle(handle PrivateKeyHandle) (signing.PrivateKeyHandle, error)
ProjectedPrivateKeyHandle returns the detached internal handle needed by repository-owned datasource bridges. The return type prevents use outside sibling modules that are permitted to import the internal signing package.
func ReplayFirstSeenValue ¶
func ReplayFirstSeenValue(nonce ReplayNonce) (string, error)
ReplayFirstSeenValue renders the nonce-bearing first-seen value "v2:<nonce>".
func ReplayPropagationPendingValue ¶
func ReplayPropagationPendingValue(leaseExpiry time.Time, nonce ReplayNonce) (string, error)
ReplayPropagationPendingValue renders the nonce-bearing pending value "pending:<unixms>:<nonce>" for one lease expiry and write nonce.
func UseReplayStorageKey ¶
UseReplayStorageKey authorizes one synchronous pre-dispatch callback for a protected key.
func ValidEnvelopePath ¶
ValidEnvelopePath reports whether exact bracketed SMTP path bytes satisfy the DKIM2 envelope path grammar, including RFC 6531 UTF-8 local parts and U-label domains. allowNull admits the null reverse path "<>". Adapters use it so that SMTPUTF8 admission has one owner.
Types ¶
type APIError ¶
type APIError struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
APIError is a bounded typed error for verifier construction or request misuse.
func (*APIError) Code ¶
func (e *APIError) Code() APIErrorCode
Code returns the stable API-error code.
type APIErrorCode ¶
type APIErrorCode string
APIErrorCode identifies bounded verifier construction or request misuse.
const ( // APIErrorCodeInvalidProvider reports a missing or unusable provider dependency. APIErrorCodeInvalidProvider APIErrorCode = "invalid_provider" // APIErrorCodeInvalidOption reports an unsafe verifier option. APIErrorCodeInvalidOption APIErrorCode = "invalid_option" // APIErrorCodeInvalidRequest reports programmer misuse of the request contract. APIErrorCodeInvalidRequest APIErrorCode = "invalid_request" )
func (APIErrorCode) Known ¶
func (c APIErrorCode) Known() bool
Known reports whether the code is in the closed public API-error vocabulary.
type Algorithm ¶
type Algorithm string
Algorithm identifies a bounded DKIM2 signature algorithm family.
const ( // AlgorithmRSASHA256 identifies RSA-SHA256 verification. AlgorithmRSASHA256 Algorithm = "rsa-sha256" // AlgorithmEd25519SHA256 identifies Ed25519-SHA256 verification. AlgorithmEd25519SHA256 Algorithm = "ed25519-sha256" // AlgorithmMLDSA44 identifies Draft-09 Section 3.4 pure ML-DSA-44 // signing and verification with the "DKIM2" context string. AlgorithmMLDSA44 Algorithm = "mldsa44" // AlgorithmUnknown represents an unrecognized message-derived algorithm without retaining its spelling. AlgorithmUnknown Algorithm = "unknown" )
type AuthenticationReason ¶
type AuthenticationReason = ReasonCode
AuthenticationReason identifies the authoritative Draft-09 result reason.
type AuthenticationReplayClass ¶
type AuthenticationReplayClass string
AuthenticationReplayClass identifies one final replay classification.
const ( // AuthenticationReplayNotChecked means replay is inapplicable before final PASS. AuthenticationReplayNotChecked AuthenticationReplayClass = "not_checked" // AuthenticationReplayNotEligible means the message passed but only the // originator's i=1 signature authenticated it, so no intermediary re-sent // it and Draft-09 Section 15.1 replay counting does not apply. AuthenticationReplayNotEligible AuthenticationReplayClass = "not_eligible" // AuthenticationReplayDisabled means the explicit no-store mode accepted the message. AuthenticationReplayDisabled AuthenticationReplayClass = "disabled" // AuthenticationReplayFirstSeen means the message-wide identity was inserted once. AuthenticationReplayFirstSeen AuthenticationReplayClass = "first_seen" // AuthenticationReplayExploded means authenticated fanout permits repeated delivery. AuthenticationReplayExploded AuthenticationReplayClass = "exploded" // AuthenticationReplayReplayed means an unexpected duplicate was observed. AuthenticationReplayReplayed AuthenticationReplayClass = "replayed" // AuthenticationReplayIndeterminate means storage could not provide a final answer. AuthenticationReplayIndeterminate AuthenticationReplayClass = "indeterminate" )
func (AuthenticationReplayClass) Known ¶
func (c AuthenticationReplayClass) Known() bool
Known reports whether the class belongs to the closed Draft-09 vocabulary.
type AuthenticationResult ¶
type AuthenticationResult struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
AuthenticationResult is one sealed final stateful Draft-09 result. It layers local replay delivery policy over the stateless DKIM2 validity result, which Verification returns unchanged.
func (AuthenticationResult) Format ¶
func (AuthenticationResult) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting from traversing verification or replay facts.
func (AuthenticationResult) GoString ¶
func (AuthenticationResult) GoString() string
GoString returns a content-free final-result representation.
func (AuthenticationResult) PrimaryReason ¶
func (r AuthenticationResult) PrimaryReason() AuthenticationReason
PrimaryReason returns the replay-owned reason, or none after final PASS.
func (AuthenticationResult) ReplayClass ¶
func (r AuthenticationResult) ReplayClass() AuthenticationReplayClass
ReplayClass returns the final bounded replay classification.
func (AuthenticationResult) State ¶
func (r AuthenticationResult) State() ResultState
State returns the authoritative final authentication state.
func (AuthenticationResult) String ¶
func (AuthenticationResult) String() string
String returns a content-free final-result representation.
func (AuthenticationResult) Valid ¶
func (r AuthenticationResult) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether cryptographic evidence and the final replay state are coherent.
func (AuthenticationResult) Verification ¶
func (r AuthenticationResult) Verification() VerifyResult
Verification returns immutable message-local cryptographic evidence.
type Authenticator ¶
type Authenticator struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
Authenticator owns verification and the mandatory stateful replay decision.
func NewAuthenticator ¶
func NewAuthenticator(verifier *Verifier, store ReplayStore, deriver *ReplayDeriver, retention ReplayRetention, options ...AuthenticatorOption) (*Authenticator, error)
NewAuthenticator constructs one enabled fail-closed Draft-09 authenticator.
func NewDisabledAuthenticator ¶
func NewDisabledAuthenticator(verifier *Verifier, options ...AuthenticatorOption) (*Authenticator, error)
NewDisabledAuthenticator constructs the sole explicit no-store authentication mode. Replay options require a store, so any option fails closed.
func (*Authenticator) Authenticate ¶
func (a *Authenticator) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, request VerifyRequest) (AuthenticationResult, error)
Authenticate performs message-local verification then one message-wide replay mutation.
func (*Authenticator) AuthenticateVerified ¶
func (a *Authenticator) AuthenticateVerified(ctx context.Context, verification VerifyResult) (AuthenticationResult, error)
AuthenticateVerified coordinates replay for immutable evidence already produced by the owned verifier.
type AuthenticatorOption ¶
type AuthenticatorOption func(*Authenticator)
AuthenticatorOption configures optional local replay delivery policy.
func WithDirectDeliveryReplayCounting ¶
func WithDirectDeliveryReplayCounting() AuthenticatorOption
WithDirectDeliveryReplayCounting makes local replay policy count messages authenticated only by the originator's i=1 signature. Draft-09 Section 15.1 leaves replay counting to local delivery policy and does not count such direct deliveries by default; a receiver that acts on every accepted message, such as a reflector, may count them so an identical direct delivery is reported as a replay. The constructors enforce that it is used only with an enabled replay store.
type BodyUnavailablePolicy ¶
type BodyUnavailablePolicy uint8
BodyUnavailablePolicy controls whether a revision may emit explicit b:null.
const ( RejectUnavailableBody BodyUnavailablePolicy = iota // impossible (Draft-09 Section 12.1 MAY). // // Warning: a message whose history contains a null body Recipe is never // a Fully Verified DKIM2 Message (Draft-09 Section 13). Every later // verifier reports PERMERROR body_history_unavailable (Section 14.2), and every later // transit or revision signer, including this library's // VerifyForRevision, refuses to sign it again. Use it only where the // recipients accept that outcome by local arrangement. AllowUnavailableBody )
func (BodyUnavailablePolicy) Known ¶
func (p BodyUnavailablePolicy) Known() bool
Known reports whether policy belongs to the closed revision vocabulary.
type CheckClass ¶
type CheckClass string
CheckClass identifies a bounded verification concern without exposing message-derived values.
const ( // CheckClassMessage identifies raw message handling. CheckClassMessage CheckClass = "message" // CheckClassProtocol identifies DKIM2 field and sequence handling. CheckClassProtocol CheckClass = "protocol" // CheckClassBodyHash identifies current body-hash verification. CheckClassBodyHash CheckClass = "body_hash" // CheckClassHeaderHash identifies current header-hash verification. CheckClassHeaderHash CheckClass = "header_hash" // CheckClassSignature identifies cryptographic signature verification. CheckClassSignature CheckClass = "signature" // CheckClassKey identifies public-key validity or availability. CheckClassKey CheckClass = "key" // CheckClassTimestamp identifies timestamp policy evaluation. CheckClassTimestamp CheckClass = "timestamp" // CheckClassEnvelope identifies current SMTP envelope comparison. CheckClassEnvelope CheckClass = "envelope" // CheckClassDomainAlignment identifies signing-domain alignment. CheckClassDomainAlignment CheckClass = "domain_alignment" // CheckClassNextDomain identifies structural next-domain evaluation. CheckClassNextDomain CheckClass = "next_domain" // CheckClassProvider identifies public-key-provider behavior. CheckClassProvider CheckClass = "provider" // CheckClassInternalContract identifies an unknown or inconsistent internal fact. CheckClassInternalContract CheckClass = "internal_contract" )
func (CheckClass) Known ¶
func (c CheckClass) Known() bool
Known reports whether the check class belongs to the closed public vocabulary.
type CheckFact ¶
type CheckFact struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
CheckFact records one bounded verification check and reason.
func (CheckFact) Class ¶
func (f CheckFact) Class() CheckClass
Class returns the bounded verification concern.
func (CheckFact) Reason ¶
func (f CheckFact) Reason() ReasonCode
Reason returns the bounded verification reason.
type ClassifiedProviderError ¶
type ClassifiedProviderError interface {
error
ProviderErrorClass() ProviderErrorClass
}
ClassifiedProviderError exposes machine-readable provider failure class without a raw cause.
type CustodyStructure ¶
type CustodyStructure string
CustodyStructure identifies the separately evaluated structural next-domain coverage.
const ( // CustodyStructureNotEvaluated reports that earlier failure prevented reliable next-domain presence detection. CustodyStructureNotEvaluated CustodyStructure = "not_evaluated" // CustodyStructureNotPresent reports that no next-domain link was present. CustodyStructureNotPresent CustodyStructure = "not_present" // CustodyStructureNDLinksEvaluated reports that one or more intermediate next-domain links were evaluated. CustodyStructureNDLinksEvaluated CustodyStructure = "nd_links_evaluated" // CustodyStructureTerminalNDRequiresOOB reports that the current terminal next-domain needs unmodeled OOB trust. CustodyStructureTerminalNDRequiresOOB CustodyStructure = "terminal_nd_requires_oob" )
func (CustodyStructure) Known ¶
func (s CustodyStructure) Known() bool
Known reports whether the custody structure belongs to the closed public vocabulary.
type DNSProviderConfig ¶
type DNSProviderConfig struct {
Limits DNSResolverLimits
Clock func() time.Time
Parent context.Context
}
DNSProviderConfig configures one instance-owned DNS public-key provider.
Example ¶
ExampleDNSProviderConfig demonstrates TTL-backed caching and caller cancellation.
transport, err := newDNSExampleTransport()
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("fixture error")
return
}
config := dkim2.DefaultDNSProviderConfig()
config.Clock = func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1700000000, 0) }
config.Limits.MaxCacheEntries = 4
config.Limits.MaxPositiveTTL = 30 * time.Second
config.Limits.LookupTimeout = 2 * time.Second
provider, err := dkim2.NewDNSPublicKeyProviderWithConfig(transport, config)
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("provider error")
return
}
verifier, err := dkim2.NewVerifier(provider, dkim2.WithVerificationClock(func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1700000000, 0) }), dkim2.WithoutSubdomainFromAuthorization())
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("verifier error")
return
}
first, firstErr := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), syntheticExampleRequest())
second, secondErr := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), syntheticExampleRequest())
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
canceled, canceledErr := verifier.Verify(ctx, syntheticExampleRequest())
fmt.Println(first.State(), second.State(), firstErr == nil && secondErr == nil, "lookups", transport.calls)
fmt.Println(errors.Is(canceledErr, context.Canceled), canceled.State() == "", "lookups", transport.calls)
fmt.Println(config.Limits.MaxCacheEntries, config.Limits.MaxPositiveTTL, config.Limits.LookupTimeout)
Output: PASS PASS true lookups 1 true true lookups 1 4 30s 2s
func DefaultDNSProviderConfig ¶
func DefaultDNSProviderConfig() DNSProviderConfig
DefaultDNSProviderConfig returns restrictive cache, concurrency, and lookup defaults.
type DNSPublicKeyProvider ¶
type DNSPublicKeyProvider struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
DNSPublicKeyProvider resolves public verification keys through DNS TXT records.
func NewDNSPublicKeyProvider ¶
func NewDNSPublicKeyProvider(transport TXTTransport) (*DNSPublicKeyProvider, error)
NewDNSPublicKeyProvider constructs a DNS-backed provider with restrictive defaults.
Example ¶
ExampleNewDNSPublicKeyProvider demonstrates injected DNS verification; the fixture record carries the retired t=y:s tag, which DNS-02 ignores.
transport, err := newDNSExampleTransport()
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("fixture error")
return
}
config := dkim2.DefaultDNSProviderConfig()
config.Clock = func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1700000000, 0) }
provider, err := dkim2.NewDNSPublicKeyProviderWithConfig(transport, config)
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("provider error")
return
}
verifier, err := dkim2.NewVerifier(provider, dkim2.WithVerificationClock(func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1700000000, 0) }), dkim2.WithoutSubdomainFromAuthorization())
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("verifier error")
return
}
result, err := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), syntheticExampleRequest())
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("caller or API error")
return
}
fact := result.SignatureSets()[0]
fmt.Println(result.State(), result.PrimaryReason())
fmt.Println(fact.Algorithm(), fact.Status(), fact.Reason())
fmt.Println("lookups", transport.calls)
Output: PASS none rsa-sha256 pass none lookups 1
func NewDNSPublicKeyProviderWithConfig ¶
func NewDNSPublicKeyProviderWithConfig(transport TXTTransport, config DNSProviderConfig) (*DNSPublicKeyProvider, error)
NewDNSPublicKeyProviderWithConfig constructs a configured bounded DNS-backed provider.
func (DNSPublicKeyProvider) Format ¶
func (DNSPublicKeyProvider) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting from traversing the retained DNS resolver.
func (DNSPublicKeyProvider) GoString ¶
func (DNSPublicKeyProvider) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without retained DNS transport state.
func (*DNSPublicKeyProvider) LookupDomainPolicy ¶
func (p *DNSPublicKeyProvider) LookupDomainPolicy(ctx context.Context, query DomainPolicyQuery) (DomainPolicyStatus, error)
LookupDomainPolicy resolves one Domain Policy Record through the provider's bounded DNS resolver, sharing its transport, cache, and single-flight coordination with key lookups.
func (*DNSPublicKeyProvider) LookupPublicKey ¶
func (p *DNSPublicKeyProvider) LookupPublicKey(ctx context.Context, query PublicKeyQuery) (PublicKeyResult, error)
LookupPublicKey resolves one canonical public query without applying verifier key policy.
func (DNSPublicKeyProvider) MarshalJSON ¶
func (DNSPublicKeyProvider) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects serialization of retained DNS resolver dependencies.
func (DNSPublicKeyProvider) MarshalText ¶
func (DNSPublicKeyProvider) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of retained DNS resolver dependencies.
func (DNSPublicKeyProvider) String ¶
func (DNSPublicKeyProvider) String() string
String returns a constant representation without retained DNS transport state.
type DNSResolverLimits ¶
type DNSResolverLimits struct {
MaxSelectorBytes, MaxSelectorLabels int
MaxSigningDomainBytes, MaxSigningDomainLabels int
MaxOwnerBytes, MaxTXTRecords, MaxTXTRecordBytes int
MaxTags, MaxTagNameBytes, MaxTagValueBytes int
MaxDecodedKeyBytes, MaxCacheEntries int
MaxPositiveTTL, MaxNegativeTTL time.Duration
MaxStableErrorTTL time.Duration
MaxConcurrentLookups, MaxCoalescedWaiters int
LookupTimeout time.Duration
}
DNSResolverLimits bounds public DNS resolution, caching, and concurrency resources.
type DNSSECStatus ¶
type DNSSECStatus string
DNSSECStatus is optional verdict-neutral resolver diagnostic metadata.
const ( // DNSSECStatusSecure reports a transport-provided secure diagnostic. DNSSECStatusSecure DNSSECStatus = "secure" // DNSSECStatusInsecure reports a transport-provided insecure diagnostic. DNSSECStatusInsecure DNSSECStatus = "insecure" // DNSSECStatusBogus reports a transport-provided bogus diagnostic. DNSSECStatusBogus DNSSECStatus = "bogus" // DNSSECStatusIndeterminate reports a transport-provided indeterminate diagnostic. DNSSECStatusIndeterminate DNSSECStatus = "indeterminate" DNSSECStatusUnavailable DNSSECStatus = "unavailable" )
func (DNSSECStatus) Known ¶
func (s DNSSECStatus) Known() bool
Known reports whether the status belongs to the closed diagnostic vocabulary.
type DSNEvidenceError ¶
type DSNEvidenceError struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
DSNEvidenceError preserves only a closed failure stage while retaining the existing public signing error through errors.Unwrap.
func (*DSNEvidenceError) Error ¶
func (e *DSNEvidenceError) Error() string
Error returns a bounded diagnostic without message, envelope, or identity data.
func (*DSNEvidenceError) Format ¶
func (e *DSNEvidenceError) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every formatting verb through the bounded diagnostic.
func (*DSNEvidenceError) Stage ¶
func (e *DSNEvidenceError) Stage() DSNEvidenceStage
Stage returns the closed failure stage or the zero value.
func (*DSNEvidenceError) Unwrap ¶
func (e *DSNEvidenceError) Unwrap() error
Unwrap preserves existing SigningError and context classification.
type DSNEvidenceStage ¶
type DSNEvidenceStage string
DSNEvidenceStage identifies one closed content-free DSN authorization stage.
const ( // DSNEvidenceStagePreflight identifies invalid evaluator or request state. DSNEvidenceStagePreflight DSNEvidenceStage = "preflight" // DSNEvidenceStageMIMEParse identifies outer DSN framing failure. DSNEvidenceStageMIMEParse DSNEvidenceStage = "mime_parse" // DSNEvidenceStageEmbeddedMessage identifies embedded RFC 5322 parsing failure. DSNEvidenceStageEmbeddedMessage DSNEvidenceStage = "embedded_message" // DSNEvidenceStageEmbeddedVerification identifies embedded cryptographic evidence failure. DSNEvidenceStageEmbeddedVerification DSNEvidenceStage = "embedded_verification" // DSNEvidenceStageEmbeddedUnsigned identifies a well-formed embedded // original without any DKIM2-Signature header field. Draft-09 Section 16 // defines DKIM2 DSN handling only for DKIM2-signed originals, so such a // report cannot be authorized for signing. The wrapped cause remains // SigningErrorAuthorizationDenied; only a caller with an explicit // compatibility policy may let the report leave unsigned and unchanged. DSNEvidenceStageEmbeddedUnsigned DSNEvidenceStage = "embedded_unsigned" // DSNEvidenceStageEmbeddedClaims identifies invalid authenticated protocol claims. DSNEvidenceStageEmbeddedClaims DSNEvidenceStage = "embedded_claims" // DSNEvidenceStageDeliveryStatusLinkage identifies RFC 3464 recipient linkage failure. DSNEvidenceStageDeliveryStatusLinkage DSNEvidenceStage = "delivery_status_linkage" // DSNEvidenceStageOuterRecipientLinkage identifies outer recipient and mf= mismatch. DSNEvidenceStageOuterRecipientLinkage DSNEvidenceStage = "outer_recipient_linkage" // DSNEvidenceStageSigningDomain identifies a failed Section 16.2 signing // identity resolution: an unavailable or inconsistent local profile // source, or cancellation during resolution. DSNEvidenceStageSigningDomain DSNEvidenceStage = "signing_domain" // local delivery_status profile domain relaxed-matches an rt= address of // the highest DKIM2-Signature of the reported message (Draft-09 Sections // 7.1 item 4 and 16.2). The report cannot be DKIM2 signed; callers // deliver it unsigned. The wrapped cause is SigningErrorAuthorizationDenied. DSNEvidenceStageIdentityUnavailable DSNEvidenceStage = "identity_unavailable" // DSNEvidenceStageFromNotAuthentic identifies a report for which Section // 16.2 candidates with a local profile exist, but none makes the report's // own From header field Authentic (Draft-09 Sections 11 and 12.4). The // report cannot be DKIM2 signed; callers deliver it unsigned. The wrapped // cause is SigningErrorAuthorizationDenied. DSNEvidenceStageFromNotAuthentic DSNEvidenceStage = "from_not_authentic" // DSNEvidenceStageAuthorized identifies completed pre-policy evidence authorization. DSNEvidenceStageAuthorized DSNEvidenceStage = "authorized" )
func DSNEvidenceStageOf ¶
func DSNEvidenceStageOf(err error) DSNEvidenceStage
DSNEvidenceStageOf returns a closed stage only for a typed DSN evidence failure.
func (DSNEvidenceStage) Known ¶
func (s DSNEvidenceStage) Known() bool
Known reports whether the stage belongs to the fixed DSN evidence pipeline.
type DSNIdentity ¶
type DSNIdentity struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
DSNIdentity is one canonical DNS domain that may be preferred as the signing identity of a delivery-status notification. It never becomes the signing domain on its own: Draft-09 Section 16.2 admits only domains that relaxed-match an rt= address of the reported message.
func NewDSNIdentity ¶
func NewDSNIdentity(domain string) (DSNIdentity, error)
NewDSNIdentity validates and canonicalizes one preferred delivery-status signing identity.
func (DSNIdentity) Domain ¶
func (i DSNIdentity) Domain() string
Domain returns the canonical DNS domain or an empty string.
func (DSNIdentity) Format ¶
func (i DSNIdentity) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every identity formatting form through the redacted representation.
func (DSNIdentity) GoString ¶
func (i DSNIdentity) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe identity representation.
func (DSNIdentity) String ¶
func (DSNIdentity) String() string
String prevents identity formatting from becoming a caller-controlled diagnostic channel.
func (DSNIdentity) Valid ¶
func (i DSNIdentity) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the identity carries a canonical nonempty DNS domain.
type DSNProfileSource ¶
type DSNProfileSource interface {
DeliveryStatusProfile(ctx context.Context, domain string) (profile SigningProfile, found bool, err error)
}
DSNProfileSource resolves the local delivery_status signing profile of one candidate domain for ResolveDSNSigningIdentity. Implementations return found=false with a nil error only when the domain has no such profile; every unavailable, ambiguous, or otherwise undecided answer is an error.
type DSNPropagationError ¶
type DSNPropagationError struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
DSNPropagationError preserves only a closed failure stage while exposing the caller context error or the public signing error through errors.Unwrap.
func (*DSNPropagationError) Error ¶
func (e *DSNPropagationError) Error() string
Error returns a bounded diagnostic without message, envelope, or identity data.
func (*DSNPropagationError) Format ¶
func (e *DSNPropagationError) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every formatting verb through the bounded diagnostic.
func (*DSNPropagationError) Stage ¶
func (e *DSNPropagationError) Stage() DSNPropagationStage
Stage returns the closed failure stage or the zero value.
func (*DSNPropagationError) Unwrap ¶
func (e *DSNPropagationError) Unwrap() error
Unwrap preserves context and signing error classification.
type DSNPropagationEvidence ¶
type DSNPropagationEvidence struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
DSNPropagationEvidence is the immutable outcome of RebuildDSNForPropagation. It carries the received-DSN evaluation, the closed rebuild outcome, and, for a rebuilt report, the unsigned report, the signing domain proven by the removed completion signature, and the authenticated next-hop recipient. No accessor exposes the report bytes before signing.
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) EightBitMIMERequired ¶
func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) EightBitMIMERequired() bool
EightBitMIMERequired reports whether the embedded original's body contains a non-ASCII byte, which is an 8BITMIME question for the re-injection client.
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) Evaluation ¶
func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) Evaluation() ReceivedDSNEvaluation
Evaluation returns the received-DSN evaluation the rebuild was based on.
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) Format ¶
func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every evidence formatting form through the redacted representation.
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) GoString ¶
func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe evidence representation.
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) MarshalJSON ¶
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects direct serialization outside generated response DTOs.
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) MarshalText ¶
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of sealed evidence.
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) NextHopRecipient ¶
func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) NextHopRecipient() []byte
NextHopRecipient returns a detached copy of the exact bracketed previous-hop mf= or nil.
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) OriginalForm ¶
func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) OriginalForm() ReceivedDSNOriginalForm
OriginalForm returns the representation of the rebuilt third part or the empty value.
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) Outcome ¶
func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) Outcome() DSNPropagationOutcome
Outcome returns the closed rebuild outcome.
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) Rebuilt ¶
func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) Rebuilt() bool
Rebuilt reports whether an unsigned report is ready for SignPropagatedDSN.
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) SMTPUTF8Required ¶
func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) SMTPUTF8Required() bool
SMTPUTF8Required reports whether any header field of the rebuilt DSN, including the embedded original's header block and the To: field carrying the next-hop path, contains a non-ASCII byte; an 8-bit body alone does not set it.
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) SigningDomain ¶
func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) SigningDomain() string
SigningDomain returns the canonical d= of the removed completion signature or an empty string.
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) String ¶
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) String() string
String returns a constant representation without sealed evidence facts.
func (DSNPropagationEvidence) Valid ¶
func (e DSNPropagationEvidence) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the evidence was issued by RebuildDSNForPropagation and is coherent.
type DSNPropagationOutcome ¶
type DSNPropagationOutcome string
DSNPropagationOutcome is the closed result of one rebuild attempt.
const ( // DSNPropagationRebuilt reports an unsigned Section 16.3 report ready for SignPropagatedDSN. DSNPropagationRebuilt DSNPropagationOutcome = "rebuilt" // DSNPropagationNotEligible reports an evaluation whose propagation projection is not eligible. DSNPropagationNotEligible DSNPropagationOutcome = "not_eligible" // DSNPropagationNotReconstructable reports a rebuild that could not prove or render the previous state. DSNPropagationNotReconstructable DSNPropagationOutcome = "not_reconstructable" // DSNPropagationTemporaryError reports a temporary key failure while verifying the previous hop. DSNPropagationTemporaryError DSNPropagationOutcome = "temperror" )
func (DSNPropagationOutcome) Known ¶
func (o DSNPropagationOutcome) Known() bool
Known reports whether the outcome belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type DSNPropagationRequest ¶
type DSNPropagationRequest struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
DSNPropagationRequest carries cloned received-DSN bytes, the observed null reverse path and single forward path, the tenant-bound local authority, and the canonical reporting MTA name rendered into the rebuilt report.
func NewDSNPropagationRequest ¶
func NewDSNPropagationRequest(raw, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, authority LocalAuthority, reportingMTA string) DSNPropagationRequest
NewDSNPropagationRequest snapshots one propagation request. The authority is mandatory because propagation without locality is meaningless.
func (DSNPropagationRequest) Format ¶
func (r DSNPropagationRequest) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every request formatting form through the redacted representation.
func (DSNPropagationRequest) GoString ¶
func (r DSNPropagationRequest) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe request representation.
func (DSNPropagationRequest) MarshalJSON ¶
func (DSNPropagationRequest) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects serialization of message or envelope bytes.
func (DSNPropagationRequest) MarshalText ¶
func (DSNPropagationRequest) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of message or envelope bytes.
func (DSNPropagationRequest) String ¶
func (DSNPropagationRequest) String() string
String prevents raw DSN or envelope content from reaching diagnostics.
type DSNPropagationSigningRequest ¶
type DSNPropagationSigningRequest struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
DSNPropagationSigningRequest binds rebuilt evidence to a propagation route ticket, the delivery_status profile of the signing domain, and metadata.
func NewDSNPropagationSigningRequest ¶
func NewDSNPropagationSigningRequest(evidence DSNPropagationEvidence, ticket RouteCopyTicket, profile SigningProfile, metadata SigningMetadata, transport SigningTransportForm) DSNPropagationSigningRequest
NewDSNPropagationSigningRequest constructs one propagation signing request without accepting caller-supplied message, envelope, or domain values.
func (DSNPropagationSigningRequest) Format ¶
func (r DSNPropagationSigningRequest) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every signing-request formatting form through the redacted representation.
func (DSNPropagationSigningRequest) GoString ¶
func (r DSNPropagationSigningRequest) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe signing-request representation.
func (DSNPropagationSigningRequest) String ¶
func (DSNPropagationSigningRequest) String() string
String prevents signing request formatting from exposing protected state.
type DSNPropagationStage ¶
type DSNPropagationStage string
DSNPropagationStage identifies one closed content-free propagation stage.
const ( // DSNPropagationStagePreflight identifies invalid signer or request state. DSNPropagationStagePreflight DSNPropagationStage = "preflight" // DSNPropagationStageEvaluation identifies the received-DSN evaluation. DSNPropagationStageEvaluation DSNPropagationStage = "evaluation" // DSNPropagationStageRebuild identifies the Section 16.3 rebuild. DSNPropagationStageRebuild DSNPropagationStage = "rebuild" // DSNPropagationStageSigning identifies the propagation signing operation. DSNPropagationStageSigning DSNPropagationStage = "signing" )
func DSNPropagationStageOf ¶
func DSNPropagationStageOf(err error) DSNPropagationStage
DSNPropagationStageOf returns the closed stage only for a typed propagation failure.
func (DSNPropagationStage) Known ¶
func (s DSNPropagationStage) Known() bool
Known reports whether the stage belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type DSNSigningEvidence ¶
type DSNSigningEvidence struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
DSNSigningEvidence is an opaque exact-input authorization produced only by EvaluateDSNForSigning and bound to one signing identity only by ResolveDSNSigningIdentity. It carries no raw-message accessor.
func (DSNSigningEvidence) Format ¶
func (e DSNSigningEvidence) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every evidence formatting form through the redacted representation.
func (DSNSigningEvidence) GoString ¶
func (e DSNSigningEvidence) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe evidence representation.
func (DSNSigningEvidence) Resolved ¶
func (e DSNSigningEvidence) Resolved() bool
Resolved reports whether ResolveDSNSigningIdentity bound the evidence to a Section 16.2 signing identity with an Authentic report From.
func (DSNSigningEvidence) SigningDomain ¶
func (e DSNSigningEvidence) SigningDomain() string
SigningDomain returns the canonical DSN signing identity chosen by ResolveDSNSigningIdentity, or an empty string before resolution.
func (DSNSigningEvidence) String ¶
func (DSNSigningEvidence) String() string
String prevents DSN evidence from exposing raw message or recipient data.
func (DSNSigningEvidence) Valid ¶
func (e DSNSigningEvidence) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the opaque evidence was issued by the DSN boundary. It does not imply that a signing identity was resolved.
type DSNSigningEvidenceRequest ¶
type DSNSigningEvidenceRequest struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
DSNSigningEvidenceRequest carries the exact outer evidence needed before a locally generated DSN can be authorized for signing, and an optional operator-preferred identity for the Section 16.2 candidate order.
func NewDSNSigningEvidenceRequest ¶
func NewDSNSigningEvidenceRequest(outerRaw, outerReversePath []byte, outerForwardPaths [][]byte) DSNSigningEvidenceRequest
NewDSNSigningEvidenceRequest snapshots one DSN evidence request whose delivery-status fields must follow the strict RFC 3464 sequence.
func NewPostfixDSNSigningEvidenceRequest ¶
func NewPostfixDSNSigningEvidenceRequest(outerRaw, outerReversePath []byte, outerForwardPaths [][]byte) DSNSigningEvidenceRequest
NewPostfixDSNSigningEvidenceRequest snapshots a DSN evidence request whose delivery-status field order may use the exact bounded form emitted by Postfix bounce(8).
Security precondition: trusted adapters must select this constructor only after independently proving that Postfix bounce(8) generated the DSN. It is not a parser hint for untrusted message input. Generic and non-Postfix paths must use NewDSNSigningEvidenceRequest.
func (DSNSigningEvidenceRequest) Format ¶
func (r DSNSigningEvidenceRequest) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every request formatting form through the redacted representation.
func (DSNSigningEvidenceRequest) GoString ¶
func (r DSNSigningEvidenceRequest) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe request representation.
func (DSNSigningEvidenceRequest) String ¶
func (DSNSigningEvidenceRequest) String() string
String prevents raw DSN or envelope content from reaching diagnostics.
func (DSNSigningEvidenceRequest) WithPreferredIdentity ¶
func (r DSNSigningEvidenceRequest) WithPreferredIdentity(preferred DSNIdentity) DSNSigningEvidenceRequest
WithPreferredIdentity returns a copy of the request that prefers one operator-configured domain within its Section 16.2 linkage tier. The preferred domain is used only when it relaxed-matches an rt= address of the reported message; it is never a signing domain on its own. An invalid identity clears the preference.
type DSNSigningRequest ¶
type DSNSigningRequest struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
DSNSigningRequest binds one issued DSN evidence object to a purpose-specific route ticket and profile.
func NewDSNSigningRequest ¶
func NewDSNSigningRequest(evidence DSNSigningEvidence, ticket RouteCopyTicket, profile SigningProfile, metadata SigningMetadata, transport SigningTransportForm) DSNSigningRequest
NewDSNSigningRequest constructs one exact DSN signing request without accepting caller-supplied message or envelope bytes.
func (DSNSigningRequest) Format ¶
func (r DSNSigningRequest) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every signing-request formatting form through the redacted representation.
func (DSNSigningRequest) GoString ¶
func (r DSNSigningRequest) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe signing-request representation.
func (DSNSigningRequest) String ¶
func (DSNSigningRequest) String() string
String prevents DSN signing request formatting from exposing protected state.
type DomainPolicyProvider ¶
type DomainPolicyProvider interface {
LookupDomainPolicy(context.Context, DomainPolicyQuery) (DomainPolicyStatus, error)
}
DomainPolicyProvider resolves Draft-09 Section 3.8 Domain Policy Records for the upward Authentic From match (Sections 7.1 item 3 and 11.1). It returns a known status with a nil error, the active caller context error, or a classified temporary or permanent provider error. A temporary error is TEMPERROR; a permanent error and every contract violation are treated as an invalid record (PERMERROR). Implementations must not place raw causes or DNS data in either return value. DNSPublicKeyProvider implements it with the same bounded resolver, cache, and transport as key lookups.
type DomainPolicyQuery ¶
type DomainPolicyQuery struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
DomainPolicyQuery identifies the canonical A-label From domain whose Domain Policy Record is looked up at _domainkey.<domain> (Draft-09 Sections 3.8 and 18). The lookup uses the domain exactly, without any tree walk.
func NewDomainPolicyQuery ¶
func NewDomainPolicyQuery(domain string) (DomainPolicyQuery, error)
NewDomainPolicyQuery constructs one canonical explicit Domain Policy Record query.
func (DomainPolicyQuery) Domain ¶
func (q DomainPolicyQuery) Domain() string
Domain returns the canonical A-label domain that holds the record.
func (DomainPolicyQuery) Format ¶
func (DomainPolicyQuery) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting from traversing the queried domain.
func (DomainPolicyQuery) GoString ¶
func (DomainPolicyQuery) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without the queried domain.
func (DomainPolicyQuery) MarshalJSON ¶
func (DomainPolicyQuery) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects serialization of the queried domain.
func (DomainPolicyQuery) MarshalText ¶
func (DomainPolicyQuery) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of the queried domain.
func (DomainPolicyQuery) String ¶
func (DomainPolicyQuery) String() string
String returns a constant representation without the queried domain.
type DomainPolicyStatus ¶
type DomainPolicyStatus string
DomainPolicyStatus identifies one closed Draft-09 Section 3.8 Domain Policy Record outcome. A temporary DNS failure is not a status: providers report it as a classified temporary provider error.
const ( // DomainPolicyAuthorized reports that subdomains may make From header // fields of the domain Authentic: no record (NXDOMAIN, NODATA, or no // record beginning with v=DKIM1), no f= tag, or no strict flag. DomainPolicyAuthorized DomainPolicyStatus = "authorized" // DomainPolicyStrict reports one record whose f= tag carries the // case-sensitive strict flag. DomainPolicyStrict DomainPolicyStatus = "strict" // DomainPolicyAmbiguous reports more than one record beginning with // v=DKIM1 (PERMERROR). DomainPolicyAmbiguous DomainPolicyStatus = "ambiguous" // DomainPolicyInvalid reports a record that begins with v=DKIM1 but is // not a valid tag-list, or a permanent lookup failure (PERMERROR). DomainPolicyInvalid DomainPolicyStatus = "invalid" )
func (DomainPolicyStatus) Known ¶
func (s DomainPolicyStatus) Known() bool
Known reports whether the status is in the closed provider vocabulary.
type Ed25519SigningCredential ¶
type Ed25519SigningCredential struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
Ed25519SigningCredential is one immutable Ed25519-SHA256 public credential paired with an opaque private-key handle.
func NewEd25519SigningCredential ¶
func NewEd25519SigningCredential(selector string, publicKey ed25519.PublicKey, handle PrivateKeyHandle) (Ed25519SigningCredential, error)
NewEd25519SigningCredential validates and snapshots one Ed25519-SHA256 credential.
func (Ed25519SigningCredential) Format ¶
func (c Ed25519SigningCredential) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every credential formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (Ed25519SigningCredential) GoString ¶
func (c Ed25519SigningCredential) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe credential Go representation.
func (Ed25519SigningCredential) String ¶
func (c Ed25519SigningCredential) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe credential summary.
func (Ed25519SigningCredential) Valid ¶
func (c Ed25519SigningCredential) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the Ed25519 credential remains coherent.
type ExistingSigningRequest ¶
type ExistingSigningRequest struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
ExistingSigningRequest is one immutable exact verified forwarding or revision request.
func NewExistingSigningRequest ¶
func NewExistingSigningRequest(capability VerifiedRevisionInput, rawMessage, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, ticket RouteCopyTicket, profile SigningProfile, metadata SigningMetadata, transport SigningTransportForm, bodyPolicy BodyUnavailablePolicy, literalPolicy RecipeLiteralPolicy) ExistingSigningRequest
NewExistingSigningRequest snapshots one verified forwarding or revision request.
func (ExistingSigningRequest) Format ¶
func (r ExistingSigningRequest) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every request formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (ExistingSigningRequest) GoString ¶
func (r ExistingSigningRequest) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe request Go representation.
func (ExistingSigningRequest) String ¶
func (r ExistingSigningRequest) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe request summary.
type HeaderFromNullSenderClass ¶
type HeaderFromNullSenderClass string
HeaderFromNullSenderClass is the closed eligibility outcome of a message offered for originator signing with a null reverse path under the explicit header_from policy.
const ( // HeaderFromNullSenderEligible marks an automatic reply or disposition // notification whose single From mailbox yields the signing domain. HeaderFromNullSenderEligible HeaderFromNullSenderClass = "eligible" // HeaderFromNullSenderProtocolFields marks a message that already carries // a DKIM2-Signature or Message-Instance header field. A new originator // instance would conflict with that history, and such null-sender mail is // a signed delivery-status notification that belongs on the Section 16 // path. HeaderFromNullSenderProtocolFields HeaderFromNullSenderClass = "dkim2_protocol_fields" // HeaderFromNullSenderDeliveryStatus marks an RFC 3464 delivery-status // notification, a top-level multipart/report with report-type // delivery-status. DSNs are signed only through the Section 16 route, // never as originator mail. HeaderFromNullSenderDeliveryStatus HeaderFromNullSenderClass = "delivery_status_report" // HeaderFromNullSenderContentTypeAmbiguous marks a message whose // top-level Content-Type is repeated, overlong, or unparsable, so it // cannot be proven not to be a delivery-status notification. HeaderFromNullSenderContentTypeAmbiguous HeaderFromNullSenderClass = "content_type_ambiguous" // HeaderFromNullSenderAuthorUnusable marks a message whose header section // is unparsable or whose From does not yield one canonical DNS domain. HeaderFromNullSenderAuthorUnusable HeaderFromNullSenderClass = "author_unusable" )
func ClassifyHeaderFromNullSender ¶
func ClassifyHeaderFromNullSender(rawMessage []byte) (string, HeaderFromNullSenderClass)
ClassifyHeaderFromNullSender decides whether a message with a null reverse path may be signed as originator mail under the header_from policy and, if so, returns the canonical From domain that binds d=. Draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2- spec Section 10.8 requires no d= match when mf= is "<>", so the signer binds d= to the message author instead of choosing it freely. Messages carrying DKIM2 protocol fields and RFC 3464 delivery-status notifications are never eligible; DSNs stay on the dedicated Section 16 route. Only the header section is parsed, so the body is never copied.
type HistoricalState ¶
type HistoricalState string
HistoricalState identifies whether one historical verification dimension was evaluated.
const ( // HistoricalStateNotEvaluated reports that the historical dimension was not evaluated. HistoricalStateNotEvaluated HistoricalState = "not_evaluated" // HistoricalStateComplete reports authenticated coverage through the origin. HistoricalStateComplete HistoricalState = "complete" // HistoricalStatePartial reports authenticated coverage with an explicit // unavailable body. Draft-09 Section 13 makes such a history FAIL // body_history_unavailable, so verification no longer produces it. HistoricalStatePartial HistoricalState = "partial" )
func (HistoricalState) Known ¶
func (s HistoricalState) Known() bool
Known reports whether the historical state belongs to the closed public vocabulary.
type LocalAuthority ¶
type LocalAuthority interface {
LookupLocalAuthority(ctx context.Context, domain string) (LocalAuthorityStatus, error)
}
LocalAuthority answers whether a canonical DNS domain is a local authority domain. It carries no tenant value: the daemon binds the tenant when it constructs the implementation. The library validates domain syntax before every call and never passes a malformed d=. Any returned error is treated as a temporary datasource failure, never as not_local; a status outside the closed vocabulary is a contract violation and is also temporary.
type LocalAuthorityStatus ¶
type LocalAuthorityStatus string
LocalAuthorityStatus is the closed answer of one local-authority lookup.
const ( // LocalAuthorityLocal reports that the bound tenant holds an active signing profile of any use for the domain. LocalAuthorityLocal LocalAuthorityStatus = "local" // LocalAuthorityNotLocal reports that the domain is not a local authority domain for the bound tenant. LocalAuthorityNotLocal LocalAuthorityStatus = "not_local" )
func (LocalAuthorityStatus) Known ¶
func (s LocalAuthorityStatus) Known() bool
Known reports whether the status belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type MLDSA44SigningCredential ¶
type MLDSA44SigningCredential struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
MLDSA44SigningCredential is one immutable pure ML-DSA-44 public credential paired with an opaque private-key handle.
func NewMLDSA44SigningCredential ¶
func NewMLDSA44SigningCredential(selector string, publicKey *mldsa.PublicKey, handle PrivateKeyHandle) (MLDSA44SigningCredential, error)
NewMLDSA44SigningCredential validates and snapshots one mldsa44 credential. It fails closed when the cryptographic runtime cannot provide ML-DSA-44 (the FIPS 140-3 Go Cryptographic Module v1.0.0) or the key is not an ML-DSA-44 key.
func (MLDSA44SigningCredential) Format ¶
func (c MLDSA44SigningCredential) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every credential formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (MLDSA44SigningCredential) GoString ¶
func (c MLDSA44SigningCredential) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe credential Go representation.
func (MLDSA44SigningCredential) String ¶
func (c MLDSA44SigningCredential) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe credential summary.
func (MLDSA44SigningCredential) Valid ¶
func (c MLDSA44SigningCredential) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the mldsa44 credential remains coherent.
type ManagedReplayStore ¶
type ManagedReplayStore interface {
ReplayStore
State() ReplayStoreState
Close(context.Context) error
}
ManagedReplayStore adds bounded lifecycle control to a replay store.
type NetTXTTransport ¶
type NetTXTTransport struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
NetTXTTransport adapts standard-library TXT lookup semantics without inventing TTL data.
func NewNetTXTTransport ¶
func NewNetTXTTransport(resolver *net.Resolver) (*NetTXTTransport, error)
NewNetTXTTransport constructs a standard-library TXT transport.
func (NetTXTTransport) Format ¶
func (NetTXTTransport) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting from traversing the retained resolver.
func (NetTXTTransport) GoString ¶
func (NetTXTTransport) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without retained resolver state.
func (*NetTXTTransport) LookupTXT ¶
func (t *NetTXTTransport) LookupTXT(ctx context.Context, absoluteName string) (TXTLookupResult, error)
LookupTXT preserves returned RR boundaries and reports zero TTL provenance.
func (NetTXTTransport) MarshalJSON ¶
func (NetTXTTransport) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects serialization of retained resolver dependencies.
func (NetTXTTransport) MarshalText ¶
func (NetTXTTransport) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of retained resolver dependencies.
func (NetTXTTransport) String ¶
func (NetTXTTransport) String() string
String returns a constant representation without retained resolver state.
type NextDomainPublicationRequest ¶
type NextDomainPublicationRequest struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
NextDomainPublicationRequest is one closed candidate future credential request.
func NewEd25519NextDomainPublicationRequest ¶
func NewEd25519NextDomainPublicationRequest(domain string, credential Ed25519SigningCredential) NextDomainPublicationRequest
NewEd25519NextDomainPublicationRequest binds one Ed25519 future credential to its nd= domain.
func NewMLDSA44NextDomainPublicationRequest ¶
func NewMLDSA44NextDomainPublicationRequest(domain string, credential MLDSA44SigningCredential) NextDomainPublicationRequest
NewMLDSA44NextDomainPublicationRequest binds one mldsa44 future credential to its nd= domain.
func NewRSANextDomainPublicationRequest ¶
func NewRSANextDomainPublicationRequest(domain string, credential RSASigningCredential) NextDomainPublicationRequest
NewRSANextDomainPublicationRequest binds one RSA future credential to its nd= domain.
func (NextDomainPublicationRequest) Format ¶
func (r NextDomainPublicationRequest) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every publication-request formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (NextDomainPublicationRequest) GoString ¶
func (r NextDomainPublicationRequest) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe publication-request Go representation.
func (NextDomainPublicationRequest) String ¶
func (r NextDomainPublicationRequest) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe publication-request summary.
type NextDomainSigningRequest ¶
type NextDomainSigningRequest struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
NextDomainSigningRequest is one exact terminal nd= creation or continuation request.
func NewNextDomainSigningRequest ¶
func NewNextDomainSigningRequest( capability VerifiedRevisionInput, rawMessage, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, ticket RouteCopyTicket, profile SigningProfile, metadata SigningMetadata, transport SigningTransportForm, bodyPolicy BodyUnavailablePolicy, literalPolicy RecipeLiteralPolicy, nextDomain string, published PublishedNextDomainCapability, ) NextDomainSigningRequest
NewNextDomainSigningRequest snapshots one exact terminal nd= request.
func (NextDomainSigningRequest) Format ¶
func (r NextDomainSigningRequest) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every request formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (NextDomainSigningRequest) GoString ¶
func (r NextDomainSigningRequest) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe request Go representation.
func (NextDomainSigningRequest) String ¶
func (r NextDomainSigningRequest) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe request summary.
type NoopObservationSink ¶
type NoopObservationSink struct{}
NoopObservationSink discards observations.
func (NoopObservationSink) Observe ¶
func (NoopObservationSink) Observe(context.Context, ObservationEvent)
Observe discards one bounded event.
type ObservationAlgorithm ¶
type ObservationAlgorithm = internalobs.Algorithm
ObservationAlgorithm identifies one bounded algorithm family.
type ObservationBucket ¶
type ObservationBucket = internalobs.Bucket
ObservationBucket identifies one bounded duration, size, or count class.
type ObservationCacheResult ¶
type ObservationCacheResult = internalobs.CacheResult
ObservationCacheResult identifies one bounded cache result.
type ObservationErrorClass ¶
type ObservationErrorClass = internalobs.ErrorClass
ObservationErrorClass identifies one bounded error class.
type ObservationEvent ¶
type ObservationEvent = internalobs.Event
ObservationEvent is the immutable closed library observation value.
func NewObservationEvent ¶
func NewObservationEvent(kind ObservationKind, operation ObservationOperation, result ObservationResult, reason ObservationReason, errorClass ObservationErrorClass, algorithm ObservationAlgorithm, cache ObservationCacheResult, duration, message, recipients, signatures, chain ObservationBucket) (ObservationEvent, bool)
NewObservationEvent validates and constructs one closed library event.
type ObservationKind ¶
type ObservationKind = internalobs.Kind
ObservationKind identifies one library-owned observation point.
type ObservationOperation ¶
type ObservationOperation = internalobs.Operation
ObservationOperation identifies one bounded operation.
type ObservationReason ¶
type ObservationReason = internalobs.Reason
ObservationReason identifies one bounded reason.
type ObservationResult ¶
type ObservationResult = internalobs.Result
ObservationResult identifies one bounded result.
type ObservationSink ¶
type ObservationSink interface {
Observe(context.Context, ObservationEvent)
}
ObservationSink receives immutable bounded observations.
type OriginatorSigningRequest ¶
type OriginatorSigningRequest struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
OriginatorSigningRequest is one immutable exact originator signing request.
func NewHeaderFromNullSenderSigningRequest ¶
func NewHeaderFromNullSenderSigningRequest(rawMessage []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, ticket RouteCopyTicket, profile SigningProfile, metadata SigningMetadata, transport SigningTransportForm) OriginatorSigningRequest
NewHeaderFromNullSenderSigningRequest snapshots one originator signing request for a message our own trusted systems emit with the null reverse path, such as an automatic reply or an RFC 8098 disposition notification. The signature carries mf=<> and the given recipients in rt=; SignOriginator admits it only when the profile domain equals HeaderFromDomain of the message. The caller owns the decision that the submission route is trusted.
func NewOriginatorSigningRequest ¶
func NewOriginatorSigningRequest(rawMessage, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, ticket RouteCopyTicket, profile SigningProfile, metadata SigningMetadata, transport SigningTransportForm) OriginatorSigningRequest
NewOriginatorSigningRequest snapshots one originator signing request. A null reverse path is refused on this path; see NewHeaderFromNullSenderSigningRequest.
func (OriginatorSigningRequest) Format ¶
func (r OriginatorSigningRequest) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every request formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (OriginatorSigningRequest) GoString ¶
func (r OriginatorSigningRequest) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe request Go representation.
func (OriginatorSigningRequest) String ¶
func (r OriginatorSigningRequest) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe request summary.
type OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage ¶
type OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage is a terminal nd= result with no generic byte escape.
func (OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) Facts ¶
func (m OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) Facts() SignedMessageFacts
Facts returns bounded immutable operation facts.
func (OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) Format ¶
func (m OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every message formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) GoString ¶
func (m OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe message Go representation.
func (OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) ReleaseForOutOfBandAcceptance ¶
func (m OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) ReleaseForOutOfBandAcceptance( ctx context.Context, ticket RouteCopyTicket, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, receiverBinding, routeScope []byte, ) ([]byte, error)
ReleaseForOutOfBandAcceptance atomically releases bytes only for the exact sealed receiver, envelope, route, and ticket lineage.
func (OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) String ¶
func (m OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe message summary.
func (OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) Valid ¶
func (m OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether this is a coherent OOB-restricted terminal result.
type PolicyAction ¶
type PolicyAction struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
PolicyAction stores one immutable local disposition.
func (PolicyAction) Kind ¶
func (a PolicyAction) Kind() PolicyActionKind
Kind returns the closed action kind.
func (PolicyAction) Terminal ¶
func (a PolicyAction) Terminal() bool
Terminal reports whether the action is terminal for DKIM2 policy.
func (PolicyAction) Valid ¶
func (a PolicyAction) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the action is initialized and known.
type PolicyActionKind ¶
type PolicyActionKind string
PolicyActionKind identifies one closed disposition action.
const ( // PolicyActionAccept matches an accept verdict. PolicyActionAccept PolicyActionKind = "accept" // PolicyActionReject matches a reject verdict. PolicyActionReject PolicyActionKind = "reject" // PolicyActionTempfail matches a temporary-failure verdict. PolicyActionTempfail PolicyActionKind = "tempfail" // PolicyActionContinue matches explicit non-terminal continuation. PolicyActionContinue PolicyActionKind = "continue" )
func (PolicyActionKind) Known ¶
func (k PolicyActionKind) Known() bool
Known reports whether the action kind belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type PolicyActionPlan ¶
type PolicyActionPlan struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
PolicyActionPlan stores exactly one immutable local disposition.
func (PolicyActionPlan) Actions ¶
func (p PolicyActionPlan) Actions() []PolicyAction
Actions returns an independent copy containing exactly one action.
func (PolicyActionPlan) Valid ¶
func (p PolicyActionPlan) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the plan contains exactly one coherent disposition.
type PolicyDecision ¶
type PolicyDecision struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
PolicyDecision stores one immutable public local-policy outcome.
func EvaluateAuthenticationPolicy ¶
func EvaluateAuthenticationPolicy(result AuthenticationResult, options ...PolicyOption) (PolicyDecision, error)
EvaluateAuthenticationPolicy evaluates local policy from the authoritative final Draft-09 result, extended by the received-DSN facts when WithReceivedDSNEvaluation attached them; a final state other than PASS keeps the outer policy and retains the facts as the outer-policy finding.
func EvaluatePolicy ¶
func EvaluatePolicy(result VerifyResult, options ...PolicyOption) (PolicyDecision, error)
EvaluatePolicy evaluates only the sealed projection embedded by library verification, extended by the received-DSN facts when WithReceivedDSNEvaluation attached them.
Example ¶
ExampleEvaluatePolicy demonstrates strict policy over a library-created passing result.
package main
import (
"context"
"crypto/rsa"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"time"
_ "embed"
dkim2 "github.com/croessner/dkim2"
)
//go:embed testdata/vectors/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-09/public-golden.json
var publicExampleCorpus []byte
type syntheticKeyProvider struct{ key *rsa.PublicKey }
// LookupPublicKey returns the frozen synthetic RSA public key.
func (p syntheticKeyProvider) LookupPublicKey(_ context.Context, query dkim2.PublicKeyQuery) (dkim2.PublicKeyResult, error) {
if query.Algorithm() != dkim2.AlgorithmRSASHA256 {
return dkim2.MissingPublicKey(query.Algorithm()), nil
}
return dkim2.FoundRSAPublicKey(p.key), nil
}
func main() {
verifier, _ := dkim2.NewVerifier(syntheticKeyProvider{key: syntheticExampleRSAKey()}, dkim2.WithVerificationClock(func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1700000000, 0) }), dkim2.WithoutSubdomainFromAuthorization())
result, _ := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), syntheticExampleRequest())
decision, _ := dkim2.EvaluatePolicy(result)
action := decision.ActionPlan().Actions()[0]
fmt.Println(decision.VerificationState(), decision.Verdict(), decision.PrimaryReason())
fmt.Println(action.Kind(), action.Terminal())
}
// syntheticExampleRequest decodes the frozen synthetic current-message fixture.
func syntheticExampleRequest() dkim2.VerifyRequest {
return syntheticExampleRequestNamed("rsa_pass")
}
// syntheticExampleRequestNamed decodes one frozen synthetic current-message fixture.
func syntheticExampleRequestNamed(name string) dkim2.VerifyRequest {
type vector struct {
Raw string `json:"raw_base64"`
Reverse string `json:"reverse_path_base64"`
Forward []string `json:"forward_paths_base64"`
}
var corpus struct {
Vectors map[string]vector `json:"vectors"`
}
_ = json.Unmarshal(publicExampleCorpus, &corpus)
fixture := corpus.Vectors[name]
raw, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(fixture.Raw)
reverse, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(fixture.Reverse)
forward := make([][]byte, len(fixture.Forward))
for index, encoded := range fixture.Forward {
forward[index], _ = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encoded)
}
return dkim2.NewVerifyRequest(raw, reverse, forward)
}
// syntheticExampleRSAKey reconstructs the frozen synthetic RSA public key.
func syntheticExampleRSAKey() *rsa.PublicKey {
var corpus struct {
RSAModulus string `json:"rsa_modulus_base64"`
RSAExponent int `json:"rsa_exponent"`
}
_ = json.Unmarshal(publicExampleCorpus, &corpus)
modulus, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(corpus.RSAModulus)
return &rsa.PublicKey{N: new(big.Int).SetBytes(modulus), E: corpus.RSAExponent}
}
Output: PASS accept protocol_pass accept true
func (PolicyDecision) ActionPlan ¶
func (d PolicyDecision) ActionPlan() PolicyActionPlan
ActionPlan returns an immutable action plan whose collection accessor clones.
func (PolicyDecision) FeedbackIntent ¶
func (d PolicyDecision) FeedbackIntent() PolicyFeedbackIntent
FeedbackIntent returns bounded authenticated feedback intent by value.
func (PolicyDecision) Findings ¶
func (d PolicyDecision) Findings() []PolicyFinding
Findings returns an independent ordered copy of policy findings.
func (PolicyDecision) Format ¶
func (PolicyDecision) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting from traversing sealed policy facts.
func (PolicyDecision) GoString ¶
func (PolicyDecision) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without sealed policy facts.
func (PolicyDecision) IsZero ¶
func (d PolicyDecision) IsZero() bool
IsZero reports whether the decision carries no initialized policy state.
func (PolicyDecision) MarshalJSON ¶
func (PolicyDecision) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects direct serialization outside generated response DTOs.
func (PolicyDecision) MarshalText ¶
func (PolicyDecision) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of sealed policy state.
func (PolicyDecision) Mode ¶
func (d PolicyDecision) Mode() PolicyMode
Mode returns the explicit local policy mode.
func (PolicyDecision) PrimaryReason ¶
func (d PolicyDecision) PrimaryReason() PolicyReason
PrimaryReason returns the exact deterministic policy reason.
func (PolicyDecision) String ¶
func (PolicyDecision) String() string
String returns a constant representation without sealed policy facts.
func (PolicyDecision) Valid ¶
func (d PolicyDecision) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the public decision is initialized and internally coherent.
func (PolicyDecision) Verdict ¶
func (d PolicyDecision) Verdict() PolicyVerdict
Verdict returns the local disposition separate from verification.
func (PolicyDecision) VerificationState ¶
func (d PolicyDecision) VerificationState() ResultState
VerificationState returns the unchanged authoritative verification state.
type PolicyError ¶
type PolicyError struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
PolicyError stores cause-free and message-free policy failure metadata.
func (*PolicyError) Code ¶
func (e *PolicyError) Code() PolicyErrorCode
Code returns the closed public policy error code.
func (*PolicyError) ConfiguredLimit ¶
func (e *PolicyError) ConfiguredLimit() int
ConfiguredLimit returns the configured limit without input content.
func (*PolicyError) Error ¶
func (e *PolicyError) Error() string
Error returns one stable diagnostic without verification or message content.
func (*PolicyError) Is ¶
func (e *PolicyError) Is(target error) bool
Is supports errors.Is matching by closed public error code.
func (*PolicyError) LimitName ¶
func (e *PolicyError) LimitName() string
LimitName returns an allowlisted public policy limit name.
func (*PolicyError) ObservedCount ¶
func (e *PolicyError) ObservedCount() int
ObservedCount returns the bounded observed count.
type PolicyErrorCode ¶
type PolicyErrorCode string
PolicyErrorCode identifies one bounded public policy-evaluation failure.
const ( // PolicyErrorInvalidOption reports an unknown, duplicate, zero, or widening option. PolicyErrorInvalidOption PolicyErrorCode = "invalid_option" // PolicyErrorInvalidInput reports absent or incoherent sealed verification provenance. PolicyErrorInvalidInput PolicyErrorCode = "invalid_input" // PolicyErrorLimitExceeded reports a configured public policy resource limit. PolicyErrorLimitExceeded PolicyErrorCode = "limit_exceeded" // PolicyErrorInternalContract reports an impossible internal policy result. PolicyErrorInternalContract PolicyErrorCode = "internal_contract" )
func (PolicyErrorCode) Known ¶
func (c PolicyErrorCode) Known() bool
Known reports whether the code belongs to the closed public vocabulary.
type PolicyFeedbackIntent ¶
type PolicyFeedbackIntent struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
PolicyFeedbackIntent stores bounded authenticated feedback routing intent.
func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) Format ¶
func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting from traversing relay identifiers.
func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) GoString ¶
func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without relay identifiers.
func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) HistoryCoverage ¶
func (i PolicyFeedbackIntent) HistoryCoverage() PolicyHistoryCoverage
HistoryCoverage returns explicit feedback-history coverage.
func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) MarshalJSON ¶
func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects direct serialization outside generated response DTOs.
func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) MarshalText ¶
func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of authenticated relay state.
func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) RelayRequired ¶
func (i PolicyFeedbackIntent) RelayRequired() bool
RelayRequired reports whether an authenticated eligible relay exists.
func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) RelaySequence ¶
func (i PolicyFeedbackIntent) RelaySequence() uint64
RelaySequence returns the highest eligible relay sequence or zero.
func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) Requested ¶
func (i PolicyFeedbackIntent) Requested() bool
Requested reports whether authenticated feedback was requested.
func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) String ¶
func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) String() string
String returns a constant representation without relay identifiers.
func (PolicyFeedbackIntent) Valid ¶
func (i PolicyFeedbackIntent) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether feedback intent is coherent and initialized.
type PolicyFinding ¶
type PolicyFinding struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
PolicyFinding records one immutable bounded policy fact.
func (PolicyFinding) Format ¶
func (PolicyFinding) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting from traversing sequence identifiers.
func (PolicyFinding) GoString ¶
func (PolicyFinding) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without sequence identifiers.
func (PolicyFinding) MarshalJSON ¶
func (PolicyFinding) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects direct serialization outside generated response DTOs.
func (PolicyFinding) MarshalText ¶
func (PolicyFinding) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of authenticated sequence state.
func (PolicyFinding) Reason ¶
func (f PolicyFinding) Reason() PolicyReason
Reason returns the closed finding reason.
func (PolicyFinding) Sequence ¶
func (f PolicyFinding) Sequence() (uint64, bool)
Sequence returns an optional authenticated sequence and presence flag.
func (PolicyFinding) Severity ¶
func (f PolicyFinding) Severity() PolicyFindingSeverity
Severity returns the frozen severity for the reason.
func (PolicyFinding) String ¶
func (PolicyFinding) String() string
String returns a constant representation without sequence identifiers.
func (PolicyFinding) Valid ¶
func (f PolicyFinding) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the finding came from a coherent internal decision.
type PolicyFindingSeverity ¶
type PolicyFindingSeverity string
PolicyFindingSeverity identifies one bounded finding severity.
const ( // PolicySeverityInfo reports informational authenticated state. PolicySeverityInfo PolicyFindingSeverity = "info" // PolicySeverityWarning reports a non-terminal concern or override. PolicySeverityWarning PolicyFindingSeverity = "warning" // PolicySeverityPermanent reports a permanent failure or violation. PolicySeverityPermanent PolicyFindingSeverity = "permanent" // PolicySeverityTemporary reports a retryable verification failure. PolicySeverityTemporary PolicyFindingSeverity = "temporary" )
func (PolicyFindingSeverity) Known ¶
func (s PolicyFindingSeverity) Known() bool
Known reports whether the severity belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type PolicyHistoryCoverage ¶
type PolicyHistoryCoverage string
PolicyHistoryCoverage identifies authenticated policy-history coverage.
const ( // PolicyHistoryNotEvaluated reports deliberately unevaluated history. PolicyHistoryNotEvaluated PolicyHistoryCoverage = "not_evaluated" // PolicyHistoryComplete reports exact contiguous authenticated history. PolicyHistoryComplete PolicyHistoryCoverage = "complete" // PolicyHistoryIndeterminate reports explicitly partial authenticated history. PolicyHistoryIndeterminate PolicyHistoryCoverage = "indeterminate" )
func (PolicyHistoryCoverage) Known ¶
func (h PolicyHistoryCoverage) Known() bool
Known reports whether coverage belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type PolicyMode ¶
type PolicyMode string
PolicyMode identifies one explicit local policy posture.
const ( // PolicyModeStrict enforces verification failure and proven violations. PolicyModeStrict PolicyMode = "strict" // PolicyModePermissive accepts permanent verification failures with findings. PolicyModePermissive PolicyMode = "permissive" // PolicyModeTesting observes outcomes without a terminal DKIM2 disposition. PolicyModeTesting PolicyMode = "testing" )
func (PolicyMode) Known ¶
func (m PolicyMode) Known() bool
Known reports whether the mode belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type PolicyOption ¶
type PolicyOption func(*policyConfig) error
PolicyOption narrows one public policy setting exactly once.
func WithPolicyMaxAuthenticatedHops ¶
func WithPolicyMaxAuthenticatedHops(limit int) PolicyOption
WithPolicyMaxAuthenticatedHops narrows the authenticated-hop evaluation limit.
func WithPolicyMaxFindings ¶
func WithPolicyMaxFindings(limit int) PolicyOption
WithPolicyMaxFindings narrows the retained-finding evaluation limit.
func WithPolicyMode ¶
func WithPolicyMode(mode PolicyMode) PolicyOption
WithPolicyMode selects one explicit local policy posture.
func WithReceivedDSNEvaluation ¶
func WithReceivedDSNEvaluation(evaluation ReceivedDSNEvaluation) PolicyOption
WithReceivedDSNEvaluation attaches the read-only received-DSN evaluation of the same inbound message, so that one evaluation yields one PolicyDecision covering the outer verification and the received-DSN mapping table. The row selected in stage order is recorded as the last finding: reject, tempfail, and continue rows replace the outer verdict, accept rows keep it, and an outer verification or final replay state other than PASS keeps the outer policy. The caller must pass the evaluation produced for the message whose result is evaluated; the evaluation carries no identifiers, so the library cannot verify that binding. An invalid evaluation or a second use of the option is rejected.
type PolicyReason ¶
type PolicyReason string
PolicyReason identifies one closed policy decision or finding reason.
const ( // PolicyReasonInvalidInput reports invalid policy input. PolicyReasonInvalidInput PolicyReason = "invalid_input" // PolicyReasonLimitExceeded reports a policy resource limit. PolicyReasonLimitExceeded PolicyReason = "limit_exceeded" // PolicyReasonInternalContract reports impossible internal state. PolicyReasonInternalContract PolicyReason = "internal_contract" // PolicyReasonProtocolPass reports authoritative verification success. PolicyReasonProtocolPass PolicyReason = "protocol_pass" // PolicyReasonProtocolFail reports authoritative integrity failure. PolicyReasonProtocolFail PolicyReason = "protocol_fail" // PolicyReasonProtocolPermerror reports authoritative permanent error. PolicyReasonProtocolPermerror PolicyReason = "protocol_permerror" // PolicyReasonProtocolTemperror reports authoritative temporary error. PolicyReasonProtocolTemperror PolicyReason = "protocol_temperror" // PolicyReasonPermissiveOverride reports an explicit permissive override. PolicyReasonPermissiveOverride PolicyReason = "permissive_override" // PolicyReasonTestingModeObserve reports explicit local observation mode. PolicyReasonTestingModeObserve PolicyReason = "testing_mode_observe" // PolicyReasonFeedbackRequested reports an authenticated feedback request. PolicyReasonFeedbackRequested PolicyReason = "feedback_requested" // PolicyReasonFeedbackRelaySelected reports the selected authenticated relay. PolicyReasonFeedbackRelaySelected PolicyReason = "feedback_relay_selected" // PolicyReasonFeedHereInert reports a relay flag without causal consent. PolicyReasonFeedHereInert PolicyReason = "feedhere_inert" // PolicyReasonExplodedReported reports an authenticated explosion flag. PolicyReasonExplodedReported PolicyReason = "exploded_reported" // PolicyReasonReceivedDSNOuterPolicy reports that the outer verification is not PASS, so the outer policy applies unchanged to a received DSN. PolicyReasonReceivedDSNOuterPolicy PolicyReason = "received_dsn_outer_policy" // PolicyReasonReceivedDSNStructureInvalid reports a received DSN whose structure member is not valid. PolicyReasonReceivedDSNStructureInvalid PolicyReason = "received_dsn_structure_invalid" // PolicyReasonReceivedDSNEmbeddedUnverified reports permanent verification failure of the embedded original. PolicyReasonReceivedDSNEmbeddedUnverified PolicyReason = "received_dsn_embedded_unverified" // PolicyReasonReceivedDSNEmbeddedAbsent reports an unsigned embedded original outside Section 16.4. PolicyReasonReceivedDSNEmbeddedAbsent PolicyReason = "received_dsn_embedded_absent" // PolicyReasonReceivedDSNTemporaryFailure reports a temporary key or datasource failure during received-DSN evaluation. PolicyReasonReceivedDSNTemporaryFailure PolicyReason = "received_dsn_temporary_failure" PolicyReasonReceivedDSNTenantUnavailable PolicyReason = "received_dsn_tenant_unavailable" // PolicyReasonReceivedDSNIdentityMismatch reports a local-hop mismatch or a misaligned outer signer. PolicyReasonReceivedDSNIdentityMismatch PolicyReason = "received_dsn_identity_mismatch" // PolicyReasonReceivedDSNNotLocal reports a received DSN in transit through a relay. PolicyReasonReceivedDSNNotLocal PolicyReason = "received_dsn_not_local" // PolicyReasonReceivedDSNRecipientUnlinked reports that no recipient group links to the completion rt= path. PolicyReasonReceivedDSNRecipientUnlinked PolicyReason = "received_dsn_recipient_unlinked" // PolicyReasonReceivedDSNLinked reports a fully linked received DSN with any propagation value. PolicyReasonReceivedDSNLinked PolicyReason = "received_dsn_linked" )
func (PolicyReason) Known ¶
func (r PolicyReason) Known() bool
Known reports whether the reason belongs to the frozen public vocabulary.
type PolicyVerdict ¶
type PolicyVerdict string
PolicyVerdict identifies one local policy disposition separate from verification.
const ( // PolicyVerdictAccept authorizes normal continuation. PolicyVerdictAccept PolicyVerdict = "accept" // PolicyVerdictReject reports permanent local-policy rejection. PolicyVerdictReject PolicyVerdict = "reject" // PolicyVerdictTempfail reports retryable local deferral. PolicyVerdictTempfail PolicyVerdict = "tempfail" // PolicyVerdictContinue withholds a terminal DKIM2 decision. PolicyVerdictContinue PolicyVerdict = "continue" )
func (PolicyVerdict) Known ¶
func (v PolicyVerdict) Known() bool
Known reports whether the verdict belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type PrivateKeyHandle ¶
type PrivateKeyHandle struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
PrivateKeyHandle is an opaque immutable reference understood only by a caller-provided PrivateKeySigner.
func NewPrivateKeyHandle ¶
func NewPrivateKeyHandle(identity []byte) (PrivateKeyHandle, error)
NewPrivateKeyHandle constructs an opaque handle from provider-owned identity bytes without retaining or exposing those bytes.
func (PrivateKeyHandle) Format ¶
func (h PrivateKeyHandle) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every handle formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (PrivateKeyHandle) GoString ¶
func (h PrivateKeyHandle) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe handle Go representation.
func (PrivateKeyHandle) String ¶
func (h PrivateKeyHandle) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe handle summary.
func (PrivateKeyHandle) Valid ¶
func (h PrivateKeyHandle) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the handle was constructed from a nonempty identity.
type PrivateKeySignRequest ¶
type PrivateKeySignRequest struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
PrivateKeySignRequest carries only one closed algorithm and the message representative of the Section 12.8 signature input that algorithm signs: the 32-byte SHA-256 digest for rsa-sha256 and ed25519-sha256, and the complete Section 12.8 input bytes for mldsa44, which is pure ML-DSA (Draft-09 Section 3.4: the field values are not hashed first).
func (PrivateKeySignRequest) Algorithm ¶
func (r PrivateKeySignRequest) Algorithm() Algorithm
Algorithm returns the requested signing algorithm.
func (PrivateKeySignRequest) Digest
deprecated
func (r PrivateKeySignRequest) Digest() []byte
Digest returns a copy of the 32-byte SHA-256 signature-input digest for rsa-sha256 and ed25519-sha256. It returns nil for mldsa44, which signs the complete input; use MessageRepresentative for every algorithm.
Deprecated: use MessageRepresentative, which covers every algorithm.
func (PrivateKeySignRequest) Format ¶
func (r PrivateKeySignRequest) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every request formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (PrivateKeySignRequest) GoString ¶
func (r PrivateKeySignRequest) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe request Go representation.
func (PrivateKeySignRequest) MessageRepresentative ¶
func (r PrivateKeySignRequest) MessageRepresentative() []byte
MessageRepresentative returns a copy of the exact bytes the algorithm's signing primitive consumes. A signer passes it unchanged to rsa.SignPKCS1v15 with crypto.SHA256, to ed25519.Sign, or, for mldsa44, to the hedged crypto/mldsa PrivateKey.Sign with MLDSA44SignerOptions (context string "DKIM2").
func (PrivateKeySignRequest) String ¶
func (r PrivateKeySignRequest) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe request summary.
func (PrivateKeySignRequest) Valid ¶
func (r PrivateKeySignRequest) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the request was created by the signing facade.
type PrivateKeySignResult ¶
type PrivateKeySignResult struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
PrivateKeySignResult is the closed immutable result of one digest-signing callback.
func NewPrivateKeySignResult ¶
func NewPrivateKeySignResult(signature []byte) PrivateKeySignResult
NewPrivateKeySignResult constructs a detached successful callback result.
func (PrivateKeySignResult) Format ¶
func (r PrivateKeySignResult) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every result formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (PrivateKeySignResult) GoString ¶
func (r PrivateKeySignResult) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe result Go representation.
func (PrivateKeySignResult) IsZero ¶
func (r PrivateKeySignResult) IsZero() bool
IsZero reports whether no declared callback result is present.
func (PrivateKeySignResult) String ¶
func (r PrivateKeySignResult) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe result summary.
type PrivateKeySigner ¶
type PrivateKeySigner interface {
SignDigest(context.Context, PrivateKeyHandle, PrivateKeySignRequest) (PrivateKeySignResult, error)
}
PrivateKeySigner signs one message representative through an opaque handle. The method keeps its historical name; for mldsa44 the representative is the complete Section 12.8 input, not a digest.
type PropagatedDSN ¶
type PropagatedDSN struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
PropagatedDSN is the signed propagated report with its bounded transport facts.
func (PropagatedDSN) Bytes ¶
func (p PropagatedDSN) Bytes() []byte
Bytes returns a detached copy of the complete signed DSN or nil.
func (PropagatedDSN) EightBitMIMERequired ¶
func (p PropagatedDSN) EightBitMIMERequired() bool
EightBitMIMERequired reports whether the re-injection needs the 8BITMIME extension because the embedded original's body carries a non-ASCII byte.
func (PropagatedDSN) Facts ¶
func (p PropagatedDSN) Facts() SignedMessageFacts
Facts returns the bounded signed-message facts.
func (PropagatedDSN) Format ¶
func (p PropagatedDSN) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every formatting form through the redacted representation.
func (PropagatedDSN) GoString ¶
func (p PropagatedDSN) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe representation.
func (PropagatedDSN) MarshalJSON ¶
func (PropagatedDSN) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects direct serialization outside generated response DTOs.
func (PropagatedDSN) MarshalText ¶
func (PropagatedDSN) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of message bytes.
func (PropagatedDSN) NextHopRecipient ¶
func (p PropagatedDSN) NextHopRecipient() []byte
NextHopRecipient returns a detached copy of the exact bracketed SMTP forward path or nil.
func (PropagatedDSN) SMTPUTF8Required ¶
func (p PropagatedDSN) SMTPUTF8Required() bool
SMTPUTF8Required reports whether the re-injection needs the SMTPUTF8 extension because a header field of the signed DSN carries a non-ASCII byte.
func (PropagatedDSN) SigningDomain ¶
func (p PropagatedDSN) SigningDomain() string
SigningDomain returns the canonical domain that signed the report or an empty string.
func (PropagatedDSN) String ¶
func (PropagatedDSN) String() string
String returns a constant representation without message bytes.
func (PropagatedDSN) Valid ¶
func (p PropagatedDSN) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the value was produced by SignPropagatedDSN.
type ProviderErrorClass ¶
type ProviderErrorClass string
ProviderErrorClass identifies an explicitly classified provider failure.
const ( // ProviderErrorClassTemporary identifies a provider failure that may succeed later. ProviderErrorClassTemporary ProviderErrorClass = "temporary" // ProviderErrorClassPermanent identifies an unrecoverable provider failure. ProviderErrorClassPermanent ProviderErrorClass = "permanent" )
func ProviderErrorClassOf ¶
func ProviderErrorClassOf(err error) ProviderErrorClass
ProviderErrorClassOf returns a known typed provider class or the zero value.
func (ProviderErrorClass) Known ¶
func (c ProviderErrorClass) Known() bool
Known reports whether the class is in the closed provider-error vocabulary.
type PublicKeyProvider ¶
type PublicKeyProvider interface {
LookupPublicKey(context.Context, PublicKeyQuery) (PublicKeyResult, error)
}
PublicKeyProvider resolves static public-key intent without exposing provider-specific models.
The legal return matrix is closed: a zero result may accompany either the active caller context error or a classified temporary or permanent provider error; a declared found, missing, invalid, or ambiguous result must accompany a nil error. Revoked, unsupported-key-type, and algorithm-mismatch results also carry no material and accompany nil error. Every other pair is a provider contract violation. Implementations must not place raw causes, provider metadata, private keys, or signer objects in either return value. A provider-owned deadline while the caller context is live is valid only when classified temporary; permanent or unclassified deadline errors are provider contract violations.
type PublicKeyQuery ¶
type PublicKeyQuery struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
PublicKeyQuery contains only canonical values needed for injected key lookup.
func NewPublicKeyQuery ¶
func NewPublicKeyQuery( signingDomain string, selector string, algorithm Algorithm, ) (PublicKeyQuery, error)
NewPublicKeyQuery constructs one canonical explicit DNS lookup query.
func (PublicKeyQuery) Algorithm ¶
func (q PublicKeyQuery) Algorithm() Algorithm
Algorithm returns the bounded signature algorithm required for lookup.
func (PublicKeyQuery) Format ¶
func (PublicKeyQuery) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting from traversing DNS owner identifiers.
func (PublicKeyQuery) GoString ¶
func (PublicKeyQuery) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without DNS owner identifiers.
func (PublicKeyQuery) MarshalJSON ¶
func (PublicKeyQuery) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects serialization of DNS query identifiers.
func (PublicKeyQuery) MarshalText ¶
func (PublicKeyQuery) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of DNS query identifiers.
func (PublicKeyQuery) Selector ¶
func (q PublicKeyQuery) Selector() string
Selector returns the canonical selector required for lookup.
func (PublicKeyQuery) SigningDomain ¶
func (q PublicKeyQuery) SigningDomain() string
SigningDomain returns the canonical signing domain required for lookup.
func (PublicKeyQuery) String ¶
func (PublicKeyQuery) String() string
String returns a constant representation without DNS owner identifiers.
type PublicKeyResult ¶
type PublicKeyResult struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
PublicKeyResult is a closed immutable provider outcome with explicit public-key variants.
func AlgorithmMismatchPublicKey ¶
func AlgorithmMismatchPublicKey(algorithm Algorithm) PublicKeyResult
AlgorithmMismatchPublicKey constructs a requested-algorithm mismatch result without material.
func AmbiguousPublicKey ¶
func AmbiguousPublicKey(algorithm Algorithm) PublicKeyResult
AmbiguousPublicKey constructs an ambiguous-key result without key material.
func FoundEd25519PublicKey ¶
func FoundEd25519PublicKey(key ed25519.PublicKey) PublicKeyResult
FoundEd25519PublicKey constructs a found Ed25519-SHA256 result with cloned public material.
func FoundMLDSA44PublicKey ¶
func FoundMLDSA44PublicKey(raw []byte) PublicKeyResult
FoundMLDSA44PublicKey constructs a found mldsa44 result from the raw 1312-octet FIPS 204 ML-DSA-44 public-key encoding carried in DNS p=. The material is cloned and structurally validated; any other length, an encoding crypto/mldsa rejects, or a runtime without ML-DSA-44 support (the FIPS 140-3 Go Cryptographic Module v1.0.0) fails closed as an invalid-key result.
func FoundRSAPublicKey ¶
func FoundRSAPublicKey(key *rsa.PublicKey) PublicKeyResult
FoundRSAPublicKey constructs a found RSA-SHA256 result with cloned public material.
func InvalidPublicKey ¶
func InvalidPublicKey(algorithm Algorithm) PublicKeyResult
InvalidPublicKey constructs an invalid-key result without key material.
func MissingPublicKey ¶
func MissingPublicKey(algorithm Algorithm) PublicKeyResult
MissingPublicKey constructs a key-not-found result without key material.
func RevokedPublicKey ¶
func RevokedPublicKey(algorithm Algorithm) PublicKeyResult
RevokedPublicKey constructs an explicitly revoked result without key material.
func UnsupportedKeyTypePublicKey ¶
func UnsupportedKeyTypePublicKey(algorithm Algorithm) PublicKeyResult
UnsupportedKeyTypePublicKey constructs an unsupported DNS key-type result without material.
func (PublicKeyResult) Algorithm ¶
func (r PublicKeyResult) Algorithm() Algorithm
Algorithm returns the declared bounded algorithm family.
func (PublicKeyResult) Ed25519PublicKey ¶
func (r PublicKeyResult) Ed25519PublicKey() (ed25519.PublicKey, bool)
Ed25519PublicKey returns an independent Ed25519 public-key copy when that variant is present.
func (PublicKeyResult) Format ¶
func (PublicKeyResult) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting from traversing public-key material.
func (PublicKeyResult) GoString ¶
func (PublicKeyResult) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without public-key material.
func (PublicKeyResult) IsZero ¶
func (r PublicKeyResult) IsZero() bool
IsZero reports whether no declared provider outcome is present.
func (PublicKeyResult) MLDSA44PublicKey ¶
func (r PublicKeyResult) MLDSA44PublicKey() ([]byte, bool)
MLDSA44PublicKey returns an independent copy of the raw 1312-octet ML-DSA-44 public-key encoding when that variant is present.
func (PublicKeyResult) MarshalJSON ¶
func (PublicKeyResult) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects serialization of provider result material.
func (PublicKeyResult) MarshalText ¶
func (PublicKeyResult) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of provider result material.
func (PublicKeyResult) PublicKeySPKI ¶
func (r PublicKeyResult) PublicKeySPKI() ([]byte, bool)
PublicKeySPKI returns the canonical SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER of the found public key of any variant, so publication tooling can compare DNS results with stored credentials through one encoder.
func (PublicKeyResult) RSAPublicKey ¶
func (r PublicKeyResult) RSAPublicKey() (*rsa.PublicKey, bool)
RSAPublicKey returns an independent RSA public-key copy when that variant is present.
func (PublicKeyResult) Status ¶
func (r PublicKeyResult) Status() PublicKeyStatus
Status returns the declared closed lookup outcome.
func (PublicKeyResult) String ¶
func (PublicKeyResult) String() string
String returns a constant representation without public-key material.
type PublicKeyStatus ¶
type PublicKeyStatus string
PublicKeyStatus identifies a closed key lookup outcome.
const ( // PublicKeyStatusFound reports exactly one declared public key. PublicKeyStatusFound PublicKeyStatus = "found" // PublicKeyStatusMissing reports no matching public key. PublicKeyStatusMissing PublicKeyStatus = "missing" // PublicKeyStatusInvalid reports provider-detected invalid public key state. PublicKeyStatusInvalid PublicKeyStatus = "invalid" // PublicKeyStatusAmbiguous reports more than one matching public key. PublicKeyStatusAmbiguous PublicKeyStatus = "ambiguous" // PublicKeyStatusRevoked reports an explicitly empty DNS public key. PublicKeyStatusRevoked PublicKeyStatus = "revoked" // PublicKeyStatusUnsupportedKeyType reports an unrecognized DNS key type. PublicKeyStatusUnsupportedKeyType PublicKeyStatus = "unsupported_key_type" // PublicKeyStatusAlgorithmMismatch reports disagreement between requested algorithm and DNS key type. PublicKeyStatusAlgorithmMismatch PublicKeyStatus = "algorithm_mismatch" )
func (PublicKeyStatus) Known ¶
func (s PublicKeyStatus) Known() bool
Known reports whether the status is in the closed provider vocabulary.
type PublishedNextDomainCapability ¶
type PublishedNextDomainCapability struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
PublishedNextDomainCapability is opaque fresh single-use publication evidence.
func (PublishedNextDomainCapability) Format ¶
func (c PublishedNextDomainCapability) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every publication-capability formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (PublishedNextDomainCapability) GoString ¶
func (c PublishedNextDomainCapability) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe publication-capability Go representation.
func (PublishedNextDomainCapability) String ¶
func (c PublishedNextDomainCapability) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe publication-capability summary.
func (PublishedNextDomainCapability) Valid ¶
func (c PublishedNextDomainCapability) Valid() bool
Valid reports only whether the capability has an issued coherent shape.
type RSASigningCredential ¶
type RSASigningCredential struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
RSASigningCredential is one immutable RSA-SHA256 public credential paired with an opaque private-key handle.
func NewRSASigningCredential ¶
func NewRSASigningCredential(selector string, publicKey *rsa.PublicKey, handle PrivateKeyHandle) (RSASigningCredential, error)
NewRSASigningCredential validates and snapshots one RSA-SHA256 credential.
func (RSASigningCredential) Format ¶
func (c RSASigningCredential) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every credential formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (RSASigningCredential) GoString ¶
func (c RSASigningCredential) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe credential Go representation.
func (RSASigningCredential) String ¶
func (c RSASigningCredential) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe credential summary.
func (RSASigningCredential) Valid ¶
func (c RSASigningCredential) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the RSA credential remains coherent.
type ReasonCode ¶
type ReasonCode string
ReasonCode identifies a bounded verification reason without retaining raw causes or input.
const ( // AuthenticationReasonDuplicateMessageWithoutExploded reports an unexpected // replay. It is a local delivery-policy rejection (Draft-09 Section 15.1); // the underlying VerifyResult still reports the DKIM2 validity PASS. AuthenticationReasonDuplicateMessageWithoutExploded ReasonCode = "duplicate_message_without_exploded" // AuthenticationReasonReplayIndeterminate reports unavailable or ambiguous replay storage. AuthenticationReasonReplayIndeterminate ReasonCode = "replay_indeterminate" // authenticated m=1 hash declaration identity. AuthenticationReasonReplayEvidenceUnavailable ReasonCode = "replay_evidence_unavailable" )
const ( // ReasonNone reports no failure reason for a successful fact. ReasonNone ReasonCode = "none" // ReasonInvalidRequest reports invalid public request state. ReasonInvalidRequest ReasonCode = "invalid_request" // ReasonLimitExceeded reports a configured resource limit violation. ReasonLimitExceeded ReasonCode = "limit_exceeded" // ReasonMalformedMessage reports malformed RFC 5322 input. ReasonMalformedMessage ReasonCode = "malformed_message" // ReasonMalformedProtocol reports malformed DKIM2 protocol input. ReasonMalformedProtocol ReasonCode = "malformed_protocol" // ReasonDuplicateHashAlgorithm reports any repeated h= algorithm name. ReasonDuplicateHashAlgorithm ReasonCode = "duplicate_hash_algorithm" // ReasonInvalidRecipeJSON reports authenticated recipe text that is not // valid JSON or not a JSON object. ReasonInvalidRecipeJSON ReasonCode = "invalid_recipe_json" // ReasonInvalidRecipe reports valid authenticated recipe JSON whose // schema, steps, or application are invalid (Draft-09 Section 14.2). // Diagnostics never carry the recipe step text. ReasonInvalidRecipe ReasonCode = "invalid_recipe" // ReasonFromNotAuthentic reports a From header field state that is not // Authentic for its responsible signature (Draft-09 Section 14.8). ReasonFromNotAuthentic ReasonCode = "from_not_authentic" // ReasonFromSubdomainForbidden reports a From header field state that // only a subdomain d= makes Authentic while the From domain's Domain // Policy Record carries the strict flag (Draft-09 Sections 3.8, 11.1, and // 14.8; FAIL). ReasonFromSubdomainForbidden ReasonCode = "from_subdomain_forbidden" // ReasonDomainPolicyTemporary reports a Domain Policy Record that could // not be retrieved because of a temporary DNS failure (Draft-09 Sections // 3.8 and 14.1; TEMPERROR). ReasonDomainPolicyTemporary ReasonCode = "domain_policy_temporary" // ReasonDomainPolicyAmbiguous reports more than one Domain Policy Record // beginning with v=DKIM1 (Draft-09 Section 3.8; PERMERROR). ReasonDomainPolicyAmbiguous ReasonCode = "domain_policy_ambiguous" // ReasonDomainPolicyInvalid reports a Domain Policy Record that begins // with v=DKIM1 but is not a valid tag-list, or a permanent lookup failure // (local fail-closed interpretation; PERMERROR). ReasonDomainPolicyInvalid ReasonCode = "domain_policy_invalid" // ReasonDuplicateSelector reports a repeated selector in one signature field. ReasonDuplicateSelector ReasonCode = "duplicate_selector" // ReasonMissingProtocol reports required DKIM2 protocol state is absent. ReasonMissingProtocol ReasonCode = "missing_protocol" // ReasonSequenceInvalid reports invalid instance or signature numbering. ReasonSequenceInvalid ReasonCode = "sequence_invalid" // ReasonUnsupportedAlgorithm reports that no required supported algorithm was checkable. ReasonUnsupportedAlgorithm ReasonCode = "unsupported_algorithm" // ReasonHashMismatch reports a supported current-message hash mismatch. ReasonHashMismatch ReasonCode = "hash_mismatch" // ReasonSignatureMismatch reports a supported cryptographic signature mismatch. ReasonSignatureMismatch ReasonCode = "signature_mismatch" // ReasonMissingKey reports that required public-key material is absent. ReasonMissingKey ReasonCode = "missing_key" // ReasonInvalidKey reports invalid public-key material. ReasonInvalidKey ReasonCode = "invalid_key" // ReasonAmbiguousKey reports ambiguous public-key material. ReasonAmbiguousKey ReasonCode = "ambiguous_key" // ReasonRevokedKey reports an explicitly revoked DNS public key. ReasonRevokedKey ReasonCode = "revoked_key" // ReasonUnsupportedKeyType reports an unsupported DNS key type. ReasonUnsupportedKeyType ReasonCode = "unsupported_key_type" // ReasonKeyAlgorithmMismatch reports disagreement between requested algorithm and DNS key type. ReasonKeyAlgorithmMismatch ReasonCode = "key_algorithm_mismatch" // ReasonProviderTemporary reports a typed temporary provider failure. ReasonProviderTemporary ReasonCode = "provider_temporary" // ReasonProviderPermanent reports a typed permanent provider failure. ReasonProviderPermanent ReasonCode = "provider_permanent" // ReasonProviderContract reports an inconsistent or unclassified provider outcome. ReasonProviderContract ReasonCode = "provider_contract" // ReasonTimestampInvalid reports an expired, future, or unrepresentable timestamp. ReasonTimestampInvalid ReasonCode = "timestamp_invalid" // ReasonEnvelopeMismatch reports current SMTP envelope disagreement. ReasonEnvelopeMismatch ReasonCode = "envelope_mismatch" // ReasonDomainAlignmentMismatch reports signing-domain alignment failure. ReasonDomainAlignmentMismatch ReasonCode = "domain_alignment_mismatch" // ReasonNextDomainMismatch reports structural next-domain disagreement. ReasonNextDomainMismatch ReasonCode = "next_domain_mismatch" // ReasonCustodyMismatch reports a Chain of Custody adjacency failure: an // mf= or d= that does not match the previous signature's rt= (Draft-09 // Sections 7.1 and 14.4). ReasonCustodyMismatch ReasonCode = "custody_mismatch" // ReasonOutOfBandRequired reports a terminal next-domain requiring unmodeled OOB trust. ReasonOutOfBandRequired ReasonCode = "out_of_band_required" // body Recipe, so the message is not a Fully Verified DKIM2 Message // (Draft-09 Section 13). ReasonBodyHistoryUnavailable ReasonCode = "body_history_unavailable" // ReasonInternalContract reports an unknown or inconsistent internal fact. ReasonInternalContract ReasonCode = "internal_contract" )
func (ReasonCode) Known ¶
func (r ReasonCode) Known() bool
Known reports whether the reason belongs to the closed public vocabulary.
type ReceivedDSNEmbedded ¶
type ReceivedDSNEmbedded string
ReceivedDSNEmbedded is the closed embedded member of the delivery_status projection.
const ( // ReceivedDSNEmbeddedVerified reports a verified complete embedded original. ReceivedDSNEmbeddedVerified ReceivedDSNEmbedded = "verified" // ReceivedDSNEmbeddedVerifiedHeadersOnly reports verified header-only embedded evidence. ReceivedDSNEmbeddedVerifiedHeadersOnly ReceivedDSNEmbedded = "verified_headers_only" // ReceivedDSNEmbeddedUnverified reports permanent embedded verification failure. ReceivedDSNEmbeddedUnverified ReceivedDSNEmbedded = "unverified" // ReceivedDSNEmbeddedTemperror reports a temporary DNS or key failure. ReceivedDSNEmbeddedTemperror ReceivedDSNEmbedded = "temperror" // ReceivedDSNEmbeddedAbsent reports an embedded original without any DKIM2-Signature. ReceivedDSNEmbeddedAbsent ReceivedDSNEmbedded = "absent" // ReceivedDSNEmbeddedNotEvaluated reports that the structure stage stopped // the evaluation before any embedded evidence could be assessed. ReceivedDSNEmbeddedNotEvaluated ReceivedDSNEmbedded = "not_evaluated" )
func (ReceivedDSNEmbedded) Known ¶
func (s ReceivedDSNEmbedded) Known() bool
Known reports whether the value belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type ReceivedDSNError ¶
type ReceivedDSNError struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
ReceivedDSNError preserves only a closed failure stage while exposing the caller context error or the public API error through errors.Unwrap.
func (*ReceivedDSNError) Error ¶
func (e *ReceivedDSNError) Error() string
Error returns a bounded diagnostic without message, envelope, or identity data.
func (*ReceivedDSNError) Format ¶
func (e *ReceivedDSNError) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every formatting verb through the bounded diagnostic.
func (*ReceivedDSNError) Stage ¶
func (e *ReceivedDSNError) Stage() ReceivedDSNStage
Stage returns the closed failure stage or the zero value.
func (*ReceivedDSNError) Unwrap ¶
func (e *ReceivedDSNError) Unwrap() error
Unwrap preserves context and API error classification.
type ReceivedDSNEvaluation ¶
type ReceivedDSNEvaluation struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
ReceivedDSNEvaluation is the immutable read-only outcome of one received-DSN evaluation. It exposes only the closed projection and bounded sequence facts; it can never authorize signing and is never an input to a signing route.
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) CompletionSequence ¶
func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) CompletionSequence() uint64
CompletionSequence returns the i= of the verified completion signature or zero.
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) Embedded ¶
func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) Embedded() ReceivedDSNEmbedded
Embedded returns the closed embedded member, which is ReceivedDSNEmbeddedNotEvaluated when the structure stage stopped the evaluation.
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) Format ¶
func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every evaluation formatting form through the redacted representation.
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) GoString ¶
func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe evaluation representation.
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) LocalHop ¶
func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) LocalHop() ReceivedDSNLocalHop
LocalHop returns the closed local_hop member.
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) LocalHopRunLength ¶
func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) LocalHopRunLength() int
LocalHopRunLength returns the number of local run members when the local hop was proven, otherwise zero.
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) MarshalJSON ¶
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects direct serialization outside generated response DTOs.
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) MarshalText ¶
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of sealed evaluation state.
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) OriginalForm ¶
func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) OriginalForm() ReceivedDSNOriginalForm
OriginalForm returns the embedded original representation once structure passed.
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) OuterAlignment ¶
func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) OuterAlignment() ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment
OuterAlignment returns the closed outer_alignment member.
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) Propagation ¶
func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) Propagation() ReceivedDSNPropagation
Propagation returns the closed informational propagation member.
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) RecipientLinkage ¶
func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) RecipientLinkage() ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage
RecipientLinkage returns the closed recipient_linkage member.
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) String ¶
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) String() string
String returns a constant representation without sealed evaluation facts.
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) Structure ¶
func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) Structure() ReceivedDSNStructure
Structure returns the closed structure member.
func (ReceivedDSNEvaluation) Valid ¶
func (e ReceivedDSNEvaluation) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the evaluation was issued by Verifier.EvaluateReceivedDSN and is coherent.
type ReceivedDSNLocalHop ¶
type ReceivedDSNLocalHop string
ReceivedDSNLocalHop is the closed local_hop member of the delivery_status projection.
const ( // ReceivedDSNLocalHopLocal reports a verified, datasource-local completion signature bound to the outer recipient. ReceivedDSNLocalHopLocal ReceivedDSNLocalHop = "local" // ReceivedDSNLocalHopNotLocal reports a completion signature under a domain the tenant does not control. ReceivedDSNLocalHopNotLocal ReceivedDSNLocalHop = "not_local" // ReceivedDSNLocalHopMismatch reports a local domain whose mf= does not bind to the outer recipient or its d=. ReceivedDSNLocalHopMismatch ReceivedDSNLocalHop = "mismatch" // ReceivedDSNLocalHopTemperror reports a temporary datasource failure. ReceivedDSNLocalHopTemperror ReceivedDSNLocalHop = "temperror" // ReceivedDSNLocalHopNotEvaluated reports an earlier stop or the absence of a tenant. ReceivedDSNLocalHopNotEvaluated ReceivedDSNLocalHop = "not_evaluated" )
func (ReceivedDSNLocalHop) Known ¶
func (s ReceivedDSNLocalHop) Known() bool
Known reports whether the value belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type ReceivedDSNOriginalForm ¶
type ReceivedDSNOriginalForm string
ReceivedDSNOriginalForm identifies the embedded original representation.
const ( // ReceivedDSNOriginalComplete identifies a message/rfc822 embedded original. ReceivedDSNOriginalComplete ReceivedDSNOriginalForm = "complete" // ReceivedDSNOriginalHeadersOnly identifies a text/rfc822-headers embedded original. ReceivedDSNOriginalHeadersOnly ReceivedDSNOriginalForm = "headers_only" )
func (ReceivedDSNOriginalForm) Known ¶
func (f ReceivedDSNOriginalForm) Known() bool
Known reports whether the form belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment ¶
type ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment string
ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment is the closed outer_alignment member of the delivery_status projection.
const ( // ReceivedDSNOuterAlignmentAligned reports that the outer signer relaxed-matches a completion rt= domain. ReceivedDSNOuterAlignmentAligned ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment = "aligned" // ReceivedDSNOuterAlignmentMisaligned reports that no completion rt= domain relaxed-matches the outer signer. ReceivedDSNOuterAlignmentMisaligned ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment = "misaligned" // ReceivedDSNOuterAlignmentNotEvaluated reports an earlier stop. ReceivedDSNOuterAlignmentNotEvaluated ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment = "not_evaluated" )
func (ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment) Known ¶
func (s ReceivedDSNOuterAlignment) Known() bool
Known reports whether the value belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type ReceivedDSNPropagation ¶
type ReceivedDSNPropagation string
ReceivedDSNPropagation is the closed informational propagation member of the delivery_status projection.
const ( // ReceivedDSNPropagationNotApplicable reports an embedded original without DKIM2 signatures. ReceivedDSNPropagationNotApplicable ReceivedDSNPropagation = "not_applicable" // ReceivedDSNPropagationEligible reports that a rebuild toward the previous hop can be attempted. ReceivedDSNPropagationEligible ReceivedDSNPropagation = "eligible" // ReceivedDSNPropagationTerminalOrigin reports that this system originated the message. ReceivedDSNPropagationTerminalOrigin ReceivedDSNPropagation = "terminal_origin" // ReceivedDSNPropagationNotFailure reports that no linked group carries Action: failed. ReceivedDSNPropagationNotFailure ReceivedDSNPropagation = "not_failure" // ReceivedDSNPropagationForbiddenNullPreviousSender reports a previous hop with mf=<>. ReceivedDSNPropagationForbiddenNullPreviousSender ReceivedDSNPropagation = "forbidden_null_previous_sender" // ReceivedDSNPropagationForbiddenIdentityMisaligned reports a completion // d= that does not relaxed-match the previous hop's rt= address, so the // propagated report would violate Draft-09 Section 16.2. ReceivedDSNPropagationForbiddenIdentityMisaligned ReceivedDSNPropagation = "forbidden_identity_misaligned" // ReceivedDSNPropagationUnsupportedChain reports an nd= previous hop or a non-verifying run member. ReceivedDSNPropagationUnsupportedChain ReceivedDSNPropagation = "unsupported_chain" // ReceivedDSNPropagationNotReconstructable reports a rebuild-preventing condition visible without a rebuild. ReceivedDSNPropagationNotReconstructable ReceivedDSNPropagation = "not_reconstructable" // ReceivedDSNPropagationNotEvaluated reports an earlier stop or the absence of a tenant. ReceivedDSNPropagationNotEvaluated ReceivedDSNPropagation = "not_evaluated" )
func (ReceivedDSNPropagation) Known ¶
func (s ReceivedDSNPropagation) Known() bool
Known reports whether the value belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage ¶
type ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage string
ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage is the closed recipient_linkage member of the delivery_status projection.
const ( // ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkageLinked reports at least one recipient group naming an authenticated rt= path. ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkageLinked ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage = "linked" // ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkageUnlinked reports that no recipient group names an authenticated rt= path. ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkageUnlinked ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage = "unlinked" // ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkageNotEvaluated reports an earlier stop. ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkageNotEvaluated ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage = "not_evaluated" )
func (ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage) Known ¶
func (s ReceivedDSNRecipientLinkage) Known() bool
Known reports whether the value belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type ReceivedDSNRequest ¶
type ReceivedDSNRequest struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
ReceivedDSNRequest carries cloned outer DSN bytes, the observed null reverse path and single forward path, and the tenant-bound local authority.
func NewReceivedDSNRequest ¶
func NewReceivedDSNRequest(raw, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, authority LocalAuthority) ReceivedDSNRequest
NewReceivedDSNRequest snapshots one received-DSN evaluation request. A nil authority means no tenant is available; locality is then not evaluated.
func (ReceivedDSNRequest) Format ¶
func (r ReceivedDSNRequest) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every request formatting form through the redacted representation.
func (ReceivedDSNRequest) GoString ¶
func (r ReceivedDSNRequest) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe request representation.
func (ReceivedDSNRequest) MarshalJSON ¶
func (ReceivedDSNRequest) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects serialization of message or envelope bytes.
func (ReceivedDSNRequest) MarshalText ¶
func (ReceivedDSNRequest) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of message or envelope bytes.
func (ReceivedDSNRequest) String ¶
func (ReceivedDSNRequest) String() string
String prevents raw DSN or envelope content from reaching diagnostics.
type ReceivedDSNStage ¶
type ReceivedDSNStage string
ReceivedDSNStage identifies one closed received-DSN evaluation stage.
const ( // ReceivedDSNStagePreflight identifies request or evaluator validation. ReceivedDSNStagePreflight ReceivedDSNStage = "preflight" // ReceivedDSNStageStructure identifies RFC 6522 and RFC 3464 structure evaluation. ReceivedDSNStageStructure ReceivedDSNStage = "structure" // ReceivedDSNStageEmbeddedVerification identifies embedded-original verification. ReceivedDSNStageEmbeddedVerification ReceivedDSNStage = "embedded_verification" // ReceivedDSNStageLocalHop identifies local-hop identity and run detection. ReceivedDSNStageLocalHop ReceivedDSNStage = "local_hop" // ReceivedDSNStageOuterAlignment identifies outer signer alignment. ReceivedDSNStageOuterAlignment ReceivedDSNStage = "outer_alignment" // ReceivedDSNStageRecipientLinkage identifies RFC 3464 recipient linkage. ReceivedDSNStageRecipientLinkage ReceivedDSNStage = "recipient_linkage" // ReceivedDSNStageFailureClass identifies propagation-group selection. ReceivedDSNStageFailureClass ReceivedDSNStage = "failure_class" // ReceivedDSNStagePreviousHop identifies previous-hop classification. ReceivedDSNStagePreviousHop ReceivedDSNStage = "previous_hop" )
func ReceivedDSNStageOf ¶
func ReceivedDSNStageOf(err error) ReceivedDSNStage
ReceivedDSNStageOf returns the closed stage only for a typed received-DSN failure.
func (ReceivedDSNStage) Known ¶
func (s ReceivedDSNStage) Known() bool
Known reports whether the stage belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type ReceivedDSNStructure ¶
type ReceivedDSNStructure string
ReceivedDSNStructure is the closed structure member of the delivery_status projection.
const ( // ReceivedDSNStructureValid reports exact RFC 6522 framing and a strict generic RFC 3464 body. ReceivedDSNStructureValid ReceivedDSNStructure = "valid" // ReceivedDSNStructureMalformed reports framing or delivery-status syntax outside the closed profile. ReceivedDSNStructureMalformed ReceivedDSNStructure = "malformed" // ReceivedDSNStructureLimitExceeded reports a DSN parser resource limit violation. ReceivedDSNStructureLimitExceeded ReceivedDSNStructure = "limit_exceeded" )
func (ReceivedDSNStructure) Known ¶
func (s ReceivedDSNStructure) Known() bool
Known reports whether the value belongs to the closed vocabulary.
type RecipeLiteralPolicy ¶
type RecipeLiteralPolicy uint8
RecipeLiteralPolicy controls whether a generated inverse recipe may disclose literals.
const ( // RecipeCopyOnly forbids embedding previous content as literals. RecipeCopyOnly RecipeLiteralPolicy = iota // RecipeAllowLiterals permits bounded literal disclosure. RecipeAllowLiterals )
func (RecipeLiteralPolicy) Known ¶
func (p RecipeLiteralPolicy) Known() bool
Known reports whether policy belongs to the closed recipe vocabulary.
type RecordedHop ¶
type RecordedHop struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
RecordedHop is one DKIM2 hop as the message's header fields record it: who signed, which Message-Instance it signed and what its Recipe says it changed. It is NOT verified. A mail client or other consumer may present it only for a message that a verifier it trusts (for example its own receiving server, through its Authentication-Results) reported as PASS; such a PASS covers the complete chain and therefore every recorded field.
func DescribeRecordedChain ¶
func DescribeRecordedChain(rawMessage []byte) ([]RecordedHop, error)
DescribeRecordedChain returns the DKIM2 hops recorded in rawMessage, ordered by sequence, or none for a message without DKIM2 fields. rawMessage must keep its CRLF line endings; only the header section is parsed (the body is neither needed nor copied), with the verifier's extraction and collection rules under the default limits. No key is looked up and nothing is verified, so the result is a description, not evidence. Malformed, over-limit or otherwise unusable input yields an invalid_request error instead of a partial chain.
func (RecordedHop) Format ¶
func (RecordedHop) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting verbs from exposing message-derived facts.
func (RecordedHop) GoString ¶
func (RecordedHop) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without message-derived facts.
func (RecordedHop) IntroducesInstance ¶
func (h RecordedHop) IntroducesInstance() bool
IntroducesInstance reports whether this hop produced its Message-Instance; a later hop signing the same instance only relayed the message unchanged.
func (RecordedHop) MessageInstance ¶
func (h RecordedHop) MessageInstance() uint64
MessageInstance returns the recorded Message-Instance number (m=) the hop signed.
func (RecordedHop) Recipe ¶
func (h RecordedHop) Recipe() VerifierRecipeDescriptor
Recipe returns the privacy-minimized descriptor of the recorded Recipe: affected header names, change classes and the body mode, never header values or body content.
func (RecordedHop) RecipeMode ¶
func (h RecordedHop) RecipeMode() string
RecipeMode returns applied when the hop recorded a Recipe for its revision, else unchanged.
func (RecordedHop) Sequence ¶
func (h RecordedHop) Sequence() uint64
Sequence returns the recorded signature sequence (i=).
func (RecordedHop) SignerDomain ¶
func (h RecordedHop) SignerDomain() string
SignerDomain returns the recorded canonical signer domain (d=), in its A-label form.
func (RecordedHop) String ¶
func (RecordedHop) String() string
String returns a constant representation without message-derived facts.
func (RecordedHop) Valid ¶
func (h RecordedHop) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the hop carries coherent recorded facts.
type ReplayCheck ¶
ReplayCheck identifies one successful replay-store outcome.
type ReplayClock ¶
ReplayClock supplies one deterministic operation time to the memory store.
type ReplayClockFunc ¶
ReplayClockFunc adapts one function to the memory-store clock seam.
type ReplayCountingPolicy ¶
type ReplayCountingPolicy struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
ReplayCountingPolicy is the local delivery policy that decides which authenticated messages replay detection counts (Draft-09 Section 15.1). It is the single owner of that decision for every replay path. The zero value is the default: only messages re-sent by an intermediary are counted.
func DirectDeliveryReplayCountingPolicy ¶
func DirectDeliveryReplayCountingPolicy() ReplayCountingPolicy
DirectDeliveryReplayCountingPolicy also counts direct deliveries that carry only the originator's i=1 signature.
func (ReplayCountingPolicy) Counts ¶
func (p ReplayCountingPolicy) Counts(identities ReplayIdentitySet) bool
Counts reports whether replay detection counts the message of a valid identity set under this policy.
func (ReplayCountingPolicy) CountsDirectDeliveries ¶
func (p ReplayCountingPolicy) CountsDirectDeliveries() bool
CountsDirectDeliveries reports whether i=1-only messages are counted.
type ReplayDeriver ¶
ReplayDeriver owns one cloned deployment-local HMAC secret and its lifecycle.
func NewReplayDeriver ¶
func NewReplayDeriver(secret []byte, epoch uint32) (*ReplayDeriver, error)
NewReplayDeriver validates and clones one exact replay-key secret and epoch.
type ReplayDisabledStore ¶
type ReplayDisabledStore = replay.DisabledStore
ReplayDisabledStore is an explicit no-storage replay provider.
func NewReplayDisabledStore ¶
func NewReplayDisabledStore() *ReplayDisabledStore
NewReplayDisabledStore constructs one explicit disabled replay provider.
type ReplayError ¶
ReplayError is one typed content-free replay failure.
type ReplayErrorCode ¶
ReplayErrorCode identifies one stable replay failure class.
func ReplayErrorCodeOf ¶
func ReplayErrorCodeOf(err error) ReplayErrorCode
ReplayErrorCodeOf returns the stable code for one direct replay failure.
type ReplayIdentity ¶
ReplayIdentity is one immutable message-wide authenticated replay identity.
type ReplayIdentitySet ¶
type ReplayIdentitySet = replay.IdentitySet //nolint:staticcheck // Public compatibility remains until the documented API window closes.
ReplayIdentitySet is the compatibility container for one message-wide identity.
func ReplayIdentities ¶
func ReplayIdentities(result VerifyResult) (ReplayIdentitySet, error)
ReplayIdentities adapts only one coherent verifier-owned aggregate-current-PASS projection.
type ReplayLease ¶
ReplayLease is an immutable validated whole-millisecond propagation pending lease.
func NewReplayLease ¶
func NewReplayLease(duration time.Duration) (ReplayLease, error)
NewReplayLease validates and constructs one propagation pending lease.
type ReplayLimits ¶
ReplayLimits contains reusable hard-bounded replay-provider resources.
type ReplayMemoryConfig ¶
type ReplayMemoryConfig struct {
Limits ReplayLimits
Clock ReplayClock
}
ReplayMemoryConfig contains bounded resources and a required injected clock.
type ReplayMemoryStore ¶
type ReplayMemoryStore = replay.MemoryStore
ReplayMemoryStore is a deterministic bounded heap-expiring replay provider.
func NewReplayMemoryStore ¶
func NewReplayMemoryStore(config ReplayMemoryConfig) (*ReplayMemoryStore, error)
NewReplayMemoryStore validates and constructs one bounded memory replay provider.
type ReplayNonce ¶
ReplayNonce is one random write identity embedded in a stored replay value so a retried provider write recognizes its own earlier commit.
func NewReplayNonce ¶
func NewReplayNonce(random io.Reader) (ReplayNonce, error)
NewReplayNonce reads one non-zero nonce from random, or from crypto/rand when random is nil.
func ParseReplayFirstSeenValue ¶
func ParseReplayFirstSeenValue(value string) (nonce ReplayNonce, legacy bool, ok bool)
ParseReplayFirstSeenValue decodes one stored first-seen value, accepting the nonce-bearing form and the legacy ReplayStoredValue.
type ReplayPropagationCommit ¶
type ReplayPropagationCommit = replay.PropagationCommit
ReplayPropagationCommit identifies one successful propagation commit outcome.
type ReplayPropagationReservation ¶
type ReplayPropagationReservation = replay.PropagationReservation
ReplayPropagationReservation identifies one successful propagation reservation outcome.
type ReplayPropagationState ¶
type ReplayPropagationState = replay.PropagationState
ReplayPropagationState is the closed stored state of one propagation coordinate.
func ParseReplayPropagationValue ¶
func ParseReplayPropagationValue(value string) (ReplayPropagationState, time.Time, bool)
ParseReplayPropagationValue decodes one stored propagation value in the committed, nonce-bearing pending, or legacy pending form.
type ReplayPropagationStore ¶
type ReplayPropagationStore interface {
ReservePropagation(context.Context, ReplayKey, ReplayRetention, ReplayLease) (ReplayPropagationReservation, error)
CommitPropagation(context.Context, ReplayKey) (ReplayPropagationCommit, error)
}
ReplayPropagationStore reserves and commits propagation coordinates in two phases.
type ReplayRetention ¶
ReplayRetention is an immutable validated whole-millisecond retention period.
func DefaultReplayRetention ¶
func DefaultReplayRetention() ReplayRetention
DefaultReplayRetention returns the frozen fourteen-day default.
func NewReplayRetention ¶
func NewReplayRetention(duration time.Duration) (ReplayRetention, error)
NewReplayRetention validates and constructs one replay retention period.
type ReplayStore ¶
type ReplayStore interface {
CheckAndRemember(context.Context, ReplayKey, ReplayRetention) (ReplayCheck, error)
}
ReplayStore atomically checks and retains replay identities.
type ReplayStoreState ¶
type ReplayStoreState = replay.StoreState
ReplayStoreState identifies one bounded replay-store lifecycle state.
type ResultState ¶
type ResultState string
ResultState identifies one of the four public DKIM2 verification outcomes.
const ( // ResultStatePASS reports complete success for the declared authenticated scope. ResultStatePASS ResultState = "PASS" // ResultStateFAIL reports that verification completed and the message is // not a Fully Verified DKIM2 Message (Draft-09 Section 14.1). ResultStateFAIL ResultState = "FAIL" // ResultStatePERMERROR reports unrecoverable malformed, missing, unsupported, or ambiguous state. ResultStatePERMERROR ResultState = "PERMERROR" // ResultStateTEMPERROR reports a typed temporary public-key-provider failure. ResultStateTEMPERROR ResultState = "TEMPERROR" )
func (ResultState) Known ¶
func (s ResultState) Known() bool
Known reports whether the result state belongs to the closed four-state vocabulary.
type RevisionVerification ¶
type RevisionVerification struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
RevisionVerification is one initialized dedicated revision outcome.
func (RevisionVerification) Format ¶
func (r RevisionVerification) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every outcome formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (RevisionVerification) GoString ¶
func (r RevisionVerification) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe outcome Go representation.
func (RevisionVerification) Status ¶
func (r RevisionVerification) Status() RevisionVerificationStatus
Status returns the closed revision outcome.
func (RevisionVerification) String ¶
func (r RevisionVerification) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe outcome summary.
func (RevisionVerification) Valid ¶
func (r RevisionVerification) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the outcome was produced by VerifyForRevision.
type RevisionVerificationStatus ¶
type RevisionVerificationStatus string
RevisionVerificationStatus identifies one dedicated all-hop revision outcome.
const ( // RevisionVerificationVerified reports complete ordinary proof. RevisionVerificationVerified RevisionVerificationStatus = "verified" // RevisionVerificationTerminalNextDomainAuthorizationRequired reports a // clean terminal nd= chain that requires authorized completion or continuation. RevisionVerificationTerminalNextDomainAuthorizationRequired RevisionVerificationStatus = "terminal_next_domain_authorization_required" // RevisionVerificationProtocolRejected reports rejected inherited evidence. RevisionVerificationProtocolRejected RevisionVerificationStatus = "protocol_rejected" // RevisionVerificationUnsupported reports unsupported-only inherited evidence. RevisionVerificationUnsupported RevisionVerificationStatus = "unsupported" // RevisionVerificationProviderTemporary reports retryable key lookup failure. RevisionVerificationProviderTemporary RevisionVerificationStatus = "provider_temporary" // RevisionVerificationProviderRejected reports permanent key rejection. RevisionVerificationProviderRejected RevisionVerificationStatus = "provider_rejected" // RevisionVerificationProviderContract reports an illegal provider matrix. RevisionVerificationProviderContract RevisionVerificationStatus = "provider_contract" // RevisionVerificationLimitExceeded reports exhausted verification bounds. RevisionVerificationLimitExceeded RevisionVerificationStatus = "limit_exceeded" )
func (RevisionVerificationStatus) Known ¶
func (s RevisionVerificationStatus) Known() bool
Known reports whether status belongs to the closed revision vocabulary.
type RouteAuthorityResult ¶
type RouteAuthorityResult struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
RouteAuthorityResult is one closed authority callback result.
func NewRouteIssuedResult ¶
func NewRouteIssuedResult(query RouteFinalizeQuery, parentID, parentSeal [sha256.Size]byte, ticketIDs, ticketSeals [][sha256.Size]byte) RouteAuthorityResult
NewRouteIssuedResult constructs exact fanout issuance bound to the supplied query.
func NewRouteTransitionResult ¶
func NewRouteTransitionResult(status RouteAuthorityStatus, query RouteTicketQuery, replacementIDs, replacementSeals [][sha256.Size]byte) RouteAuthorityResult
NewRouteTransitionResult constructs an exact ticket transition acknowledgement.
func RouteDeniedResult ¶
func RouteDeniedResult() RouteAuthorityResult
RouteDeniedResult constructs the sole content-free authority denial.
func (RouteAuthorityResult) Format ¶
func (r RouteAuthorityResult) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every result formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (RouteAuthorityResult) GoString ¶
func (r RouteAuthorityResult) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe authority-result Go representation.
func (RouteAuthorityResult) IsZero ¶
func (r RouteAuthorityResult) IsZero() bool
IsZero reports whether no authority outcome was declared.
func (RouteAuthorityResult) String ¶
func (r RouteAuthorityResult) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe authority-result summary.
type RouteAuthorityStatus ¶
type RouteAuthorityStatus string
RouteAuthorityStatus identifies a method-specific authority outcome.
const ( // RouteAuthorityIssued reports successful parent and ticket issuance. RouteAuthorityIssued RouteAuthorityStatus = "issued" // RouteAuthorityReserved reports successful atomic reservation. RouteAuthorityReserved RouteAuthorityStatus = "reserved" // RouteAuthorityReleased reports successful pre-boundary release. RouteAuthorityReleased RouteAuthorityStatus = "released" // RouteAuthorityBurned reports successful external-boundary commitment. RouteAuthorityBurned RouteAuthorityStatus = "burned" // RouteAuthorityReplacementIssued reports successful same-lineage replacement. RouteAuthorityReplacementIssued RouteAuthorityStatus = "replacement_issued" // RouteAuthorityConsumed reports successful restricted release consumption. RouteAuthorityConsumed RouteAuthorityStatus = "consumed" // RouteAuthorityDenied reports a content-free authority denial. RouteAuthorityDenied RouteAuthorityStatus = "denied" )
func (RouteAuthorityStatus) Known ¶
func (s RouteAuthorityStatus) Known() bool
Known reports whether status belongs to the closed route authority vocabulary.
type RouteCopyTicket ¶
type RouteCopyTicket struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
RouteCopyTicket is one immutable non-reusable exact-copy capability.
func (RouteCopyTicket) Format ¶
func (t RouteCopyTicket) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every ticket formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (RouteCopyTicket) GoString ¶
func (t RouteCopyTicket) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe ticket Go representation.
func (RouteCopyTicket) String ¶
func (t RouteCopyTicket) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe ticket summary.
func (RouteCopyTicket) TotalMultiplicity ¶
func (t RouteCopyTicket) TotalMultiplicity() int
TotalMultiplicity returns the sealed parent fanout copy count.
func (RouteCopyTicket) Valid ¶
func (t RouteCopyTicket) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the ticket carries a coherent authority seal.
type RouteDisclosure ¶
type RouteDisclosure string
RouteDisclosure identifies one closed recipient-disclosure shape.
const ( // RouteDisclosureSingle identifies one ordinary disclosed recipient. RouteDisclosureSingle RouteDisclosure = "single" // RouteDisclosureAuthorizedGroup identifies an explicitly authorized recipient group. RouteDisclosureAuthorizedGroup RouteDisclosure = "authorized_group" // RouteDisclosureBccSeparated identifies a privacy-preserving one-recipient copy. RouteDisclosureBccSeparated RouteDisclosure = "bcc_separated" )
func (RouteDisclosure) Known ¶
func (d RouteDisclosure) Known() bool
Known reports whether the disclosure belongs to the closed route vocabulary.
type RouteEntry ¶
type RouteEntry struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
RouteEntry is one immutable intended signing output copy.
func NewDeliveryStatusPropagationRouteEntry ¶
func NewDeliveryStatusPropagationRouteEntry(source SigningSource, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, routeScope []byte) (RouteEntry, error)
NewDeliveryStatusPropagationRouteEntry constructs one exact propagated-DSN route descriptor: purpose delivery_status_propagation, disclosure single, class external, the null reverse path, and exactly one forward path, the authenticated previous-hop mf= of the rebuilt report. It is purpose-separated from DSN signing and originator tickets so that neither can authorize a propagation and a propagation ticket can authorize nothing else.
func NewDeliveryStatusRouteEntry ¶
func NewDeliveryStatusRouteEntry(source SigningSource, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, disclosure RouteDisclosure, routeScope []byte) (RouteEntry, error)
NewDeliveryStatusRouteEntry constructs one exact DSN route descriptor. It is purpose-separated from originator tickets so a generic signing ticket cannot authorize a null reverse-path delivery-status operation.
func NewExistingRouteEntry ¶
func NewExistingRouteEntry(capability VerifiedRevisionInput, source SigningSource, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, disclosure RouteDisclosure, routeScope []byte) (RouteEntry, error)
NewExistingRouteEntry constructs one exact forwarding or revision route descriptor bound to a verified revision capability.
func NewInControlExistingRouteEntry ¶
func NewInControlExistingRouteEntry( capability VerifiedRevisionInput, source SigningSource, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, disclosure RouteDisclosure, routeScope, receiverBinding []byte, ) (RouteEntry, error)
NewInControlExistingRouteEntry constructs an existing-message route that stays under the operator's control; inbound receiver evidence is required exactly for terminal next-domain completion and absent for ordinary predecessors.
func NewNextDomainContinuationRouteEntry ¶
func NewNextDomainContinuationRouteEntry( capability VerifiedRevisionInput, source SigningSource, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, disclosure RouteDisclosure, routeScope, inboundReceiverBinding, outboundReceiverBinding []byte, ) (RouteEntry, error)
NewNextDomainContinuationRouteEntry constructs one exact terminal nd= route with independently sealed inbound and outbound OOB receiver evidence.
func NewNextDomainRouteEntry ¶
func NewNextDomainRouteEntry( capability VerifiedRevisionInput, source SigningSource, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, disclosure RouteDisclosure, routeScope, receiverBinding []byte, ) (RouteEntry, error)
NewNextDomainRouteEntry constructs one outbound-only OOB route for creating a terminal nd= signature from an ordinary predecessor.
func NewOriginatorRouteEntry ¶
func NewOriginatorRouteEntry(source SigningSource, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, disclosure RouteDisclosure, routeScope []byte) (RouteEntry, error)
NewOriginatorRouteEntry constructs one exact originator route descriptor.
func NewReceiverBoundExistingRouteEntry ¶
func NewReceiverBoundExistingRouteEntry( capability VerifiedRevisionInput, source SigningSource, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte, disclosure RouteDisclosure, routeScope, receiverBinding []byte, ) (RouteEntry, error)
NewReceiverBoundExistingRouteEntry constructs an ordinary external route carrying exact inbound OOB receiver-transaction evidence for nd completion.
func (RouteEntry) Format ¶
func (e RouteEntry) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every route-entry formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (RouteEntry) GoString ¶
func (e RouteEntry) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe route-entry Go representation.
func (RouteEntry) String ¶
func (e RouteEntry) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe route-entry summary.
type RouteFanoutAuthority ¶
type RouteFanoutAuthority interface {
Finalize(context.Context, RouteFinalizeQuery) (RouteAuthorityResult, error)
Reserve(context.Context, RouteTicketQuery) (RouteAuthorityResult, error)
ReleaseReservation(context.Context, RouteTicketQuery) (RouteAuthorityResult, error)
Burn(context.Context, RouteTicketQuery) (RouteAuthorityResult, error)
Replace(context.Context, RouteTicketQuery) (RouteAuthorityResult, error)
ConsumeRelease(context.Context, RouteTicketQuery) (RouteAuthorityResult, error)
}
RouteFanoutAuthority owns issuance and atomic ticket transitions.
func NewRequestRouteAuthority ¶
func NewRequestRouteAuthority() RouteFanoutAuthority
NewRequestRouteAuthority constructs one operation-scoped in-memory route authority. Callers must create a fresh value per request and discard it after the resulting signing operation completes.
type RouteFanoutPlan ¶
type RouteFanoutPlan struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
RouteFanoutPlan is the immutable finalized parent route plan.
func (RouteFanoutPlan) CopyCount ¶
func (p RouteFanoutPlan) CopyCount() int
CopyCount returns the exact finalized multiplicity.
func (RouteFanoutPlan) Format ¶
func (p RouteFanoutPlan) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every plan formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (RouteFanoutPlan) GoString ¶
func (p RouteFanoutPlan) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe route-plan Go representation.
func (RouteFanoutPlan) String ¶
func (p RouteFanoutPlan) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe route-plan summary.
func (RouteFanoutPlan) Valid ¶
func (p RouteFanoutPlan) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the plan carries a coherent authority seal.
type RouteFanoutRequest ¶
type RouteFanoutRequest struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
RouteFanoutRequest snapshots one complete ordered collection of intended copies.
func NewRouteFanoutRequest ¶
func NewRouteFanoutRequest(entries []RouteEntry) (RouteFanoutRequest, error)
NewRouteFanoutRequest constructs a complete immutable fanout request.
func (RouteFanoutRequest) Format ¶
func (r RouteFanoutRequest) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every request formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (RouteFanoutRequest) GoString ¶
func (r RouteFanoutRequest) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe fanout-request Go representation.
func (RouteFanoutRequest) String ¶
func (r RouteFanoutRequest) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe fanout-request summary.
type RouteFinalizeQuery ¶
type RouteFinalizeQuery struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
RouteFinalizeQuery carries only opaque exact fanout bindings to an authority.
func (RouteFinalizeQuery) BindingDigest ¶
func (q RouteFinalizeQuery) BindingDigest(index int) []byte
BindingDigest returns a detached exact binding digest by ordered index.
func (RouteFinalizeQuery) Count ¶
func (q RouteFinalizeQuery) Count() int
Count returns the coupled copy and ticket count.
func (RouteFinalizeQuery) Format ¶
func (q RouteFinalizeQuery) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every query formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (RouteFinalizeQuery) GoString ¶
func (q RouteFinalizeQuery) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe query Go representation.
func (RouteFinalizeQuery) String ¶
func (q RouteFinalizeQuery) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe query summary.
func (RouteFinalizeQuery) Valid ¶
func (q RouteFinalizeQuery) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the query has a complete authority-bound shape.
type RouteTicketQuery ¶
type RouteTicketQuery struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
RouteTicketQuery carries only opaque exact ticket-transition identities.
func (RouteTicketQuery) BindingIdentity ¶
func (q RouteTicketQuery) BindingIdentity() [sha256.Size]byte
BindingIdentity returns the opaque exact-copy binding.
func (RouteTicketQuery) CapabilitySeal ¶
func (q RouteTicketQuery) CapabilitySeal() [sha256.Size]byte
CapabilitySeal returns the opaque authority-issued ticket seal.
func (RouteTicketQuery) Format ¶
func (q RouteTicketQuery) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every query formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (RouteTicketQuery) GoString ¶
func (q RouteTicketQuery) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe query Go representation.
func (RouteTicketQuery) ParentIdentity ¶
func (q RouteTicketQuery) ParentIdentity() [sha256.Size]byte
ParentIdentity returns the opaque parent identity.
func (RouteTicketQuery) String ¶
func (q RouteTicketQuery) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe query summary.
func (RouteTicketQuery) TicketIdentity ¶
func (q RouteTicketQuery) TicketIdentity() [sha256.Size]byte
TicketIdentity returns the opaque ticket identity.
func (RouteTicketQuery) Valid ¶
func (q RouteTicketQuery) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether every opaque transition identity is present.
type SignatureSetFact ¶
type SignatureSetFact struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
SignatureSetFact records one bounded algorithm-family and signature-set outcome.
func (SignatureSetFact) Algorithm ¶
func (f SignatureSetFact) Algorithm() Algorithm
Algorithm returns the bounded signature algorithm family.
func (SignatureSetFact) Format ¶
func (SignatureSetFact) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting from traversing the message-derived selector.
func (SignatureSetFact) GoString ¶
func (SignatureSetFact) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without the selector.
func (SignatureSetFact) Reason ¶
func (f SignatureSetFact) Reason() ReasonCode
Reason returns the bounded signature-set reason.
func (SignatureSetFact) Selector ¶
func (f SignatureSetFact) Selector() (string, bool)
Selector returns the parsed selector of a non-passing set (Draft-09 Section 14.6 step 8); a passing set and an internal-contract fact carry none.
func (SignatureSetFact) Status ¶
func (f SignatureSetFact) Status() SignatureStatus
Status returns the bounded signature-set status.
func (SignatureSetFact) String ¶
func (SignatureSetFact) String() string
String returns a constant representation so formatting never carries the message-derived selector; callers read it explicitly through Selector.
type SignatureStatus ¶
type SignatureStatus string
SignatureStatus identifies a bounded per-signature-set outcome.
const ( // SignatureStatusPASS reports a supported passing signature set. SignatureStatusPASS SignatureStatus = "pass" // SignatureStatusFAIL reports a supported failing signature set. SignatureStatusFAIL SignatureStatus = "fail" // SignatureStatusPERMERROR reports permanent key or protocol state for the // set, including an unknown or locally disabled algorithm. SignatureStatusPERMERROR SignatureStatus = "permerror" // SignatureStatusTEMPERROR reports typed temporary provider state for the set. SignatureStatusTEMPERROR SignatureStatus = "temperror" )
func (SignatureStatus) Known ¶
func (s SignatureStatus) Known() bool
Known reports whether the signature status belongs to the closed public vocabulary.
type SignedMessageFacts ¶
type SignedMessageFacts struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
SignedMessageFacts contains bounded immutable non-secret operation facts.
func (SignedMessageFacts) Algorithms ¶
func (f SignedMessageFacts) Algorithms() []Algorithm
Algorithms returns detached generated algorithms in canonical order.
func (SignedMessageFacts) Authorizations ¶
func (f SignedMessageFacts) Authorizations() []SigningAuthorizationFact
Authorizations returns detached completed authorization facts.
func (SignedMessageFacts) BodyUnavailable ¶
func (f SignedMessageFacts) BodyUnavailable() bool
BodyUnavailable reports whether the revision emitted explicit b:null.
func (SignedMessageFacts) BodyUnavailableReason ¶
func (f SignedMessageFacts) BodyUnavailableReason() SigningBodyUnavailableReason
BodyUnavailableReason returns the bounded reason only for explicit b:null.
func (SignedMessageFacts) EnvelopeForm ¶
func (f SignedMessageFacts) EnvelopeForm() SigningEnvelopeForm
EnvelopeForm returns the generated signature envelope form.
func (SignedMessageFacts) Flags ¶
func (f SignedMessageFacts) Flags() []SignedMessageFlag
Flags returns detached generated known flags.
func (SignedMessageFacts) Format ¶
func (f SignedMessageFacts) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every facts formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (SignedMessageFacts) GoString ¶
func (f SignedMessageFacts) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe facts Go representation.
func (SignedMessageFacts) Multiplicity ¶
func (f SignedMessageFacts) Multiplicity() int
Multiplicity returns the sealed parent fanout copy count.
func (SignedMessageFacts) NewInstanceNumber ¶
func (f SignedMessageFacts) NewInstanceNumber() uint64
NewInstanceNumber returns the emitted m= number or zero.
func (SignedMessageFacts) RecipeOutcome ¶
func (f SignedMessageFacts) RecipeOutcome() SigningRecipeOutcome
RecipeOutcome returns whether an inverse recipe was emitted.
func (SignedMessageFacts) Restriction ¶
func (f SignedMessageFacts) Restriction() SigningRestriction
Restriction returns the strongest closed output restriction.
func (SignedMessageFacts) Role ¶
func (f SignedMessageFacts) Role() SigningRole
Role returns the exact hash-derived role.
func (SignedMessageFacts) Sequence ¶
func (f SignedMessageFacts) Sequence() uint64
Sequence returns the emitted i= number.
func (SignedMessageFacts) String ¶
func (f SignedMessageFacts) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe facts summary.
func (SignedMessageFacts) Valid ¶
func (f SignedMessageFacts) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether every closed fact correlation is coherent.
type SignedMessageFlag ¶
type SignedMessageFlag string
SignedMessageFlag identifies one emitted known protocol flag.
const ( // SignedMessageFlagFeedback reports emitted feedback. SignedMessageFlagFeedback SignedMessageFlag = "feedback" // SignedMessageFlagFeedHere reports emitted feedhere. SignedMessageFlagFeedHere SignedMessageFlag = "feedhere" // SignedMessageFlagExploded reports emitted exploded. SignedMessageFlagExploded SignedMessageFlag = "exploded" )
func (SignedMessageFlag) Known ¶
func (f SignedMessageFlag) Known() bool
Known reports whether flag belongs to the emitted closed vocabulary.
type Signer ¶
type Signer struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
Signer owns revision proof, fanout planning, authorization, publication, private signing, insertion, and final atomic proof for all three signing paths.
func NewSigner ¶
func NewSigner(publicKeys PublicKeyProvider, routes RouteFanoutAuthority, authorizer SigningAuthorizer, privateKeys PrivateKeySigner, options ...SignerOption) (*Signer, error)
NewSigner constructs the complete three-path signing facade.
Its incoming-chain verification (VerifyForRevision) requires the same explicit Draft-09 Section 11.1 choice as NewVerifier: publicKeys also implements DomainPolicyProvider, WithSignerDomainPolicyProvider is passed, or WithoutSignerSubdomainFromAuthorization is passed; otherwise construction fails with SigningErrorInvalidOptions. The signer's own d= choice stays downward only (disposition D8).
func (*Signer) EvaluateDSNForSigning ¶
func (s *Signer) EvaluateDSNForSigning(ctx context.Context, request DSNSigningEvidenceRequest) (DSNSigningEvidence, error)
EvaluateDSNForSigning derives the opaque pre-policy authorization for a null reverse-path DSN after RFC 6522/3464 structure and recipient linkage, embedded DKIM2 verification, and outer-recipient binding all pass. It never touches a signing profile; ResolveDSNSigningIdentity selects the Draft-09 Section 16.2 signing identity afterwards. A returned original without any DKIM2-Signature header field fails with DSNEvidenceStageEmbeddedUnsigned; one that carries such a field always takes the strict verification path.
func (*Signer) IssueNextDomainPublication ¶
func (s *Signer) IssueNextDomainPublication(ctx context.Context, request NextDomainPublicationRequest) (PublishedNextDomainCapability, error)
IssueNextDomainPublication performs one fresh authoritative publication lookup.
func (*Signer) PlanPropagationRoute ¶
func (s *Signer) PlanPropagationRoute(ctx context.Context, evidence DSNPropagationEvidence, routeScope []byte) (RouteCopyTicket, error)
PlanPropagationRoute plans exactly one delivery_status_propagation route ticket over the rebuilt report that the evidence carries. The ticket source is the report's own bytes, so it matches the message SignPropagatedDSN signs; the reverse path is null, the single forward path is the authenticated previous-hop mf=, and the disclosure and route class are the fixed single external shape. Neither the caller nor the route scope can select the recipient or the signing domain: both stay derived from the removed completion signature and the verified previous hop.
func (*Signer) PlanRouteFanout ¶
func (s *Signer) PlanRouteFanout(ctx context.Context, request RouteFanoutRequest) (RouteFanoutPlan, []RouteCopyTicket, error)
PlanRouteFanout finalizes one complete intended fanout and returns its exact tickets.
func (*Signer) RebuildDSNForPropagation ¶
func (s *Signer) RebuildDSNForPropagation(ctx context.Context, request DSNPropagationRequest) (DSNPropagationEvidence, error)
RebuildDSNForPropagation evaluates one received DSN under Draft-09 Section 16.4 with the signer's own verifier and, when the evaluation is eligible, rebuilds it under Section 16.3 into an unsigned report addressed to the authenticated previous hop. The signing domain is the canonical d= of the removed completion signature; neither the request nor the adapter can select it. Protocol outcomes are returned in the evidence; only invalid requests, cancellation, and internal contract violations return a Go error.
func (*Signer) ResolveDSNSigningIdentity ¶
func (s *Signer) ResolveDSNSigningIdentity(ctx context.Context, evidence DSNSigningEvidence, source DSNProfileSource) (DSNSigningEvidence, SigningProfile, error)
ResolveDSNSigningIdentity is the single owner of the Draft-09 Section 16.2 DSN signing identity. It walks the candidates of dsn.Evidence.SigningIdentityCandidates (domains that relaxed-match an rt= address of the highest DKIM2-Signature of the reported message, RFC 3464 linked recipients first, then the preferred identity, then the most specific domain) and binds the first candidate that has a local delivery_status profile and makes the report's own From header field Authentic (Sections 11 and 12.4) through the downward match only: the DSN identity resolver never uses a subdomain d= to make a parent From Authentic and never queries a Domain Policy Record (Sections 11.1 and 12.4, local disposition D8). It returns the bound evidence and that profile.
No candidate with a profile yields DSNEvidenceStageIdentityUnavailable; candidates with a profile that all leave the From non-Authentic yield DSNEvidenceStageFromNotAuthentic. Both are explicit "cannot be DKIM2 signed" outcomes, never a fallback to another domain. A profile source error, a profile for a different domain, or cancellation fails with DSNEvidenceStageSigningDomain and preserves the cause.
func (*Signer) SignDSN ¶
func (s *Signer) SignDSN(ctx context.Context, request DSNSigningRequest) (SigningResult, SigningRecovery, error)
SignDSN signs only a DSN previously authorized by EvaluateDSNForSigning.
func (*Signer) SignExisting ¶
func (s *Signer) SignExisting(ctx context.Context, request ExistingSigningRequest) (SigningResult, SigningRecovery, error)
SignExisting executes the sole combined verified forwarding or revision path.
func (*Signer) SignNextDomain ¶
func (s *Signer) SignNextDomain(ctx context.Context, request NextDomainSigningRequest) (SigningResult, SigningRecovery, error)
SignNextDomain executes the distinct terminal next-domain request path.
func (*Signer) SignOriginator ¶
func (s *Signer) SignOriginator(ctx context.Context, request OriginatorSigningRequest) (SigningResult, SigningRecovery, error)
SignOriginator executes the sole originator request path. A null reverse path is admitted only through NewHeaderFromNullSenderSigningRequest and only when the profile domain is the single From mailbox domain.
func (*Signer) SignPropagatedDSN ¶
func (s *Signer) SignPropagatedDSN(ctx context.Context, request DSNPropagationSigningRequest) (PropagatedDSN, SigningRecovery, error)
SignPropagatedDSN signs only a report rebuilt by RebuildDSNForPropagation. The ticket must carry the delivery_status_propagation purpose with the null reverse path and the authenticated next-hop recipient, the profile must belong to the derived signing domain, and the result must carry exactly one Message-Instance m=1 and one DKIM2-Signature i=1 with mf=<> and rt= equal to the previous hop's mf=.
func (*Signer) VerifyForRevision ¶
func (s *Signer) VerifyForRevision(ctx context.Context, request VerifyRequest) (RevisionVerification, VerifiedRevisionInput, error)
VerifyForRevision verifies all inherited protocol evidence and seals clean exact input.
type SignerOption ¶
type SignerOption func(*signerConfig) error
SignerOption configures one validated signing facade dependency.
func WithSignerDomainPolicyProvider ¶
func WithSignerDomainPolicyProvider(provider DomainPolicyProvider) SignerOption
WithSignerDomainPolicyProvider selects the Domain Policy Record provider the signer's incoming-chain verification (VerifyForRevision) uses for the upward Authentic From match. The signer's own d= choice stays downward only (disposition D8).
func WithSigningClock ¶
func WithSigningClock(clock func() time.Time) SignerOption
WithSigningClock injects the single deterministic operation clock.
func WithSigningLimits ¶
func WithSigningLimits(limits SigningLimits) SignerOption
WithSigningLimits applies one immutable narrow-only limit set.
func WithoutSignerSubdomainFromAuthorization ¶
func WithoutSignerSubdomainFromAuthorization() SignerOption
WithoutSignerSubdomainFromAuthorization makes the signer's incoming-chain verification use the local downward-only policy.
type SigningAuthorizationFact ¶
type SigningAuthorizationFact struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
SigningAuthorizationFact records one bounded completed authorization stage.
func (SigningAuthorizationFact) Format ¶
func (f SigningAuthorizationFact) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every authorization-fact formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (SigningAuthorizationFact) GoString ¶
func (f SigningAuthorizationFact) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe authorization-fact Go representation.
func (SigningAuthorizationFact) Purpose ¶
func (f SigningAuthorizationFact) Purpose() SigningAuthorizationPurpose
Purpose returns the completed authorization purpose.
func (SigningAuthorizationFact) Restriction ¶
func (f SigningAuthorizationFact) Restriction() SigningRestriction
Restriction returns the completed authorization restriction.
func (SigningAuthorizationFact) Status ¶
func (f SigningAuthorizationFact) Status() SigningAuthorizationStatus
Status returns the completed authorization status.
func (SigningAuthorizationFact) String ¶
func (f SigningAuthorizationFact) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe authorization-fact summary.
func (SigningAuthorizationFact) Valid ¶
func (f SigningAuthorizationFact) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether this is one coherent signing authorization fact.
type SigningAuthorizationPurpose ¶
type SigningAuthorizationPurpose string
SigningAuthorizationPurpose identifies one closed authorization decision.
const ( // SigningAuthorizationPolicy authorizes exact modification and route facts. SigningAuthorizationPolicy SigningAuthorizationPurpose = "policy" // SigningAuthorizationFeedbackRelay authorizes inherited feedback relay. SigningAuthorizationFeedbackRelay SigningAuthorizationPurpose = "feedback_relay" // SigningAuthorizationRecipientDisclosure authorizes exact multi-recipient disclosure. SigningAuthorizationRecipientDisclosure SigningAuthorizationPurpose = "recipient_disclosure" // SigningAuthorizationReceiveNextDomain authorizes receipt from one inherited nd= hop. SigningAuthorizationReceiveNextDomain SigningAuthorizationPurpose = "receive_terminal_next_domain" // SigningAuthorizationSendNextDomain authorizes one exact terminal nd= route. SigningAuthorizationSendNextDomain SigningAuthorizationPurpose = "send_terminal_next_domain" )
func (SigningAuthorizationPurpose) Known ¶
func (p SigningAuthorizationPurpose) Known() bool
Known reports whether the purpose belongs to the closed signing vocabulary.
type SigningAuthorizationQuery ¶
type SigningAuthorizationQuery struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
SigningAuthorizationQuery carries exact bounded authorization evidence.
func (SigningAuthorizationQuery) Binding ¶
func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) Binding() [sha256.Size]byte
Binding returns the opaque exact-operation authorization binding.
func (SigningAuthorizationQuery) Format ¶
func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every query formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (SigningAuthorizationQuery) GoString ¶
func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe query Go representation.
func (SigningAuthorizationQuery) OutOfBandFacts ¶
func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) OutOfBandFacts() (SigningOutOfBandFacts, bool)
OutOfBandFacts returns exact trusted-boundary evidence for receive/send purposes.
func (SigningAuthorizationQuery) PolicyFacts ¶
func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) PolicyFacts() (SigningModificationFacts, SigningRestriction, bool)
PolicyFacts returns bounded policy facts and the inherited restriction.
func (SigningAuthorizationQuery) Purpose ¶
func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) Purpose() SigningAuthorizationPurpose
Purpose returns the closed authorization purpose.
func (SigningAuthorizationQuery) Recipients ¶
func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) Recipients() [][]byte
Recipients returns detached exact envelope recipients only across this trusted boundary.
func (SigningAuthorizationQuery) String ¶
func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe query summary.
func (SigningAuthorizationQuery) Valid ¶
func (q SigningAuthorizationQuery) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the query contains one coherent sealed purpose.
type SigningAuthorizationResult ¶
type SigningAuthorizationResult struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
SigningAuthorizationResult is a closed query-bound authorization result.
func AuthorizeSigning ¶
func AuthorizeSigning(query SigningAuthorizationQuery) SigningAuthorizationResult
AuthorizeSigning constructs an approval for the exact supplied query.
func DenySigning ¶
func DenySigning(query SigningAuthorizationQuery) SigningAuthorizationResult
DenySigning constructs a denial for the exact supplied query.
func (SigningAuthorizationResult) Format ¶
func (r SigningAuthorizationResult) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every result formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (SigningAuthorizationResult) GoString ¶
func (r SigningAuthorizationResult) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe result Go representation.
func (SigningAuthorizationResult) IsZero ¶
func (r SigningAuthorizationResult) IsZero() bool
IsZero reports whether no declared authorization result is present.
func (SigningAuthorizationResult) String ¶
func (r SigningAuthorizationResult) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe result summary.
type SigningAuthorizationStatus ¶
type SigningAuthorizationStatus string
SigningAuthorizationStatus identifies one closed declared authorization result.
const ( // SigningAuthorizationAuthorized approves the exact supplied query. SigningAuthorizationAuthorized SigningAuthorizationStatus = "authorized" // SigningAuthorizationDenied denies the exact supplied query. SigningAuthorizationDenied SigningAuthorizationStatus = "denied" )
func (SigningAuthorizationStatus) Known ¶
func (s SigningAuthorizationStatus) Known() bool
Known reports whether status belongs to the closed authorization vocabulary.
type SigningAuthorizer ¶
type SigningAuthorizer interface {
Authorize(context.Context, SigningAuthorizationQuery) (SigningAuthorizationResult, error)
}
SigningAuthorizer decides exact policy, OOB, feedback, and disclosure queries.
type SigningBodyUnavailableReason ¶
type SigningBodyUnavailableReason string
SigningBodyUnavailableReason identifies why an explicit b:null was required.
const ( // be represented by the bounded inverse recipe. SigningBodyUnavailableUnrepresentable SigningBodyUnavailableReason = "unrepresentable" SigningBodyUnavailableLiteralRequired SigningBodyUnavailableReason = "literal_required" )
func (SigningBodyUnavailableReason) Known ¶
func (r SigningBodyUnavailableReason) Known() bool
Known reports whether reason belongs to the closed unavailable-body vocabulary.
type SigningCredential ¶
type SigningCredential interface {
// contains filtered or unexported methods
}
SigningCredential is one validated credential of any signable algorithm: RSASigningCredential, Ed25519SigningCredential, or MLDSA44SigningCredential. The interface is sealed to this package.
type SigningEnvelopeForm ¶
type SigningEnvelopeForm string
SigningEnvelopeForm identifies the generated signature envelope shape.
const ( // SigningEnvelopeOrdinary identifies the ordinary mf=/rt= form. SigningEnvelopeOrdinary SigningEnvelopeForm = "ordinary_mf_rt" // SigningEnvelopeNextDomain identifies the terminal nd= form. SigningEnvelopeNextDomain SigningEnvelopeForm = "next_domain" )
func (SigningEnvelopeForm) Known ¶
func (f SigningEnvelopeForm) Known() bool
Known reports whether form belongs to the closed signing vocabulary.
type SigningError ¶
type SigningError struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
SigningError is a bounded cause-free public signing failure.
func (*SigningError) Code ¶
func (e *SigningError) Code() SigningErrorCode
Code returns the stable public signing error code.
func (*SigningError) Error ¶
func (e *SigningError) Error() string
Error returns a secret-safe stable diagnostic.
func (*SigningError) Format ¶
func (e *SigningError) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format renders every fmt form through the bounded diagnostic.
func (*SigningError) Is ¶
func (e *SigningError) Is(target error) bool
Is matches public signing errors by stable code.
type SigningErrorCode ¶
type SigningErrorCode string
SigningErrorCode identifies one bounded signing failure.
const ( SigningErrorInvalidOptions SigningErrorCode = "invalid_options" SigningErrorInvalidRequest SigningErrorCode = "invalid_request" SigningErrorCapabilityMismatch SigningErrorCode = "capability_mismatch" SigningErrorMalformedInput SigningErrorCode = "malformed_input" SigningErrorProtocolTampering SigningErrorCode = "protocol_tampering" SigningErrorSequenceFailure SigningErrorCode = "sequence_failure" SigningErrorReferenceFailure SigningErrorCode = "reference_failure" SigningErrorHashStateAmbiguity SigningErrorCode = "hash_state_ambiguity" SigningErrorChainFailure SigningErrorCode = "chain_failure" SigningErrorAuthorizationDenied SigningErrorCode = "authorization_denied" SigningErrorPolicyRestriction SigningErrorCode = "policy_restriction" SigningErrorDisclosureDenied SigningErrorCode = "disclosure_denied" SigningErrorUnsupportedAlgorithm SigningErrorCode = "unsupported_algorithm" SigningErrorKeyMismatch SigningErrorCode = "key_mismatch" SigningErrorCallbackTemporary SigningErrorCode = "callback_temporary" SigningErrorCallbackPermanent SigningErrorCode = "callback_permanent" SigningErrorCryptographicSelfCheck SigningErrorCode = "cryptographic_self_check_failure" SigningErrorLimitExceeded SigningErrorCode = "limit_exceeded" SigningErrorInternalInvariant SigningErrorCode = "internal_invariant_failure" )
Public signing failures use the protocol core's closed vocabulary.
func (SigningErrorCode) Known ¶
func (c SigningErrorCode) Known() bool
Known reports whether the code belongs to the public signing vocabulary.
type SigningFlag ¶
type SigningFlag string
SigningFlag identifies one caller-requestable baseline flag. Draft-07 Section 10.10 removed donotmodify and donotexplode, so feedback is the sole requestable flag.
const ( // SigningFlagFeedback requests authenticated feedback. SigningFlagFeedback SigningFlag = "feedback" )
func (SigningFlag) Known ¶
func (f SigningFlag) Known() bool
Known reports whether the flag may be requested by a caller.
type SigningLimits ¶
type SigningLimits struct {
// MaxMessageBytes bounds exact input and completed output bytes.
MaxMessageBytes int
// MaxHeaderBytes bounds the completed raw header block.
MaxHeaderBytes int
// MaxHeaderFields bounds completed header occurrences.
MaxHeaderFields int
// MaxFieldBytes bounds one generated protocol field.
MaxFieldBytes int
// MaxLineBytes bounds one generated physical header line.
MaxLineBytes int
// MaxInstances bounds all Message-Instance fields.
MaxInstances int
// MaxSignatures bounds all DKIM2-Signature fields.
MaxSignatures int
// MaxProtocolFields bounds both protocol field families together.
MaxProtocolFields int
// MaxHashSetsPerInstance bounds hash sets in one instance.
MaxHashSetsPerInstance int
// MaxSignatureSetsPerField bounds signature sets in one field.
MaxSignatureSetsPerField int
// MaxTotalSignatureSets bounds inherited and generated signature sets.
MaxTotalSignatureSets int
// MaxPublicKeyLookups bounds inherited and generated publication lookups.
MaxPublicKeyLookups int
// MaxSignatureInputBytes bounds one Section 12.8 input.
MaxSignatureInputBytes int
// MaxCanonicalWorkBytes bounds aggregate canonical work.
MaxCanonicalWorkBytes int
// MaxGeneratedRecipients bounds recipients rendered into one new field.
MaxGeneratedRecipients int
// MaxParentOutputCopiesAndTickets bounds the coupled fanout cardinality.
MaxParentOutputCopiesAndTickets int
// MaxEnvelopePathBytes bounds decoded generated envelope paths.
MaxEnvelopePathBytes int
// MaxDecodedRecipeBytes bounds one generated or inherited recipe.
MaxDecodedRecipeBytes int
// MaxGeneratedSignatureSets bounds sets emitted in the new field.
MaxGeneratedSignatureSets int
// MaxAuthorizationCalls bounds applicable authorization callbacks.
MaxAuthorizationCalls int
// MaxPrivateSigningCalls bounds generated private signing callbacks.
MaxPrivateSigningCalls int
// MaxNonceBytes bounds optional signing nonce bytes.
MaxNonceBytes int
// MinRSABits is the smallest accepted RSA key size.
MinRSABits int
// MaxRSABits is the largest accepted RSA key size.
MaxRSABits int
// MaxPrivateSignatureBytes bounds one private callback result.
MaxPrivateSignatureBytes int
// MaxRouteDescriptorBytes bounds aggregate fanout descriptor bytes.
MaxRouteDescriptorBytes int
// MaxRouteWorkUnits bounds fanout planning work.
MaxRouteWorkUnits int
// MaxUniquePreSignSourceBytes bounds unique source bytes hashed per fanout.
MaxUniquePreSignSourceBytes int
// MaxRouteAuthorityCalls bounds one signing or release attempt.
MaxRouteAuthorityCalls int
}
SigningLimits contains public narrow-only signing ceilings.
Zero-valued fields use the corresponding hard default. Callers narrowing related dimensions must keep the resulting set coherent.
func DefaultSigningLimits ¶
func DefaultSigningLimits() SigningLimits
DefaultSigningLimits returns every public hard ceiling explicitly.
func (SigningLimits) Validate ¶
func (l SigningLimits) Validate() error
Validate rejects widening and incoherent narrowed limits.
type SigningMetadata ¶
type SigningMetadata struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
SigningMetadata is immutable optional nonce and requested-flag metadata.
func NewSigningMetadata ¶
func NewSigningMetadata(nonce []byte, noncePresent bool, flags []SigningFlag) (SigningMetadata, error)
NewSigningMetadata validates and snapshots optional nonce and requested flags.
func (SigningMetadata) Format ¶
func (m SigningMetadata) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every metadata formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (SigningMetadata) GoString ¶
func (m SigningMetadata) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe metadata Go representation.
func (SigningMetadata) String ¶
func (m SigningMetadata) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe metadata summary.
type SigningModificationFacts ¶
type SigningModificationFacts struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
SigningModificationFacts contains only bounded authenticated modification facts.
func (SigningModificationFacts) BodyChanged ¶
func (f SigningModificationFacts) BodyChanged() bool
BodyChanged reports whether the authoritative body hash changed.
func (SigningModificationFacts) ExistingHeadersChanged ¶
func (f SigningModificationFacts) ExistingHeadersChanged() bool
ExistingHeadersChanged reports whether inherited non-protocol headers changed.
func (SigningModificationFacts) Format ¶
func (f SigningModificationFacts) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every facts formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (SigningModificationFacts) GoString ¶
func (f SigningModificationFacts) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe facts Go representation.
func (SigningModificationFacts) String ¶
func (f SigningModificationFacts) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe facts summary.
func (SigningModificationFacts) Valid ¶
func (f SigningModificationFacts) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the facts came from a sealed signing query.
type SigningOutOfBandFacts ¶
type SigningOutOfBandFacts struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
SigningOutOfBandFacts exposes exact values only across the trusted authorizer boundary.
func (SigningOutOfBandFacts) Format ¶
func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every OOB facts formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (SigningOutOfBandFacts) ForwardPaths ¶
func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) ForwardPaths() [][]byte
ForwardPaths returns detached purpose-bound exact SMTP recipient evidence.
func (SigningOutOfBandFacts) GoString ¶
func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe OOB facts Go representation.
func (SigningOutOfBandFacts) PredecessorDomain ¶
func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) PredecessorDomain() string
PredecessorDomain returns the authenticated canonical predecessor domain.
func (SigningOutOfBandFacts) PredecessorKind ¶
func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) PredecessorKind() SigningPredecessorKind
PredecessorKind returns the authenticated predecessor envelope form.
func (SigningOutOfBandFacts) ProfileDomain ¶
func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) ProfileDomain() string
ProfileDomain returns the exact canonical signing domain.
func (SigningOutOfBandFacts) ProposedNextDomain ¶
func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) ProposedNextDomain() string
ProposedNextDomain returns the terminal nd= value or empty for receive authorization.
func (SigningOutOfBandFacts) ReceiverBinding ¶
func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) ReceiverBinding() []byte
ReceiverBinding returns the detached exact receiver-transaction evidence.
func (SigningOutOfBandFacts) ReversePath ¶
func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) ReversePath() []byte
ReversePath returns detached purpose-bound exact SMTP reverse-path evidence.
func (SigningOutOfBandFacts) RouteScope ¶
func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) RouteScope() []byte
RouteScope returns the detached exact trusted route-scope handle.
func (SigningOutOfBandFacts) String ¶
func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe OOB facts summary.
func (SigningOutOfBandFacts) Valid ¶
func (f SigningOutOfBandFacts) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the facts form one exact receive or send authorization.
type SigningPredecessorKind ¶
type SigningPredecessorKind string
SigningPredecessorKind identifies the authenticated predecessor envelope form.
const ( // SigningPredecessorOrdinary identifies an ordinary mf=/rt= predecessor. SigningPredecessorOrdinary SigningPredecessorKind = "ordinary" // SigningPredecessorNextDomain identifies a terminal nd= predecessor. SigningPredecessorNextDomain SigningPredecessorKind = "next_domain" )
func (SigningPredecessorKind) Known ¶
func (k SigningPredecessorKind) Known() bool
Known reports whether the predecessor kind belongs to the closed signing vocabulary.
type SigningProfile ¶
type SigningProfile struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
SigningProfile is an immutable canonical signing domain with one credential for each of up to three signable algorithms. The emitted s= tag joins the classical credentials (rsa-sha256, ed25519-sha256) as one sig-all group and puts an mldsa44 credential in a separate sig-any alternative after "|" (Draft-09 Section 10.9 phased deployment).
func NewDualSigningProfile ¶
func NewDualSigningProfile(domain string, rsaCredential RSASigningCredential, ed25519Credential Ed25519SigningCredential) (SigningProfile, error)
NewDualSigningProfile constructs a canonical RSA-then-Ed25519 profile.
func NewEd25519SigningProfile ¶
func NewEd25519SigningProfile(domain string, credential Ed25519SigningCredential) (SigningProfile, error)
NewEd25519SigningProfile constructs a single-algorithm Ed25519-SHA256 profile.
func NewMLDSA44SigningProfile ¶
func NewMLDSA44SigningProfile(domain string, credential MLDSA44SigningCredential) (SigningProfile, error)
NewMLDSA44SigningProfile constructs a single-algorithm mldsa44 profile.
func NewProjectedSigningProfile ¶
func NewProjectedSigningProfile(projected signing.Profile) (SigningProfile, error)
NewProjectedSigningProfile seals one already validated internal datasource projection for sibling command modules without rebuilding its credentials.
The parameter deliberately remains an internal type: only modules inside this repository may cross this narrow datasource-to-signing bridge.
func NewRSASigningProfile ¶
func NewRSASigningProfile(domain string, credential RSASigningCredential) (SigningProfile, error)
NewRSASigningProfile constructs a single-algorithm RSA-SHA256 profile.
func NewSigningProfile ¶
func NewSigningProfile(domain string, credentials ...SigningCredential) (SigningProfile, error)
NewSigningProfile constructs a profile from one credential per algorithm in any order; the profile owner sorts them into the canonical signing order and rejects duplicate algorithms, duplicate selectors (across every s= group), nil credentials, and more than three credentials.
func (SigningProfile) Format ¶
func (p SigningProfile) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every profile formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (SigningProfile) GoString ¶
func (p SigningProfile) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe profile Go representation.
func (SigningProfile) String ¶
func (p SigningProfile) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe profile summary.
func (SigningProfile) Valid ¶
func (p SigningProfile) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the profile remains canonical and coherent.
type SigningRecipeOutcome ¶
type SigningRecipeOutcome string
SigningRecipeOutcome identifies whether an inverse recipe was emitted.
const ( // SigningRecipeUnchanged reports that no recipe was emitted. SigningRecipeUnchanged SigningRecipeOutcome = "unchanged" // SigningRecipeGenerated reports one emitted inverse recipe. SigningRecipeGenerated SigningRecipeOutcome = "recipe" )
func (SigningRecipeOutcome) Known ¶
func (o SigningRecipeOutcome) Known() bool
Known reports whether outcome belongs to the closed recipe vocabulary.
type SigningRecovery ¶
type SigningRecovery struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
SigningRecovery owns one shared consumptive same-lineage route recovery action.
func (SigningRecovery) Format ¶
func (r SigningRecovery) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every recovery formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (SigningRecovery) GoString ¶
func (r SigningRecovery) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe recovery Go representation.
func (SigningRecovery) Recover ¶
func (r SigningRecovery) Recover(ctx context.Context) (RouteCopyTicket, error)
Recover consumes this recovery action and returns a same-lineage replacement when ready.
func (SigningRecovery) RecoveryPending ¶
func (r SigningRecovery) RecoveryPending() bool
RecoveryPending reports whether authority cleanup must be retried.
func (SigningRecovery) ReplacementReady ¶
func (r SigningRecovery) ReplacementReady() bool
ReplacementReady reports whether Recover will yield an already issued ticket.
func (SigningRecovery) String ¶
func (r SigningRecovery) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe recovery summary.
func (SigningRecovery) Valid ¶
func (r SigningRecovery) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether recovery has one actionable closed state.
type SigningRestriction ¶
type SigningRestriction string
SigningRestriction identifies one closed signing output restriction.
const ( // SigningRestrictionUnrestricted permits ordinary message release. SigningRestrictionUnrestricted SigningRestriction = "unrestricted" // SigningRestrictionOutOfBandAcceptance requires exact OOB-bound release. SigningRestrictionOutOfBandAcceptance SigningRestriction = "requires_out_of_band_acceptance" )
func (SigningRestriction) Known ¶
func (r SigningRestriction) Known() bool
Known reports whether restriction belongs to the closed signing vocabulary.
type SigningResult ¶
type SigningResult struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
SigningResult is a closed signing result sum.
func (SigningResult) Format ¶
func (r SigningResult) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every result formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (SigningResult) GoString ¶
func (r SigningResult) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe result Go representation.
func (SigningResult) OutOfBandAcceptance ¶
func (r SigningResult) OutOfBandAcceptance() (OutOfBandAcceptanceSignedMessage, bool)
OutOfBandAcceptance returns the OOB-restricted no-byte variant when present.
func (SigningResult) String ¶
func (r SigningResult) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe result summary.
func (SigningResult) Unrestricted ¶
func (r SigningResult) Unrestricted() (UnrestrictedSignedMessage, bool)
Unrestricted returns the sole byte-releasable variant when present.
func (SigningResult) Valid ¶
func (r SigningResult) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether exactly one coherent result variant is present.
type SigningRole ¶
type SigningRole string
SigningRole identifies the role derived by the exact Section 12.1 hash gate.
const ( // SigningRoleOriginator creates the initial protocol fields. SigningRoleOriginator SigningRole = "originator" // SigningRoleHashUnchangedForwarder appends a signature without a new instance. SigningRoleHashUnchangedForwarder SigningRole = "hash_unchanged_forwarder" // SigningRoleReviser appends one inverse-recipe instance and signature. SigningRoleReviser SigningRole = "reviser" )
func (SigningRole) Known ¶
func (r SigningRole) Known() bool
Known reports whether role belongs to the closed signing vocabulary.
type SigningSource ¶
type SigningSource struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
SigningSource is one immutable exact pre-sign RFC 5322 source identity.
func NewSigningSource ¶
func NewSigningSource(rawMessage []byte) (SigningSource, error)
NewSigningSource snapshots exact pre-sign RFC 5322 bytes for fanout planning.
func (SigningSource) Format ¶
func (s SigningSource) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every source formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (SigningSource) GoString ¶
func (s SigningSource) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe source Go representation.
func (SigningSource) String ¶
func (s SigningSource) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe source summary.
func (SigningSource) Valid ¶
func (s SigningSource) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the source owns initialized exact bytes.
type SigningTransportForm ¶
type SigningTransportForm string
SigningTransportForm identifies the closed signable transport declaration.
const ( // SigningTransportFinalNetworkPreDotStuffing declares final network-form // RFC 5322 bytes before SMTP dot-stuffing. SigningTransportFinalNetworkPreDotStuffing SigningTransportForm = "final_network_form_pre_dot_stuffing" )
func (SigningTransportForm) Known ¶
func (f SigningTransportForm) Known() bool
Known reports whether form is the sole signable transport declaration.
type TXTAbsenceClass ¶
type TXTAbsenceClass string
TXTAbsenceClass distinguishes authoritative NXDOMAIN and NODATA results.
const ( // TXTAbsenceNXDOMAIN reports authoritative owner-name absence. TXTAbsenceNXDOMAIN TXTAbsenceClass = "nxdomain" // TXTAbsenceNODATA reports an existing owner without TXT data. TXTAbsenceNODATA TXTAbsenceClass = "nodata" )
func (TXTAbsenceClass) Known ¶
func (a TXTAbsenceClass) Known() bool
Known reports whether the absence class belongs to the closed public vocabulary.
type TXTLookupResult ¶
type TXTLookupResult struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
TXTLookupResult owns one immutable mutually exclusive found or absent answer.
func NewAbsentTXTLookupResult ¶
func NewAbsentTXTLookupResult(absence TXTAbsenceClass, ttl time.Duration, dnssec DNSSECStatus) (TXTLookupResult, error)
NewAbsentTXTLookupResult constructs an authoritative negative result.
func NewAmbiguousTXTLookupResult ¶
func NewAmbiguousTXTLookupResult(recordCount int, ttl time.Duration, dnssec DNSSECStatus) (TXTLookupResult, error)
NewAmbiguousTXTLookupResult constructs count-only ambiguity without payload traversal. The Section 3.7 filter cannot inspect such an answer, so it resolves as an ambiguous key.
func NewFoundTXTLookupResult ¶
func NewFoundTXTLookupResult(payloads [][]byte, ttl time.Duration, dnssec DNSSECStatus) (TXTLookupResult, error)
NewFoundTXTLookupResult constructs found state from raw payloads using count-first validation: up to MaxCarriedTXTRecords payloads are kept, a larger answer becomes count-only ambiguity without payload traversal.
func (TXTLookupResult) Absence ¶
func (r TXTLookupResult) Absence() TXTAbsenceClass
Absence returns the authoritative negative class when absent.
func (TXTLookupResult) DNSSECStatus ¶
func (r TXTLookupResult) DNSSECStatus() DNSSECStatus
DNSSECStatus returns verdict-neutral bounded diagnostic metadata.
func (TXTLookupResult) Format ¶
func (TXTLookupResult) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting from traversing DNS TXT result storage.
func (TXTLookupResult) GoString ¶
func (TXTLookupResult) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without DNS TXT payload bytes.
func (TXTLookupResult) IsZero ¶
func (r TXTLookupResult) IsZero() bool
IsZero reports whether no declared public transport result is present.
func (TXTLookupResult) MarshalJSON ¶
func (TXTLookupResult) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects serialization outside the bounded provider boundary.
func (TXTLookupResult) MarshalText ¶
func (TXTLookupResult) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of DNS TXT result storage.
func (TXTLookupResult) NegativeTTL ¶
func (r TXTLookupResult) NegativeTTL() time.Duration
NegativeTTL returns authoritative negative TTL provenance.
func (TXTLookupResult) PositiveTTL ¶
func (r TXTLookupResult) PositiveTTL() time.Duration
PositiveTTL returns found-answer TTL provenance.
func (TXTLookupResult) RecordCount ¶
func (r TXTLookupResult) RecordCount() int
RecordCount returns the exact RR count without requiring ambiguous payload traversal.
func (TXTLookupResult) Records ¶
func (r TXTLookupResult) Records() []TXTRecord
Records returns the detached TXT payloads, or nil when absent or count-only ambiguous.
func (TXTLookupResult) Status ¶
func (r TXTLookupResult) Status() TXTLookupStatus
Status returns the mutually exclusive lookup status.
func (TXTLookupResult) String ¶
func (TXTLookupResult) String() string
String returns a constant representation without DNS TXT payload bytes.
type TXTLookupStatus ¶
type TXTLookupStatus string
TXTLookupStatus identifies a mutually exclusive found or absent DNS answer.
const ( // TXTLookupStatusFound reports one or more TXT resource records. TXTLookupStatusFound TXTLookupStatus = "found" // TXTLookupStatusAbsent reports authoritative DNS name or data absence. TXTLookupStatusAbsent TXTLookupStatus = "absent" )
func (TXTLookupStatus) Known ¶
func (s TXTLookupStatus) Known() bool
Known reports whether the status belongs to the closed public vocabulary.
type TXTRecord ¶
type TXTRecord struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
TXTRecord owns one already-concatenated TXT resource-record payload.
func (TXTRecord) GoString ¶
GoString returns a constant representation without DNS TXT payload bytes.
func (TXTRecord) MarshalJSON ¶
MarshalJSON rejects serialization outside the bounded provider boundary.
func (TXTRecord) MarshalText ¶
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of DNS TXT payload bytes.
type TXTTransport ¶
type TXTTransport interface {
LookupTXT(context.Context, string) (TXTLookupResult, error)
}
TXTTransport resolves one absolute DNS TXT owner through caller context.
Implementations return a declared result with nil error, a zero result with caller context error, or a zero result with an existing typed public provider error. Raw and contradictory combinations are contract violations later.
type UnrestrictedSignedMessage ¶
type UnrestrictedSignedMessage struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
UnrestrictedSignedMessage is a fully proved message with a generic byte-copy accessor.
func (UnrestrictedSignedMessage) Bytes ¶
func (m UnrestrictedSignedMessage) Bytes() []byte
Bytes returns an independent copy of the complete RFC 5322 output.
func (UnrestrictedSignedMessage) Facts ¶
func (m UnrestrictedSignedMessage) Facts() SignedMessageFacts
Facts returns bounded immutable operation facts.
func (UnrestrictedSignedMessage) Format ¶
func (m UnrestrictedSignedMessage) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every message formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (UnrestrictedSignedMessage) GeneratedFields ¶
func (m UnrestrictedSignedMessage) GeneratedFields() [][]byte
GeneratedFields returns detached complete RFC 5322 fields in the exact insertion order proved by the signing coordinator.
func (UnrestrictedSignedMessage) GoString ¶
func (m UnrestrictedSignedMessage) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe message Go representation.
func (UnrestrictedSignedMessage) SigningIdentity ¶
func (m UnrestrictedSignedMessage) SigningIdentity() (domain string, timestamp uint64, err error)
SigningIdentity returns the domain and Unix timestamp of the newly generated signature on a proved unrestricted result. It excludes inherited signatures and fails closed for zero or incoherent results. Restricted results do not expose this accessor; their existing release boundaries remain unchanged.
func (UnrestrictedSignedMessage) String ¶
func (m UnrestrictedSignedMessage) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe message summary.
func (UnrestrictedSignedMessage) Valid ¶
func (m UnrestrictedSignedMessage) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether this is a coherent unrestricted result.
type VerificationAssessment ¶
type VerificationAssessment struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
VerificationAssessment separates DKIM2 applicability from the four verification states.
func (VerificationAssessment) Applicable ¶
func (a VerificationAssessment) Applicable() bool
Applicable reports whether DKIM2 protocol fields started a verification.
func (VerificationAssessment) Format ¶
func (VerificationAssessment) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting verbs from traversing verification facts.
func (VerificationAssessment) GoString ¶
func (VerificationAssessment) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant content-free assessment representation.
func (VerificationAssessment) MarshalJSON ¶
func (VerificationAssessment) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects serialization outside an owning transport adapter.
func (VerificationAssessment) MarshalText ¶
func (VerificationAssessment) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of retained verification facts.
func (VerificationAssessment) String ¶
func (VerificationAssessment) String() string
String returns a constant content-free assessment representation.
func (VerificationAssessment) Valid ¶
func (a VerificationAssessment) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether this is exactly one closed applicability variant.
func (VerificationAssessment) Verification ¶
func (a VerificationAssessment) Verification() (VerifyResult, bool)
Verification returns an immutable four-state result only for applicable input.
type VerificationLimits ¶
type VerificationLimits struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
VerificationLimits is an immutable closed configuration whose values may only narrow hard maxima.
func DefaultVerificationLimits ¶
func DefaultVerificationLimits() VerificationLimits
DefaultVerificationLimits returns the closed defaults, which equal the hard maxima.
func (VerificationLimits) MaxCheckFacts ¶
func (l VerificationLimits) MaxCheckFacts() int
MaxCheckFacts returns the configured retained check-fact limit.
func (VerificationLimits) MaxInstanceHashSets ¶
func (l VerificationLimits) MaxInstanceHashSets() int
MaxInstanceHashSets returns the configured Message-Instance hash-set limit.
func (VerificationLimits) MaxRawMessageBytes ¶
func (l VerificationLimits) MaxRawMessageBytes() int
MaxRawMessageBytes returns the configured raw-message byte limit.
func (VerificationLimits) MaxRecipients ¶
func (l VerificationLimits) MaxRecipients() int
MaxRecipients returns the configured current-recipient count limit.
func (VerificationLimits) MaxSignatureFacts ¶
func (l VerificationLimits) MaxSignatureFacts() int
MaxSignatureFacts returns the configured retained signature-set-fact limit.
func (VerificationLimits) MaxSignatureSets ¶
func (l VerificationLimits) MaxSignatureSets() int
MaxSignatureSets returns the configured DKIM2-Signature set limit per field.
type VerificationScope ¶
type VerificationScope string
VerificationScope identifies which message state was verified.
const ( // VerificationScopeCurrent limits the result to the highest current signature and instance. VerificationScopeCurrent VerificationScope = "current" // VerificationScopeChain reports authenticated verification through every inherited revision. VerificationScopeChain VerificationScope = "chain" )
func (VerificationScope) Known ¶
func (s VerificationScope) Known() bool
Known reports whether the scope belongs to the closed public vocabulary.
type VerificationTarget ¶
type VerificationTarget struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
VerificationTarget identifies the current signature sequence and Message-Instance number.
func (VerificationTarget) Format ¶
func (VerificationTarget) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting from traversing sequence identifiers.
func (VerificationTarget) GoString ¶
func (VerificationTarget) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without sequence identifiers.
func (VerificationTarget) Instance ¶
func (t VerificationTarget) Instance() uint64
Instance returns the target Message-Instance number.
func (VerificationTarget) MarshalJSON ¶
func (VerificationTarget) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects serialization outside explicit mapped response boundaries.
func (VerificationTarget) MarshalText ¶
func (VerificationTarget) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of sequence identifiers.
func (VerificationTarget) Sequence ¶
func (t VerificationTarget) Sequence() uint64
Sequence returns the target DKIM2-Signature sequence number.
func (VerificationTarget) String ¶
func (VerificationTarget) String() string
String returns a constant representation without sequence identifiers.
type VerifiedRevisionInput ¶
type VerifiedRevisionInput struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
VerifiedRevisionInput is an opaque exact-input capability with no raw-message accessor.
func (VerifiedRevisionInput) Format ¶
func (c VerifiedRevisionInput) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format routes every capability formatting form through the redacted summary.
func (VerifiedRevisionInput) GoString ¶
func (c VerifiedRevisionInput) GoString() string
GoString returns the constant secret-safe capability Go representation.
func (VerifiedRevisionInput) String ¶
func (c VerifiedRevisionInput) String() string
String returns a constant secret-safe capability summary.
func (VerifiedRevisionInput) Valid ¶
func (c VerifiedRevisionInput) Valid() bool
Valid reports only whether the capability has an issued structural shape.
type Verifier ¶
type Verifier struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
Verifier is the public current-verification facade.
Example ¶
ExampleVerifier demonstrates secret-safe structured result handling.
package main
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"time"
_ "embed"
dkim2 "github.com/croessner/dkim2"
)
//go:embed testdata/vectors/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-09/public-golden.json
var publicExampleCorpus []byte
type syntheticMissingProvider struct{}
// LookupPublicKey returns deterministic key absence without network access.
func (syntheticMissingProvider) LookupPublicKey(_ context.Context, query dkim2.PublicKeyQuery) (dkim2.PublicKeyResult, error) {
return dkim2.MissingPublicKey(query.Algorithm()), nil
}
func main() {
verifier, err := dkim2.NewVerifier(
syntheticMissingProvider{},
dkim2.WithVerificationClock(func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1700000000, 0) }), dkim2.WithoutSubdomainFromAuthorization(),
)
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("construction error")
return
}
result, err := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), syntheticExampleRequest())
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("caller or API error")
return
}
switch result.State() {
case dkim2.ResultStatePASS:
fmt.Println("PASS")
case dkim2.ResultStateFAIL:
fmt.Println("FAIL")
case dkim2.ResultStatePERMERROR:
fmt.Println("PERMERROR")
case dkim2.ResultStateTEMPERROR:
fmt.Println("TEMPERROR")
}
fmt.Println(result.PrimaryReason())
fmt.Println(result.Scope(), result.HistoricalContent(), result.HistoricalSignatures(), result.CustodyStructure())
fmt.Println(result.CheckCount(), result.SignatureSetCount())
for _, check := range result.Checks() {
fmt.Println(check.Class(), check.Reason())
}
for _, signature := range result.SignatureSets() {
fmt.Println(signature.Algorithm(), signature.Status(), signature.Reason())
}
}
// syntheticExampleRequest decodes the frozen synthetic current-message fixture.
func syntheticExampleRequest() dkim2.VerifyRequest {
return syntheticExampleRequestNamed("rsa_pass")
}
// syntheticExampleRequestNamed decodes one frozen synthetic current-message fixture.
func syntheticExampleRequestNamed(name string) dkim2.VerifyRequest {
type vector struct {
Raw string `json:"raw_base64"`
Reverse string `json:"reverse_path_base64"`
Forward []string `json:"forward_paths_base64"`
}
var corpus struct {
Vectors map[string]vector `json:"vectors"`
}
_ = json.Unmarshal(publicExampleCorpus, &corpus)
fixture := corpus.Vectors[name]
raw, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(fixture.Raw)
reverse, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(fixture.Reverse)
forward := make([][]byte, len(fixture.Forward))
for index, encoded := range fixture.Forward {
forward[index], _ = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encoded)
}
return dkim2.NewVerifyRequest(raw, reverse, forward)
}
Output: PERMERROR missing_key current not_evaluated not_evaluated not_present 7 1 body_hash none domain_alignment none envelope none header_hash none key missing_key next_domain none timestamp none rsa-sha256 permerror missing_key
Example (TemporaryProvider) ¶
ExampleVerifier_temporaryProvider demonstrates bounded provider-failure inspection.
package main
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"time"
_ "embed"
dkim2 "github.com/croessner/dkim2"
)
//go:embed testdata/vectors/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-09/public-golden.json
var publicExampleCorpus []byte
type syntheticTemporaryProvider struct{}
// LookupPublicKey returns typed temporary state without exposing a provider cause.
func (syntheticTemporaryProvider) LookupPublicKey(context.Context, dkim2.PublicKeyQuery) (dkim2.PublicKeyResult, error) {
return dkim2.PublicKeyResult{}, dkim2.NewTemporaryProviderError()
}
func main() {
verifier, err := dkim2.NewVerifier(syntheticTemporaryProvider{}, dkim2.WithVerificationClock(func() time.Time { return time.Unix(1700000000, 0) }), dkim2.WithoutSubdomainFromAuthorization())
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("construction error")
return
}
result, err := verifier.Verify(context.Background(), syntheticExampleRequest())
if err != nil {
fmt.Println("caller or API error")
return
}
fact := result.SignatureSets()[0]
fmt.Println(result.State(), result.PrimaryReason())
fmt.Println(fact.Algorithm(), fact.Status(), fact.Reason())
}
// syntheticExampleRequest decodes the frozen synthetic current-message fixture.
func syntheticExampleRequest() dkim2.VerifyRequest {
return syntheticExampleRequestNamed("rsa_pass")
}
// syntheticExampleRequestNamed decodes one frozen synthetic current-message fixture.
func syntheticExampleRequestNamed(name string) dkim2.VerifyRequest {
type vector struct {
Raw string `json:"raw_base64"`
Reverse string `json:"reverse_path_base64"`
Forward []string `json:"forward_paths_base64"`
}
var corpus struct {
Vectors map[string]vector `json:"vectors"`
}
_ = json.Unmarshal(publicExampleCorpus, &corpus)
fixture := corpus.Vectors[name]
raw, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(fixture.Raw)
reverse, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(fixture.Reverse)
forward := make([][]byte, len(fixture.Forward))
for index, encoded := range fixture.Forward {
forward[index], _ = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encoded)
}
return dkim2.NewVerifyRequest(raw, reverse, forward)
}
Output: TEMPERROR provider_temporary rsa-sha256 temperror provider_temporary
func NewVerifier ¶
func NewVerifier(provider PublicKeyProvider, options ...VerifierOption) (*Verifier, error)
NewVerifier constructs a fully initialized current-verification facade.
Construction requires an explicit Draft-09 Section 11.1 choice (local interpretation D9): provider also implements DomainPolicyProvider (as DNSPublicKeyProvider does), WithDomainPolicyProvider is passed, or WithoutSubdomainFromAuthorization is passed. A missing or conflicting choice fails with APIErrorCodeInvalidOption.
func (*Verifier) Assess ¶
func (v *Verifier) Assess(ctx context.Context, request VerifyRequest) (output VerificationAssessment, resultErr error)
Assess classifies complete DKIM2 protocol absence before starting verification.
func (*Verifier) EvaluateReceivedDSN ¶
func (v *Verifier) EvaluateReceivedDSN(ctx context.Context, request ReceivedDSNRequest) (ReceivedDSNEvaluation, error)
EvaluateReceivedDSN evaluates one inbound DKIM2-signed delivery-status notification under Draft-09 Section 16.4 after the caller verified the outer message as an ordinary message with this verifier. It shares the verifier's key provider, limits, clock, and observation sink and adds the tenant-bound local authority carried by the request. The request must carry the observed null reverse path and exactly one forward path. Protocol outcomes are returned in the evaluation; only invalid requests, cancellation, and internal contract violations return a Go error.
func (Verifier) GoString ¶
GoString returns a constant representation without injected provider state.
func (Verifier) MarshalJSON ¶
MarshalJSON rejects serialization of retained verifier dependencies.
func (Verifier) MarshalText ¶
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of retained verifier dependencies.
func (*Verifier) Verify ¶
func (v *Verifier) Verify(ctx context.Context, request VerifyRequest) (output VerifyResult, resultErr error)
Verify delegates chain-authenticated verification and preserves the disjoint result/error contract.
type VerifierHop ¶
type VerifierHop struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
VerifierHop is one immutable authenticated chain record.
func (VerifierHop) BodyAvailability ¶
func (h VerifierHop) BodyAvailability() string
BodyAvailability returns known or unavailable.
func (VerifierHop) CustodyTransition ¶
func (h VerifierHop) CustodyTransition() string
CustodyTransition returns origin, ordinary, next_domain, or terminal_next_domain.
func (VerifierHop) Exploded ¶
func (h VerifierHop) Exploded() bool
Exploded reports authenticated exploded presence.
func (VerifierHop) FeedHere ¶
func (h VerifierHop) FeedHere() bool
FeedHere reports authenticated feedhere presence.
func (VerifierHop) Feedback ¶
func (h VerifierHop) Feedback() bool
Feedback reports authenticated feedback presence.
func (VerifierHop) Format ¶
func (VerifierHop) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting verbs from exposing message-derived facts.
func (VerifierHop) GoString ¶
func (VerifierHop) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without message-derived facts.
func (VerifierHop) HistoryBodyState ¶
func (h VerifierHop) HistoryBodyState() string
HistoryBodyState returns the authenticated historical body state.
func (VerifierHop) HistoryHeaderState ¶
func (h VerifierHop) HistoryHeaderState() string
HistoryHeaderState returns the authenticated historical header state.
func (VerifierHop) HopBinding ¶
func (h VerifierHop) HopBinding() [32]byte
HopBinding returns the verifier-owned record binding.
func (VerifierHop) MessageInstance ¶
func (h VerifierHop) MessageInstance() uint64
MessageInstance returns the authenticated Message-Instance number.
func (VerifierHop) Recipe ¶
func (h VerifierHop) Recipe() VerifierRecipeDescriptor
Recipe returns the immutable Recipe descriptor.
func (VerifierHop) RecipeMode ¶
func (h VerifierHop) RecipeMode() string
RecipeMode returns unchanged or applied.
func (VerifierHop) Sequence ¶
func (h VerifierHop) Sequence() uint64
Sequence returns the authenticated signature sequence.
func (VerifierHop) SignatureAlgorithms ¶
func (h VerifierHop) SignatureAlgorithms() []string
SignatureAlgorithms returns sorted unique successfully verified algorithms.
func (VerifierHop) SignerDomain ¶
func (h VerifierHop) SignerDomain() string
SignerDomain returns the canonical verified signer domain.
func (VerifierHop) String ¶
func (VerifierHop) String() string
String returns a constant representation without message-derived facts.
func (VerifierHop) Valid ¶
func (h VerifierHop) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the hop owns complete cloned evidence.
type VerifierOption ¶
type VerifierOption func(*verifierConfig) error
VerifierOption narrows one validated verifier setting during construction.
func WithDomainPolicyProvider ¶
func WithDomainPolicyProvider(provider DomainPolicyProvider) VerifierOption
WithDomainPolicyProvider selects the conforming Draft-09 Section 11.1 behavior with an explicit Domain Policy Record provider: a subdomain d= makes a parent From Authentic unless the From domain publishes f=strict.
func WithMaxCheckFacts ¶
func WithMaxCheckFacts(limit int) VerifierOption
WithMaxCheckFacts narrows the retained public check-fact limit.
func WithMaxInstanceHashSets ¶
func WithMaxInstanceHashSets(limit int) VerifierOption
WithMaxInstanceHashSets narrows the hash-set limit per Message-Instance field.
func WithMaxRawMessageBytes ¶
func WithMaxRawMessageBytes(limit int) VerifierOption
WithMaxRawMessageBytes narrows the raw RFC 5322 message-size limit.
func WithMaxRecipients ¶
func WithMaxRecipients(limit int) VerifierOption
WithMaxRecipients narrows the current SMTP recipient-count limit.
func WithMaxSignatureFacts ¶
func WithMaxSignatureFacts(limit int) VerifierOption
WithMaxSignatureFacts narrows the retained public signature-set-fact limit.
func WithMaxSignatureSets ¶
func WithMaxSignatureSets(limit int) VerifierOption
WithMaxSignatureSets narrows the signature-set limit per DKIM2-Signature field.
func WithObservationSink ¶
func WithObservationSink(sink ObservationSink) VerifierOption
WithObservationSink injects one bounded nonnormative observation receiver.
func WithVerificationClock ¶
func WithVerificationClock(clock func() time.Time) VerifierOption
WithVerificationClock injects the deterministic time source used by timestamp policy.
func WithoutSubdomainFromAuthorization ¶
func WithoutSubdomainFromAuthorization() VerifierOption
WithoutSubdomainFromAuthorization selects the documented local policy that never uses the upward Authentic From match and never queries a Domain Policy Record. Messages that Draft-09 defines as PASS through a subdomain d= then FAIL with from_not_authentic.
type VerifierProjection ¶
type VerifierProjection struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
VerifierProjection is sealed complete-chain verifier evidence for policy consumers.
func (VerifierProjection) Binding ¶
func (p VerifierProjection) Binding() [32]byte
Binding returns the verifier-owned complete projection binding.
func (VerifierProjection) Draft ¶
func (p VerifierProjection) Draft() string
Draft returns the exact verifier baseline.
func (VerifierProjection) Format ¶
func (VerifierProjection) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting verbs from exposing message-derived facts.
func (VerifierProjection) GoString ¶
func (VerifierProjection) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without message-derived facts.
func (VerifierProjection) Hops ¶
func (p VerifierProjection) Hops() []VerifierHop
Hops returns detached ordered chain records.
func (VerifierProjection) Schema ¶
func (p VerifierProjection) Schema() string
Schema returns the stable projection identity.
func (VerifierProjection) String ¶
func (VerifierProjection) String() string
String returns a constant representation without message-derived facts.
func (VerifierProjection) Valid ¶
func (p VerifierProjection) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the projection is complete and bounded.
type VerifierRecipeDescriptor ¶
type VerifierRecipeDescriptor struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
VerifierRecipeDescriptor is a privacy-minimized authenticated Recipe summary.
func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) AffectedHeaderCount ¶
func (d VerifierRecipeDescriptor) AffectedHeaderCount() int
AffectedHeaderCount returns the coherence count for AffectedHeaders.
func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) AffectedHeaders ¶
func (d VerifierRecipeDescriptor) AffectedHeaders() []string
AffectedHeaders returns sorted unique lower-case header names without values.
func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) BodyMode ¶
func (d VerifierRecipeDescriptor) BodyMode() string
BodyMode returns absent, steps, or unavailable.
func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) ChangeClasses ¶
func (d VerifierRecipeDescriptor) ChangeClasses() []string
ChangeClasses returns sorted unique conservative change classes.
func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) ChangeCount ¶
func (d VerifierRecipeDescriptor) ChangeCount() int
ChangeCount returns the number of normalized change dimensions.
func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) Digest ¶
func (d VerifierRecipeDescriptor) Digest() [32]byte
Digest returns the verifier-owned normalized descriptor binding.
func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) Format ¶
func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting verbs from exposing message-derived facts.
func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) GoString ¶
func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without message-derived facts.
func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) HasHeaderChanges ¶
func (d VerifierRecipeDescriptor) HasHeaderChanges() bool
HasHeaderChanges reports whether any authenticated header dimension is present.
func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) String ¶
func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) String() string
String returns a constant representation without message-derived facts.
func (VerifierRecipeDescriptor) Valid ¶
func (d VerifierRecipeDescriptor) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the descriptor is a closed bounded projection.
type VerifyRequest ¶
type VerifyRequest struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
VerifyRequest contains immutable raw RFC 5322 bytes and independent current SMTP envelope evidence.
func NewVerifyRequest ¶
func NewVerifyRequest(rawMessage, reversePath []byte, forwardPaths [][]byte) VerifyRequest
NewVerifyRequest constructs a request by cloning every caller-owned byte slice.
func (VerifyRequest) Format ¶
func (VerifyRequest) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting from traversing message or envelope bytes.
func (VerifyRequest) ForwardPaths ¶
func (r VerifyRequest) ForwardPaths() [][]byte
ForwardPaths returns independent copies of the current bracketed SMTP forward-paths.
func (VerifyRequest) GoString ¶
func (VerifyRequest) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without message or envelope bytes.
func (VerifyRequest) MarshalJSON ¶
func (VerifyRequest) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects serialization outside the explicitly generated REST request.
func (VerifyRequest) MarshalText ¶
func (VerifyRequest) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of message or envelope bytes.
func (VerifyRequest) RawMessage ¶
func (r VerifyRequest) RawMessage() []byte
RawMessage returns an independent copy of the authoritative RFC 5322 bytes.
func (VerifyRequest) ReversePath ¶
func (r VerifyRequest) ReversePath() []byte
ReversePath returns an independent copy of the current bracketed SMTP reverse-path.
func (VerifyRequest) String ¶
func (VerifyRequest) String() string
String returns a constant representation without message or envelope bytes.
type VerifyResult ¶
type VerifyResult struct {
// contains filtered or unexported fields
}
VerifyResult is an immutable structured current-verification outcome.
func (VerifyResult) CheckCount ¶
func (r VerifyResult) CheckCount() int
CheckCount returns the bounded number of retained check facts.
func (VerifyResult) Checks ¶
func (r VerifyResult) Checks() []CheckFact
Checks returns an independent copy of the bounded check facts.
func (VerifyResult) CustodyStructure ¶
func (r VerifyResult) CustodyStructure() CustodyStructure
CustodyStructure returns separately evaluated structural next-domain coverage.
func (VerifyResult) Draft ¶
func (r VerifyResult) Draft() string
Draft returns the exact DKIM2 draft identifier governing this result.
func (VerifyResult) Format ¶
func (VerifyResult) Format(state fmt.State, _ rune)
Format prevents formatting from traversing sealed or message-derived facts.
func (VerifyResult) GoString ¶
func (VerifyResult) GoString() string
GoString returns a constant representation without sealed or message-derived facts.
func (VerifyResult) HistoricalContent ¶
func (r VerifyResult) HistoricalContent() HistoricalState
HistoricalContent returns the historical content and recipe coverage state.
func (VerifyResult) HistoricalSignatures ¶
func (r VerifyResult) HistoricalSignatures() HistoricalState
HistoricalSignatures returns the historical cryptographic-signature coverage state.
func (VerifyResult) MarshalJSON ¶
func (VerifyResult) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error)
MarshalJSON rejects serialization outside explicit mapped response boundaries.
func (VerifyResult) MarshalText ¶
func (VerifyResult) MarshalText() ([]byte, error)
MarshalText rejects diagnostic serialization of sealed verification facts.
func (VerifyResult) PrimaryReason ¶
func (r VerifyResult) PrimaryReason() ReasonCode
PrimaryReason returns the deterministic highest-precedence bounded reason.
func (VerifyResult) Scope ¶
func (r VerifyResult) Scope() VerificationScope
Scope returns the authenticated verification scope.
func (VerifyResult) SignatureSetCount ¶
func (r VerifyResult) SignatureSetCount() int
SignatureSetCount returns the bounded number of retained signature-set facts.
func (VerifyResult) SignatureSets ¶
func (r VerifyResult) SignatureSets() []SignatureSetFact
SignatureSets returns an independent copy of the bounded signature-set facts.
func (VerifyResult) State ¶
func (r VerifyResult) State() ResultState
State returns one of the four public verification states.
func (VerifyResult) String ¶
func (VerifyResult) String() string
String returns a constant representation without sealed or message-derived facts.
func (VerifyResult) Target ¶
func (r VerifyResult) Target() VerificationTarget
Target returns the current verification target metadata.
func (VerifyResult) Valid ¶
func (r VerifyResult) Valid() bool
Valid reports whether the result is a complete library-owned current-verification aggregate.
func (VerifyResult) VerifierProjection ¶
func (r VerifyResult) VerifierProjection() (VerifierProjection, bool)
VerifierProjection returns detached complete-chain evidence when present.
Source Files
¶
- adapters.go
- authenticator.go
- delivery_status.go
- dns_provider.go
- dns_transport.go
- doc.go
- domain_policy.go
- dsn_propagation.go
- envelope_path.go
- header_from.go
- observation.go
- policy.go
- policy_errors.go
- policy_options.go
- provider_bridge.go
- received_dsn.go
- recorded_chain.go
- replay_facade.go
- signing_authorization.go
- signing_callbacks.go
- signing_errors.go
- signing_facade.go
- signing_identity.go
- signing_limits.go
- signing_next_domain.go
- signing_profile.go
- signing_result.go
- signing_routes.go
- verification_assessment.go
- verifier.go
- verifier_projection.go
- verify_errors.go
- verify_options.go
- verify_provider.go
- verify_request.go
- verify_result.go
Directories
¶
| Path | Synopsis |
|---|---|
|
Package admincontract owns the versioned provider-neutral datasource administration commitment grammar shared with external lifecycle writers.
|
Package admincontract owns the versioned provider-neutral datasource administration commitment grammar shared with external lifecycle writers. |
|
Package authresults owns the bounded local Authentication-Results profile.
|
Package authresults owns the bounded local Authentication-Results profile. |
|
cmd
|
|
|
dkim2-dsn-propagator
module
|
|
|
dkim2-milter
module
|
|
|
dkim2ctl
module
|
|
|
dkim2d
module
|
|
|
Package headerfold restores the fold points of daemon-projected DKIM2 header field values for adapters that write header fields themselves.
|
Package headerfold restores the fold points of daemon-projected DKIM2 header field values for adapters that write header fields themselves. |
|
internal
|
|
|
canonical
Package canonical owns DKIM2 canonical byte transformations and digest result containers for the draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-09 baseline.
|
Package canonical owns DKIM2 canonical byte transformations and digest result containers for the draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-09 baseline. |
|
combine
Package combine owns the Draft-09 AND/OR group structure shared by the Message-Instance h= (Section 9.3) and DKIM2-Signature s= (Section 10.9) tags: an ordered list of groups separated by "|", each an ordered list of sets separated by ",".
|
Package combine owns the Draft-09 AND/OR group structure shared by the Message-Instance h= (Section 9.3) and DKIM2-Signature s= (Section 10.9) tags: an ordered list of groups separated by "|", each an ordered list of sets separated by ",". |
|
cryptodkim2
Package cryptodkim2 owns shared DKIM2 public-key validation and signature verification.
|
Package cryptodkim2 owns shared DKIM2 public-key validation and signature verification. |
|
datasource
Package datasource owns storage-neutral profile and administrative-policy contracts without binding protocol code to provider models.
|
Package datasource owns storage-neutral profile and administrative-policy contracts without binding protocol code to provider models. |
|
datasource/flatfile
Package flatfile decodes strict bounded versioned datasource documents into immutable in-memory snapshots.
|
Package flatfile decodes strict bounded versioned datasource documents into immutable in-memory snapshots. |
|
datasource/memory
Package memory provides the immutable static datasource reference provider.
|
Package memory provides the immutable static datasource reference provider. |
|
datasource/signingprofile
Package signingprofile is the sole bridge from validated datasource results to signing profiles.
|
Package signingprofile is the sole bridge from validated datasource results to signing profiles. |
|
domainname
Package domainname owns the Draft-09 Section 18 conversion of protocol domain names from U-labels to A-labels.
|
Package domainname owns the Draft-09 Section 18 conversion of protocol domain names from U-labels to A-labels. |
|
dsn
Package dsn parses the bounded MIME structure required before DKIM2 delivery-status evidence can be evaluated.
|
Package dsn parses the bounded MIME structure required before DKIM2 delivery-status evidence can be evaluated. |
|
dsn/dsntest
Package dsntest builds deterministic DKIM2-signed messages and RFC 6522 delivery-status reports for received-DSN evaluation tests.
|
Package dsntest builds deterministic DKIM2-signed messages and RFC 6522 delivery-status reports for received-DSN evaluation tests. |
|
instance
Package instance parses Message-Instance header fields for the DKIM2 draft baseline draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-09.
|
Package instance parses Message-Instance header fields for the DKIM2 draft baseline draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-09. |
|
keyresolver
Package keyresolver owns bounded DNS-02 query, TXT transport, key-record, decoding, cache, and coalesced-flight semantics.
|
Package keyresolver owns bounded DNS-02 query, TXT transport, key-record, decoding, cache, and coalesced-flight semantics. |
|
mailbox
Package mailbox owns bounded parsing of RFC 5322 author address lists for DKIM2 From authenticity (Draft-09 Section 11).
|
Package mailbox owns bounded parsing of RFC 5322 author address lists for DKIM2 From authenticity (Draft-09 Section 11). |
|
niliface
Package niliface detects unusable nil-backed interface dependencies.
|
Package niliface detects unusable nil-backed interface dependencies. |
|
observability
Package observability defines bounded library observation events without binding protocol code to a telemetry implementation.
|
Package observability defines bounded library observation events without binding protocol code to a telemetry implementation. |
|
policy
Package policy owns deterministic local decisions over sealed DKIM2 verification facts.
|
Package policy owns deterministic local decisions over sealed DKIM2 verification facts. |
|
provider
Package provider owns the shared, cause-free classification for injected DKIM2 providers and authorizers.
|
Package provider owns the shared, cause-free classification for injected DKIM2 providers and authorizers. |
|
rawmsg
Package rawmsg owns the raw RFC 5322 message representation used by DKIM2 protocol code.
|
Package rawmsg owns the raw RFC 5322 message representation used by DKIM2 protocol code. |
|
recipe
Package recipe strictly parses, applies, and generates bounded DKIM2 message reconstruction recipes for draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-09.
|
Package recipe strictly parses, applies, and generates bounded DKIM2 message reconstruction recipes for draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-09. |
|
replay
Package replay owns storage-neutral replay detection contracts and invariants.
|
Package replay owns storage-neutral replay detection contracts and invariants. |
|
routeplan
Package routeplan owns bounded DKIM2 fanout planning and ticket state.
|
Package routeplan owns bounded DKIM2 fanout planning and ticket state. |
|
service
Package service coordinates bounded current-message verification and maps protocol-core facts into deterministic four-state internal results.
|
Package service coordinates bounded current-message verification and maps protocol-core facts into deterministic four-state internal results. |
|
signature
Package signature parses DKIM2-Signature header fields for the DKIM2 draft baseline draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-09.
|
Package signature parses DKIM2-Signature header fields for the DKIM2 draft baseline draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-09. |
|
signing
Package signing owns shared signing-operation contracts, restrictive limits, usage accounting, and bounded error vocabulary for the DKIM2 draft baseline.
|
Package signing owns shared signing-operation contracts, restrictive limits, usage accounting, and bounded error vocabulary for the DKIM2 draft baseline. |
|
tagvalue
Package tagvalue owns shared DKIM2 tag-list scanning rules.
|
Package tagvalue owns shared DKIM2 tag-list scanning rules. |
|
verify
Package verify coordinates DKIM2 static-key verification contracts.
|
Package verify coordinates DKIM2 static-key verification contracts. |
|
Package provider exposes storage-neutral datasource construction and lookup.
|
Package provider exposes storage-neutral datasource construction and lookup. |
|
flatfile
Package flatfile exposes the explicit flat-file signing provider adapter.
|
Package flatfile exposes the explicit flat-file signing provider adapter. |